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THE STUMBLING BLOCK
The concept of freedom is the stone of stumbling for all
empiricists but at the same time the key to the loftiest
practical principles for critical moralists, who perceive by its





In this Article, I succumb to the temptation to make policy
recommendations. My policy is "Stop making policy recom-
mendations!" Or, to put this more reasonably, legal academia
should realize that policy scholarship should not dominate legal
scholarship as it does now. Jurisprudential, theoretical, and
doctrinal scholarship should have equal prestige and presence in
academia if for no other reason than these forms of scholarship
more closely relate to the practice of law that engages most of our
students. Indeed, I argue that despite prevailing perceptions that
policy-oriented scholarship is pragmatic and hard-headed, other
forms of scholarship have much greater practical application.
I address my critique specifically towards recent trends in law
and economics scholarship, but it is aimed towards policy-oriented
scholarship generally. I also suggest that critical legal scholarship
might be revitalized by a new approach to theory informed by the
Continental speculative tradition originating with the philosophy
of Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel and continuing into the
twentieth century with the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan.
I contrast the thin concept of rationality adopted by both the law
and economics and critical legal studies movements with the
thicker one adopted by speculative theory.
I suggest a reason for both the overwhelming dominance of
policy-oriented scholarship among legal academics and the es-
trangement of so much of legal academia from legal practice. Policy
1. IMMANUELKANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTIcALRFASON 18 (T.K Abbott trans., Prometheus
Books 1996) (1788) [hereinafter KANT, PRACTICAL REASONI.
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scholars address law from the position of the governor-legislatures
and activist judges who write the law in order to further society's
"objective" purposes. They use the law as a tool to achieve a
desired policy. In order to do this, policy scholars must claim an
ability to predict the empirical behavior of those legal actors
subjected to the law. Spontaneous and unpredictable behavior is
therefore anathema to the policy planner. Consequently, they seek
to define rationality as predictable behavior and dismiss the
unpredictable choice of ends as irrational.2 When legal actors
evince behavior that does not comport with this definition of
rationality, policy scholars suggest legal rules designed to
manipulate these actors into behaving in ways closer to those
predicted by their theory.' Policy scholarship thus reflects a
fundamental fear of freedom. In Kant's words, freedom is the
stumbling block on which policy scholarship founders.4
In contrast, speculative theorists and doctrinal scholars, like
practicing attorneys, address the law from the position of the
governed-those subjected to the law's power. They seek to under-
stand how the law affects those subjected to its power in order to
help them use the law to achieve their own "subjective" purposes.
Speculative theory suggests that it is irrational behavior that is
rigidly predictable and that rationality is nothing but the capacity
for pure spontaneity.
In recent years, Richard Posner, the doyen of the law and
economics movement, has loosed a blistering tirade on the use of
neo-Kantian moral theory in legal policymaking.5 This attack is of
a piece with the utilitarian grounds of the neo-classical economics
that Posner preaches. Kant's theories of freedom and rationality are
inextricably linked to his moral theory. Both theories are
antithetical to the economic understanding of rationality which is
limited to ends-means reasoning. Posner is absolutely correct,
therefore, that in order to adopt a theory of economic rationality,
one must also reject Kantian moral theory. Utilitarianism's fear
2. See infra Part II.A. 1.
3. See infra notes 376-406 and accompanying text.
4. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 18.
5. See generally RICHARDA. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
(1999) (hereinafter POSNER, MORAL THEORYI; Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral
and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637 (1998).
266 [Vol. 44:263
THE STUMBLING BLOCK
of freedom and hatred of Kantianism are one and the same.
Nevertheless, despite my promotion of speculative theory in this
Article, I wish to partially defend Posner from the attacks of neo-
Kantians such as Ronald Dworkin.6 The type of detailed normative
policy advice often proffered in the name of neo-Kantianism is
inconsistent with Kantian theory and the speculative tradition it
engendered.
In this Article, I explain why the law and economics movement
has consistently refused to respond seriously to external criticism.
From the perspective of Lacanian discourse theory, law and
economics and speculative theory not only fail to address each
other, they are literally speaking two different languages. Policy-
oriented scholarship speaks what is called the discourse of the
university. Critical theorists, doctrinal scholars, and practicing
attorneys, however, speak the discourse of the hysteric. The two
discourses cannot communicate directly because they presuppose
radically different audiences. Policy scholars speak from the
position of expertise and address law's goals. Critical theorists and
doctrinal scholars speak from the position of the subject subjected
to the law and address law's power. Schematically, each is the other
side-the exact logical reverse-of the other. Consequently, Lacan
argues that although those speaking the university discourse
claim to speak from the position of knowledge, they only produce
alienation, whereas those who speak the hysteric's discourse speak
from the position of alienation and produce knowledge.7
B. Neo-classical Price Theory and Behavioral Economics
The law and economics movement has traditionally been
dominated by the Chicago School neo-classical price theory asso-
ciated with Milton Friedman. Neo-classical price theory makes
predictions based on the assumption that economic subjects act as
though they were economically rational.' Recently, the law and
economics movement has discovered the work of the rival Carnegie
6. See Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998).
7. See infra notes 362-75, 443-62 and accompanying text.
8. See generally Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS
IN POsITIVE ECONOMICS 21-22 (1953).
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School of behavioral economics associated with Herbert Simon.9
Prominent examples of this alternative theory include an article
published by Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler in
the Stanford Law Review' and most of the papers presented at the
New and Critical Approaches to Law and Economics symposium
held at the University of Oregon Law School in March 2000." In
contrast to neo-classical price theory, behavioral economics does not
start with the rationality postulate as an assumption, but instead
makes empirical studies of how economic subjects actually behave.
As Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler have emphasized, behavioral
economists believe that empirical data suggest economic subjects
are only "boundedly rational" in the sense that they consistently
deviate from the neo-classical model of economic rationality in
certain specific, observable ways.' 2
What is so striking, however, is that the lessons most of these
legal scholars purport to draw from bounded rationality are
diametrically opposed to those that Simon intends to teach. Simon
does not start from a preconception that economic rationality, as
classically conceived, is either a superior or paradigmatic form of
reasoning."i Indeed, he thinks it is impossible in the real world. He
9. See generally HERBERT A- SIMON, AN EMPIRICALLY BASED MICROECONOMICS (1997)
[hereinafter SIMON, MICROECONOMICS]; HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED
RATIONALITY: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (1982) [hereinafter
SIMON, BOUNDED RATIONALITY].
10. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998) [hereinafter Jolls et al., BehavioralApproach]. This essay was later
republished as the lead essay in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13 (Cass Sunstein ed.,
2000); see also Christine Jolls, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1593 (1998) [hereinafter Jolls et al.,Theories and Tropes].
11. Symposium, New and Critical Perspectives to Law and Economics, 79 OR. L. REV. 1
(2000).
12. Jolla, et al., Behavioral Approach, supra note 10, at 1476-78.
13. Simon discusses the diverse notions of rationality adopted by different theorists, and
compares them with the rationality postulated in his essays: From Substantive to Procedural
Rationality, METHOD AND APPRAISAL IN ECONOMICS 129 (S.J. Latsis ed., 1976), reprinted in
SIMON, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 9, at 424; Rationality, A DICTIONARY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 573 (J. Gould & W.L. Kolb eds., 1964), reprinted in SIMON, BOUNDED
RATIONALITY, supra note 9, at 405; Theories of Bounded Rationality, DECISION AND
ORGANIZATION 161 (C.B. Radner & R. Radner eds., 1972), reprinted in SIMON, BOUNDED
RATIONALITY, supra note 9, at 408. Psychologist Gregory Mitchell has recently developed a
powerful critique of the behavioral economics movement in legal academia alleging that
much of this scholarship fundamentally misreads or misuses the empirical studies on which
it is supposed to be based. Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously: The
268 [Vol. 44:263
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studies actual market behavior for two reasons. First, he, like
most economists outside of law schools, strongly disagrees with
Friedman's assertion that the empirical accuracy of assumptions
underlying an economic model are irrelevant so long as the model
is a relatively good predictor of behavior.14 Even if one were to
accept arguendo the dubious proposition that prediction is the only
valid test of an economic theory, which Simon and others do not,15
the rationality postulate fails on these grounds; neo-classical
economics is a notoriously poor predictor of actual behavior.'6
Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1907 (2002)
14. "The ultimate goal of a positive science is the development of a theory' or hypothesis'
that yields valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet
observed." Friedman, supra note 8, at 3,7. Friedman asserts that the "widely held view" that
"the conformity of... 'assumptions' to 'reality' is a test of the validity of the hypothesis" is
"fundamentally wrong and productive of much mischief." Id. at 14. He goes even further and
maintains that "[tlo be important ... a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its
assumptions." Id. at 14.
15. Despite Posner's assertions, Friedman's methodology is, in fact, wildly controversial
in economic quarters. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just-So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22
CARDOZO L. REV. 351 (2001) [hereinafter Schroeder, Just-So Stories]. Simon disparages
Friedman's assertion as "the unreality principle." SIMON, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note
9, at 61-62. Mark Blaug condemns it as the F-twist. MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF
ECONOMICS OR How ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 97 (2d ed. 1992). Samuelson calls Friedman's
concept of methodology "a monstrous perversion of science." PAUL A. SAMUELSON, THE
COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 762 (R.C. Merton ed., 1972).
16. For all his talk about prediction, falsification, and testing, Friedman's argument in
favor of the rationality postulate is notoriously lacking in empirical support. For example,
Friedman claims that the maximization-of-returns hypothesis is supported by an"important
body of evidence" culled "from countless applications of the hypothesis to specific problems
and the repeated failure of its implications to be contradicted." Friedman, supra note 8, at
22. Blaug rightfully describes this as "without doubt the most frustrating passage in
Friedman's entire essay because it is unaccompanied by even a single instance of these
'countless applications.' BLAUG, supra note 15, at 101. Friedman's defense is that the
"evidence is extremely hard to document [because] it is scattered...." Friedman, supra note
8, at 22. This answer seems lame at best and disingenuous at worst. See BLAUG, supra note
15, at 101.
Becker points out that when economists talk about the predictions made by the rationality
postulate, they usually have in mind the well-documented phenomenon of downward sloping
demand curves. GARY S: BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 157-58
(1976) [hereinafter BECKER, ECONOMIC APPROACH]. True, research has yet to discover any
meaningful exceptions to the "rule." Id. at 156. As Becker points out, however, this is itself
not a reason to accept the rationality postulate since the phenomena of downward sloping
demand curves is equally consistent with any number of other simpler and less controversial
assumptions (such as the existence of budgetary restraints). Id. at 156-57. "Hence the market
would act as if'it' were rational [i.e., demand curves would be negatively inclined] not only
when households were rational, but also when they were inert, impulsive, or otherwise
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:263
Simon suggests that a model based on more empirically accurate
assumptions is likely to be a superior predictor. 7
Second, Simon believes that one appropriate goal of economics
is to help economic actors achieve their personal economic goals,
18
something that neo-classical price theory neglects. Simon, like
Ronald Coase, questions the assumption that one can derive "real
world" advice from the abstract perfect market assumptions of price
theory.'9 For example, if maximization is impossible in the real
irrational.' Id. at 161.
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler emphasize neo-classical economics' notoriously poor predictive
track records as one of the primary reasons to investigate behavioral economics as an
alterative. See Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach, supra note 10, at 1487-88.
17. For a theory to make good predictions, Simon argues:
[Ilt must be a theory that describes [the operations of firms] realistically, not
an "as if" theory. In beth its descriptive and its normative aspects, it must
describe, and prescribe for, the decision making processes of managers with
close attention to the kinds of knowledge that are attainable and the kinds of
computations that can actually be carried out.
SIMON, MICROECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 63.
18. Id. at 62 (arguing that "we want economic theories ... to help guide the actual
management and operation of firms.").
19. As I argue elsewhere, Ronald Coase similarly disagreed with the neo-classical
assumption that one could give advice in the real world based on perfect market
assumptions. Indeed, a careful reading shows that this disagreement forms the basis of his
famous "Coase Theorem.' I set forth this analysis in Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the
Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1998) [hereinafter
Schroeder, The End of the Market].
For example, neo-classical economists assume that rational producers in a perfect market
seek to maximize their profits and assume that real producers should try to do so as much
as possible. Although law and economics scholars claim to invoke the spirit of Ronald Coase
and his famous "Coase Theorem," Coase himself is particularly critical of the whole notion
of economic rationality generally and the concept of utility maximization specifically. He
states, "There is no reason to suppose that most human beings are engaged in maximizing
anything unless it be unhappiness, and even this with incomplete success." R.H. COASE, THE
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 4 (1988) [hereinafter COASE, THE FIRM]. As I have argued
extensively elsewhere, I believe that the law and economics movement has radically misread
Coase. See Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra, at 483.
As correctly described by Jules L. Coleman, the Coase Theorem can be seen as a definition
of what it is to act economically rationally. Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and
Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221, 225
(1980). "To act rationally ... is to promote allocative efficiency [by, in the cases discussed by
Coase] ... put[ting] resources to their profit-maximizing use." Id.
Coase's point, however, is that economics should cease using ideal models of economic
rationality and perfect markets precisely because they are impossible in the real world.
Rather, he believes (like Simon) that economists should study how economic decisions are
in fact made in the real world. He notes:
One result of this divorce of the theory from its subject matter has been that the
270
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world of imperfect markets and limited information, then it is
equally impossible to try to approximate maximization with
abstract economic models based on perfect markets and infor-
mation. Consequently, so-called economic rationality is in fact
irrational in the colloquial sense of being ineffective, if not outright
crazy. Simon argues that in order for economists to give good advice
they should examine how actual successful and unsuccessful
economic subjects make economic decisions in the real world.
Because a real producer can never have access to the type of perfect
information needed to maximize profits, Simon believes that any
decision process based on an attempt to maximize is doomed to
failure.2' Rather, successful entrepreneurs engage in a form of
common sense that Simon calls "satisficing."21
In contrast, Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler, and many other self-
identified legal economists seek to graft Simon's empirical obser-
vations onto the very aspect of neo-classical economics Simon
rejects-the assumption that economic rationality is a superior
mode of decision making in the "real" world. The policy suggestions
made by Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler, and others are designed to force
economically irrational subjects to act as though they were
economically rational maximizers.2" In their words, although "the
legal system ought always to respect informed choice, ... govern-
ment decisionmakers ... can be relied upon to make better choices
than citizens." ' That is, the experts should tell you not only what
to do, but also what you should want.
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler's position is the reverse or other side
of Simon's. Rather than giving economic subjects information that
the subjects themselves can evaluate to help them make decisions,
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler would have experts make decisions as
entitles whose decisions economists are engaged in analyzing have not been
made the subject of study and in consequence lack any substance.... We have
consumers without humanity, firms without organization, and even exchange
without markets.
COASE, THE FIRM, supra, at 3.
20. See SIMON, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 9, at 369-70.
21. Id. at 219, 417. Blaug describes Simon's theory of "satisficing" as an alternate to the
classical rationality postulate that can be "described as a non-fully-rational theory of
individual action under both certainty and uncertainty." BLAUG, supra note 15, at 233.
22. See infra notes 376-406 and accompanying text.
23. Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach, supra note 10, at 1475 (emphasis added).
20021 271
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:263
to how subjects should act and, if necessary, deceive the subjects
so that they act "appropriately." This is what Lacan called the
university discourse, in which the expert or bureaucrat makes
claims to superior knowledge as a means of veiling and justifying
the exercise of power.24 It is the position of the governor who wishes
to control others, rather than that of the governed who seek to free
themselves and achieve self-control. It represents not merely a fear
of freedom for the experts themselves, but a fundamental hatred of
it in others.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, I briefly describe the
familiar rationality postulate of neo-classic price theory reflected in
mainstream law and economics literature. Second, I contrast it to
the very diverse concept of rationality encountered in speculative
theory. Last, I demonstrate how Lacanian discourse theory offers
both a more coherent critique of policy-oriented scholarship and an
account of why policy scholars are unable to hear their critics.
II. RATIONALITY
The American law and economics movement, based on neo-
classical price theory, posits that legal subjects are economically
"rational."2' This proposition has long been the subject of critique
24. See infra notes 362-75 and accompanying text.
25. As expressed by Blaug:
[TIhe most characteristic feature of neoclassical economics [is], namely, its
insistence on methodological individualism: the attempt to derive all economic
behavior from the action of individuals seeking to maximize their utility,
subject to the constraints of technology and endowments. This is the so-called
rationality postulate, which figures as a minor premise in every neoclassical
argument.
BLAUG, supra note 15, at 229. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law And
Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REV. 147 (2000) [hereinafter Schroeder, Economic
Rationality]. Perhaps this is more accurately expressed as the proposition that if economic
subjects in the aggregate act as though they were economically rational a sufficiently large
percentage of the time, one can make reasonably good economic predictions based on the
assumption that economic subjects act as if they were rational. Friedman, supra note 8, at
21-22.
Blaug emphasizes that this rationality postulate has become so strongly embedded in
economic theory "that some have seriously denied that it is possible to construct any
economic theory not based on utility maximization." BLAUG, supra note 15, at 230. Blaug
contends that this assertion is "obviously" false and cites not merely Marxism but Keynesian
theory as counterexamples. Id.
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from both supporters and opponents of the economic approach to
law.2" Frequently, critics challenge the empirical validity of the
hypothesis and/or its analytic usefulness.27 Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler,
and other scholars sympathetic with the economics movement cite
empirical work done by behavioral economists and argue that the
rationality of economic actors is bounded-that is, people tend to
display economically "irrational" behavior in certain predictable
situations." On moral, philosophic, or aesthetic grounds some
question the extension of the hypothesis of economic rationality
beyond the scope of express market transactions.29 Others question
the particular vision of economic rationality offered by a specific
author.30 In this Article, I do not criticize the rationality postulate
26. "Objections to the national actor model in law and economics are almost as old as the
field itself." Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach, supra note 10, at 1474.
27. I discussed various criticism of, and alternatives to, the rationality postulate as
formulated by Posner and encountered in contemporary law reviews in Schroeder, Economic
Rationality, supra note 25, at 147. I discussed the methodology purportedly adopted by
Friedman and Posner in defending the rationality postulate in Schroeder, Just-So Stories,
supra note 15, at 351.
28. In the words of Simon:
If we regard this model as a description of the actual behavior of some
entrepreneur, we see that if we are to predict his behavior, the knowledge that
he is rational is only a small part--almost an insignificant part--of the
information that we require. His intention to be rational leads to particular
behavior only in the context of conditions in which his behavior takes place....
Indeed, our principal use for such models is in predicting how the
entrepreneur's behavior will be affected by a change in the environment that
conditions or "bounds" his rationality.
SIMON, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 9, at 214.
29. For example, Margaret Jane Radin has gone so far as to condemn the economic
approach even to property law issues as being alienating and destructive of human
flourishing. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 93 (1996). I have
criticized Radin's romanticism extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE
VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY AND THE FEMININE 229-92 (1998)
[hereinafter SCHROEDER, VESTAL]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora'sAmphora: TheAmbiguity
of Gift, 46 UCLA L. REV. 815, 883-98 (1999) [hereinafter Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora];
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Imagery of Personal Property as the
Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REv. 55 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder, Virgin
Territory].
30. Amartya Sen suggests that even among neo-classical economists there is
disagreement as to whether the economic rationality requirement is an axiom to be assumed
or a hypothesis to be falsified. "If today you were to poll economists of different schools, you
would almost certainly find the coexistence of beliefs (i) that the rational behaviour theory
is unfalsifiable, (ii) that it is falsifiable and so far unfalsified, and (ii) [sic] that it is falsifiable
and indeed patently false." AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 91 (1982).
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per se. Instead, I seek to shed some light on the question of why the
rationality postulate is so attractive to some and so objectionable to
others.
One reason might be that the concept of "rationality" adopted by
economists is radically different from that used in certain other
disciplines and philosophical systems. To suggest that this debate
is characterized by a semantic breakdown is not to say that the
differences between the two sides can be reduced entirely to
semantics. Rather, the difference between different definitions of
the term "rationality" reflect either different conceptions of human
nature or different understandings of the goals of legal and
jurisprudential analysis.
A. Economic Rationality
Even mainstream neo-classical Chicago School economists
adopt various definitions of economic rationality which differ in
significant ways. I shall limit myself to the version promulgated by
Posner as the one that has had the greatest impact on legal
scholarship. Because this concept is so familiar, and because I have
covered this ground before,"1 my description shall be brief and shall
serve mainly as an introduction to my subsequent discussion of
speculative rationality which is less well known in legal circles.
1. Rationality as Ends-Means Reasoning
Economic rationality is, according to Posner, instrumental or
ends-means reasoning. 2 Simon has described this definition of
31. See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 25, at 159-85.
32. "[Riationality is the ability and inclination to use instrumental reasoning to get on
in life." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (1992) [hereinafter POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
Blaug describes the neo-classic notion of rationality as follows:
For the economist, ... rationality means choosing in accordance with a
preference ordering that is complete and transitive, subject to perfect and
costlessly acquired information; where there is uncertainty about future
outcomes, rationality means maximizing expected utility, that is, the utility of
an outcome multiplied by the probability of its occurrence.
BLAUG, supra note 15, at 229.
[Vol. 44:263274
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rationality as a form of "substantive" rationality, in the sense that
it is aimed at achieving a specific substantive goal. 3
More accurately, as understood by Posner, economic rationality
does not involve any form of reasoning at all, but may be better
described as ends-means behavior."' Although the colloquial
sense of "rationality" means the use of reason, Posner's concept
completely avoids any notion of conscious cogitation. In Posner's
formulation, "it would not be a solecism to speak of a rational frog"3 5
or rat 6 insofar as these creatures instinctively act in ways that
further their simple ends such as eating and mating. In recent
work, Posner dips into evolutionary theory and locates economic
rationality at the level of the gene, 37 a mindless thing incapable of
even the most rudimentary mental activity, let alone reason.
Indeed, Posner, following Friedman, almost proudly proclaims that
his theory completely lacks psychological content.38
It is usually assumed that economic rationality is equivalent
to "maximization." Once a subject identifies what she wants,
she will act in such a way as to maximize her desideratum. The
desideratum of producers is usually considered to be profit and that
of consumers to be utility (happiness), although Posner has
33. "[Substantive rationality) is concerned only with finding what action maximizes
utility in the given situation, hence is concerned with analyzing the situation but not the
decision-maker.' SIMON, MICROECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 18.
34. "Rationality means little more to an economist than a disposition to choose,
consciously or unconsciously, an apt means to whatever ends the chooser happens to have....
It does not assume consciousness; it certainly does not assume omniscience."
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 17.
35. Id.
36. "Rats are at least as rational as human beings when rationality is defined as
achieving one's ends (survival and reproduction, in the case of rats) at least cost." Richard
A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551
(1998) [hereinafter Posner, Behavioral Economics].
37. Id. at 1561-64, 1570.
38. Friedman dismisses criticisms of the rationality postulate on the grounds that "it
rests on outmoded psychology and must be reconstructed in line with each new development
in psychology." Friedman, supra note 8, at 30. Indeed, Posner thinks that it is a critique of
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler to point out that the behavioral economic approach is
psychological in nature. See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 36, at 1558. As Simon
notes, psychological theory is irrelevant to the neo-classical model of rationality since it does
not depend on an "understanding of human thought processes." SIMON, MICROECONOMICS,
supra note 9, at 18.
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suggested that wealth is or should be the desideratum furthered by
law.39
Most neo-classical economists agree that economic rationality
does not involve a choice of ends.' Ends are deemed to be sub-
jective, idiosyncratic and pre-given.4' Although it is assumed that
consumers wish to maximize their utility, most economists have
nothing to say about what would make any specific consumer
"happy." This is the usual meaning of the clich6 "there is no arguing
about tastes." 2 From this, Posner concludes that economic ratio-
nality is not merely consistent with irrationality, it requires
irrationality in the sense that the desires of economic subjects are
considered to be beyond rational explanation.'
Note what this implies. One's ends (tastes, desires, etc.) are
considered the provenance of pure idiosyncratic subjectivity and are
beyond rational explanation. Neo-classical economics, therefore,
39. As Posner himself notes, wealth maximization has both positive and normative
aspects. The former posits "that the common law is best understood on the 'as if assumption
that judges try to maximize the wealth of society." RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW
172-73 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMNGLAW]. The latter posits "that judges should
interpret... antitrust statutes to make them conform to the dictates of wealth maximization."
Id. at 173; see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DIcTIONARY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 679 (1998). Even Posner now admits that "niot all
questions that come up in law, however, can be effortlessly recast as economic questions."
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra, at 22 (discussing abortion specifically). "In recent years,
Posner has weakened his claim from one that asserted that common law courts should be
exclusively concerned with wealth maximization to one that asserts that wealth
maximization is one of the values that common law courts ought to pursue." Kornhauser,
supra, at 682.
40. Becker is a notable exception-an economist who criticizes his fellow economists for
assuming that preferences are pre-given and, therefore, "independent of both past and future
consumption, and of the behavior of everyone else" when experience shows otherwise. GARY
S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 4 (1996) [hereinafter BECKER, AcCOuNTING FOR
TASTES].
41. As Posner says, "A preference can be taken as a given, and economic analysis proceed
as usual, even if the preference is irrational." Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 36,
at 1554.
42. Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 25, at 210. Becker and Stigler turn this
cichd inside-out and give it a fascinating new meaning. According to them, there is no
arguing about tastes not because they are idiosyncratic, but because they are universal. See
infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
43. Posner states: "[P]references cannot be divorced from emotion, or emotion from their
stimuli, and so instrumental reasoning cannot be thought pervaded with irrationality merely
because a frequent goal of such reasoning is a preference that we would not have if we were
not emotional beings." Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 36, at 1554.
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assumes that freedom and rationality are two very different things.
Rationality (instrumental or ends-means reasoning) can be, but is
not necessarily, a way of implementing one's freedom in the world,
but it is not itself an exercise of freedom.
Indeed, economic rationality is the opposite of freedom.
Economic rationality is in thrall or servitude to irrational ends,
or what Kant calls "pathology."' Posner implicitly recognizes this
when he ascribes economic rationality to rats and frogs, 5 creatures
that, as far as he knows, are not capable of free will, but are
slaves to their biological instinct. Posner even posits that genes,
little automata that mechanically reproduce themselves, are
economically rational. 6
2. The Irrationality of Ends
Notwithstanding claims of legal economists that they have
nothing to say about people's preferences, one should not blindly
trust such self-serving protestations. First, in order to make
an economic model based on ends-means reasoning workable,
economists must by necessity make assumptions or observations
about ends. Traditional economic models are based on the
assumption that economic subjects are self-interested (i.e., that a
consumer's utility will be maximized if she considers her narrow
self-interest). 4'7 Nevertheless, as Posner is the first to point out,
there is no theoretical reason why one could not posit that subjects
might have a "taste" for altruism so that utility maximization could
be other-directed or even self-destructive. 8 Moreover, although it
is usually assumed that individual tastes are independent, one
could theoretically posit that tastes are affected by outside
influences such as sympathy or antipathy towards others. 9 This is,
44. See infra Part II.B.6.
45. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
47. Although this is the traditional model, Posner claims that the "economic analysis of
law ... long ago abandoned the model of hyperrational, emotionless, unsocial, supremely
egoistic, nonstrategic man (or woman)." Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 36, at
1552.
48. Id. at 1557.
49. Id. at 1557-58.
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however, rarely done. Indeed, it is hard to see how assumptions
such as altruism or sympathy can be added to the model without
turning it into a truism.' Adding altruism or sympathy to an
economic model risks making all conceivable behavior rational in
the trivial sense that the actor must have thought his choice was a
good idea at the time, regardless of his later reevaluation.
Although these are points typically associated with critics of
economics, they also form the basis of Gary Becker and George
Stigler's attempt to formulate a "new home economics"51 that con-
ceptualizes households as producers, rather than consumers, of
utility.52 As Stigler and Becker recognize, the traditional economic
insistence that tastes are irrational creates an irreconcilable
conflict with neo-classical economics' traditional goal of predicting
economic behavior.53 If rational people are supposed to act instru-
mentally to achieve their preferences, then one cannot predict their
actions unless one can predict their preferences. This observation
raises an implicit but fundamental paradox in neo-classical
economics' relationship to the concept or ideal of free will.
Legal academic scholarship tends to accept Posner and
Friedman's assertion that, as a science, the only valid test of an
economic theory is accurate prediction, even if this theory is wildly
controversial among other economists and philosophers of science.
This, of course, helps to explain the overwhelming acceptance of law
and economics within legal academia. If, as I have suggested, many
legal scholars see their task as policy science, then they need to be
able to predict what the likely effects of their advice might be. Neo-
classical economics claims to be precisely the type of predictive tool
that policymakers need.
In order to give advice as to what level of law making or other
government intervention is appropriate for society one must be able
50. Sen is probably the most noted economist who has written extensively on this issue.
See SEN, supra note 30, at 92.
51. BLAUG, supra note 15, at 220.
52. Id.
53. To paraphrase their argument, if economists refuse to account for tastes, they are in
effect, giving up on making economics into a true predictive science. Slight changes in
assumptions about tastes will result in radically different predictions, and if one's predictions
turn out to be inaccurate, any and all observed anomalies can be retroactively justified by
reference to changes in tastes. See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est
Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977).
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to predict the likely results of one's proposals and compare them
to the likely results of alternatives. Even if one assumes that
people are economically rational, one still cannot predict individual
behavior unless one first knows people's goals. Moreover, if society's
goal is to maximize the aggregate utilities of its individual
members, one cannot even pretend to give policy advice unless one
first determines what these individual utilities are likely to be.
In other words, the very goals of predictability, which are a
necessary part of policy science generally and utilitarianism spe-
cifically, require that one break down the barrier protecting the
privacy of tastes that is libertarianism's definition of negative
freedom. One must treat these tastes as predictable and "objective"
and not as free and "subjective."
As I discuss below,54 the "new" legal economists take a further
step beyond merely realizing that their policy science requires that
they identify, predict, and thereby restrain the freedom to choose
one's individual ends. The behavioral economists' proposition that
economic rationality is bounded suggests that economic subjects are
not necessarily able to choose the best means to their ends. Jolls,
Sunstein, Thaler, and the participants in the Oregon symposium,
however, teeter on taking a step further. If information is limited
and rationality is bounded, then perhaps economic subjects are not
merely incapable of choosing their means, but are also incompetent
in identifying their true desires. The policies proposed by these
scholars come close to recommending that experts not merely
manipulate the means that individuals choose, but manipulate the
choice of ends as well!
3. The Natural and the Positive
Surprisingly, the approach of utilitarianism (and romanticism)
to the relationship between subjectivity and individual rights is
half-way between that of libertarianism and Hegelianism.
Libertarianism sees both the legal subject and certain basic
legal rights as natural. The legal subject is the self-identical,
54. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.a, III.B.2.b.
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autonomous individual who has the right to life, liberty, and prop-
erty in the state of nature.55
The intuitive appeal of this approach is obvious. It claims to
protect certain cherished rights as inviolable. Any existing regime
of positive law can be justified only insofar as it respects these basic
rights imposed by natural law.5" The problem with this approach,
however, is that it is hard to imagine what it could mean to have
rights, particularly the right to property, in a state of nature prior
to the formation of a legal regime.
As Hohfeld famously noted, rights can only be conceptualized
with respect to other legal subjects-I have rights against another
person or persons that will be recognized and enforced by other
persons.57 Rights can, therefore, only exist within the inter-
subjective context of a given society, i.e., a given legal regime. This
observation leads to the classic criticism of libertarianism. The
natural right to property serves as the bulwark that protects the
private individual from the violence of the state, but by necessity,
it is the state that sets the scope of individuals' property rights."
55. For a brief account of the history of the idea of natural law from classical Greece
through the Enlightenment, see COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 1-109 (2000).
56. Ofcourse, libertarians recognize that any specific legal regime is merely positive, not
natural. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of a regime of positive law depends on its consistency
with a minimal set of natural rights. For example, the libertarian right to property is
arguably protected by the positive law of the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam To-Day: On the
Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence, 84 GEO. L.J. 1531 (1996) [hereinafter Schroeder,
Never Jam To-Day].
57. See WESLEYNEwCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN
LEGAL REASONING 65 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919). I raised this objection to the
libertarian conception of natural rights in Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra note 19,
at 502-03 and in Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra note 29, at 862-63.
58. See, for example, Jennifer Nedelsky's discussion of the paradox of libertarian
tradition in the context of the U.S. Constitution:
How can "the tradition" be characterized by both coherence and endurance and
by an apparently unlimited mutability in the purported core of the structure?
The paradox itself suggests the answers: it is the myth of property-its
rhetorical power combined with the illusory nature of the image of
property-that has been crucial to our system. And it is this mythic quality that
current changes [i.e., disaggregation] in the concept may threaten.
JENNIFERNEDELsKY, PRIVATE PROPERTYAND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 224 (1990).
As I have written extensively elsewhere this paradox is the reason for the famous
incoherence of takings jurisprudence under the U.S. Constitution. See SCHROEDER, VESTAL,
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Utilitarianism shares libertarianism's belief that the legal
subject is natural. Legal subjects' preferences are "pre-given" in the
sense that their preferences are external to the law. Utilitarianism
deems legal rights to be merely a means of achieving the ends of
maximum aggregate utility. This approach obviously has the
advantage of solving the libertarian paradox of rights. One problem
with this approach, however, is that it makes rights contingent
(and therefore merely privileges). Another classic reproach to
utilitarianism is moral monstrousness. If utilitarianism's only
standard is aggregate utility, then it would have to support any
number of monstrous institutions such as slavery or torture if it
could be shown that the aggregate pleasure experienced by the
masters or sadists exceeded the pain suffered by the slaves and
torture victims. 5
9
Moreover, this criticism reveals an internal inconsistency
within utilitarian theory. Utilitarian law is supposed to reflect the
natural preferences of the appropriate populace, but utilitarianism
has no theory of preferences. As Posner correctly notes, legal
economists have been forced to abandon as empirically inaccurate
supra note 29, at 293-99, 312-21; Schroeder, Never Jam To-Day, supra note 56, at 1531-34,
1544-57, 1562-69. As Nedelsky states:
The idea of boundaries and of a sharp distinction between law and politics has
been central to the American conception of limited government. Property was
for 150 years the quintessential instance of rights as boundaries. It has been
the symbol and source of a protected sphere into which the state cannot enter.
NEDELSKY, supra, at 8. Similarly, Vandevelde notes:
Property and its counterpart, sovereignty, have been understood as generic
terms for, respectively, the collection of freedoms held by the individual and the
collection of powers held by the state. In very real terms, the concept of
property has marked the boundaries of individual freedom and the limits of
state power.
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property ofthe Nineteenth Century: The Development of the
Modern Concept of Property, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 325, 328 (1980). "Therefore a concept of
property is necessary to render the Constitution an effective safeguard against excessive
governmental interference with individual life." Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of
Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1409 (1991).
59. Indeed, Posner gives moral monstrousness as one of the reasons he rejects utility as
the desideratum of law and proposes wealth maximization as an alternative. "I reject
utilitarianism because of its problems of measurement (how is one to measure subjective
satisfaction objectively?), of boundaries (whose satisfactions are to count?), and of 'moral
monstrousness' (how should we weight the satisfactions of the criminal and the
unproductive?)." Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and
Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 251 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Value].
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the traditional utilitarian vision of the legal subject as the self-
interested, autonomous individual.6' Posner has also recently
questioned whether the legal subject is even self-identical.6 ' As I
discuss elsewhere, it is not clear what is left.62
I believe that one reason that the critical left's attempted
assault on the law and economics movement was so unsuccessful
is that most self-identified "critical legal studies" scholarship is
characterized by what I call romanticism." Romanticism can be
seen as a barren hybrid achieved by crossing the libertarian and
utilitarian instincts. The romantic shares with the libertarian and
the utilitarian the liberal intuition that the subject is natural. The
romantic, like the utilitarian, recognizes that law can only be
positive, yet, like the libertarian, longs for a "natural" state prior to
positive law in which the natural person could breathe free. The
utilitarian emphasizes the use of positive law as a tool to achieve
society's goals (i.e., aggregate utility). The romantic concludes that
positive law is a tool of repression because it ignores the happiness
of any specific individual. The romantic sees moral monstrousness
not as a theoretical problem of utilitarian philosophy, but as a
necessary, if banal, everyday evil of a policy-oriented law. In other
words, the romantic agrees with the basic propositions of utili-
tarianism, but merely comes to a different moral evaluation of its
implications. Unfortunately, the romantic's agenda of a society
without law as we know it seems impossible. As a result, roman-
ticism generally, and critical legal studies specifically, fail as
effective critique of utilitarianism.
In contrast, speculative theory can serve as an alternative to
utilitarianism. Hegelian legal theory shares utilitarianism's critique
of natural rights. Rights are not natural, but human inventions that
can only exist in a legal regime. As discussed below, however,
speculative theory also rejects the liberal presupposition that the
legal subject is natural.6 4 Subjectivity is as much a human artifact
60. See id. at 247; infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
62. See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 25, at 149-52.
63. I have developed this argument more fully in Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra
note 29, at 883-98, and in JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF
THE MARKET (forthcoming 2003) (hereinafter SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS].
64. See infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
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as law. Speculative theory, therefore, both rejects the utilitarian
conclusion of completely contingent rights and the romantic
dream that the individual can achieve freedom if released from
the law's chains. Hegelian theory views legal rights and legal
subjectivity as mutually constitutive; one cannot exist without
the other." Legal rights, being artificial, can be changed as an
empirical matter, but one cannot abrogate rights without radically
changing the individual subject.6 6 This Hegelian analysis will
eventually lead to the psychoanalytic theory of the necessary
interrelationship between the split subject and what will be called
the big Other (i.e., the symbolic order of law, language, and
sexuality) which is the focus of a later section of this Article. 7
B. Speculative Rationality
In this section, I introduce the concept of rationality encoun-
tered in speculative philosophy and critical theory. Because the
speculative tradition begins with Kant, I have chosen to give a brief
account of certain aspects of his theories of rationality, freedom,
and morality as found in his first two critiques and The Metaphysics
of Morals."
65. SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 20-24.
66. In other words, legal rights are artificial, but not arbitrary, in the sense that they are
created to serve a function-the creation of legal subjectivity. Arbitrarily to change these
rights in such a way as to abrogate their function would be self-defeating. To resort to
metaphor, a house is artificial but its structure is not arbitrary because it has been created
to serve a function--shelter. Although one can make many changes in the house, one cannot
arbitrarily make certain changes (such as filling in the foundation, knocking down the weight
bearing walls, etc.) that would cause the house to collapse and defeat its function.
67. See infra Part III.A.5.
68. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans. & ed., 1996)
[hereinafter KANT, MORAIS]. I do not purport to give a comprehensive account or a definitive
interpretation of these extremely complex theories. I cannot hope to winnow an entire
intellectual tradition down to a few law review pages. Indeed, as Henry Allison suggests "it
is also no exaggeration to state that Kant's theory of freedom is the most difficult aspect of
his philosophy to interpret, let alone defend." HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT'S THEORY OF
FREEDOM 1 (1990). What I hope to do is to present sufficient information to illustrate the
fundamental difference between the speculative and economic understanding of rationality,
and the interrelationship among rationality, freedom, and morality.
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1. Negative Freedom as Liberty
For Kant, rationality, freedom, and spontaneity are, if not
identical, so closely interrelated that one cannot conceive of one
without the others. They form a sort of Holy Trinity-three
separate concepts that are yet one unity. Kant, of course, recognizes
that rational persons necessarily engage in instrumental reasoning,
but he does not reduce rationality to consequentialism. His entire
oeuvre on rationality can be seen as an attack on utilitarianism
avant la lettre.
Kant introduced his concept of freedom and its necessary
condition to rationality in his first critique, The Critique of Pure
Reason, as part of his analysis of the four antinomies. 69 Kant
argues that reason leads to two equally persuasive, yet mutually
inconsistent, conclusions on four fundamental cosmological issues.70
Each antinomy consists of a dogmatic thesis derived by reason
purely from a priori propositions, and an empirical antithesis
drawn from reason and applied to experience.71
Each thesis and its antithesis are supported by apogogic
reasoning, "that is, each side attempts to establish its case by
demonstrating the impossibility of the alternative. Thus, the
operative assumption shared by both sides is that the opposing
claims are contradictories."" Kant believes that these conflicting
positions will lead to the "euthanasia of reason,"73 which can only
be overcome by skepticism.' Kant's skeptical criticism leads to the
resolution that the thesis and antithesis of each antinomy exist in
"dialectical opposition" to each other.75
It is Kant's third antinomy that concerns us. The thesis is:
"Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only causality
operating to originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of
69. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., 1900)
[hereinafter KANT, PURE REASON].
70. Id. at 235-36.
71. See id. at 262-70; ALLISON, supra note 68, at 13.
72. ALLISON, supra note 68, at 14.
73. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 69, at 231.
74. See id. at 275-78.
75. ALLISON, supra note 68, at 13.
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freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena." 76
The antithesis is: "There is no such thing as freedom, but every-
thing in the world happens solely according to the laws of nature."
77
The issue at stake here is "whether I am a free agent, or, like other
beings, am bound in the chains of nature and fate."7 8
Kant purports to resolve this antinomy by showing "that no real
contradiction exists between [the thesis and the antithesis], and
that, consequently, both may be true."79 By doing so, Kant claims to
show the possibility, if not the necessity, of free will.'
Kant's resolution, and his resulting analysis of the inter-
relationship among rationality, freedom, and spontaneity, is based
on his distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself
or noumenon. The phenomenon is the empirical or sensible world
of our experience, while the noumenon is the essential or
intelligible world with which we have no direct experience.8 ' An
explanation and defense of these notoriously difficult concepts is
beyond the scope of this Article.82 Nevertheless, I am hopeful that
76. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 69, at 252.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 263. The questions raised by the other three antinomies are:
whether the world has a beginning and a limit to its extension in space;
whether there exists anywhere, or perhaps, in my own thinking Self an
indivisible and indestructible unity-or whether nothing but what is divisible
and transitory exists; ... whether, finally, there is a supreme cause of the world,
or all our thought and speculation must end with nature and the order of
external things.
Id.
79. Id. at 316. The third, along with the fourth (concerning the existence of God) are the
two "dynamical" antinomies which are solved in this fashion. Kant resolves the first two
"mathematical" antimonies by showing that neither are true. Id. at 298-99; ALLISON, supra
note 68, at 13-14.
80. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 69, at 313.
81. As Robert Merrihew Adams puts it:
[Kant] argues, on the one hand, that we can know that any world that we can
experience must necessarily conform to certain principles of mathematics and
natural philosophy, connected with these forms and concepts; and on the other
hand, that since our knowledge of the experienced world is so profoundly
shaped by the needs of our cognitive faculties, we cannot reasonably take it as
knowledge of things as they are in themselves [i.e., noumenal, but only of
things as they must and do appear to us [i.e., phenomena].
Robert Merrihew Adams, Introduction to IMMANUEL. KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON vii, ix (Allen Wood ed. & George Di Giovanni trans., 1998).
82. As Adams notes, his explanation "is a gross oversimplification of a famously complex
argument, but ... it will do for present purposes." Id. at n.3.
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the distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenon will
become apparent in the context of the foregoing discussion.
Kant decides that the empirical antithesis, i.e., that everything
is caused (and freedom does not exist), is true of nature or
phenomena.' He states, "if phenomena are things in themselves,
freedom is impossible. In this case, nature is the complete and all-
sufficient cause of every event.8 4 But, according to Kant, the
universal natural rule of causality does not apply to noumena,
which are not empirical but only intelligible.85
One might be tempted to derive from these propositions the
conclusion that freedom is only of theoretical interest because
it cannot exist in the sensible world in which we live. Insofar as
each person is an empirical individual (i.e., a human animal), she
is herself a phenomenon who is bound by the chains of nature.8
Even if the soul were free in heaven, how could man be free on
earth? To pose this issue in Kantian terminology, is freedom merely
transcendental, or can it also be made practical?
The fundamental Kantian distinction between the noumenon
and the phenomenon might suggest either that the existence of
transcendental freedom at the noumenal level explains nothing
about practical freedom's existence at the phenomenal level or that
the existence of transcendental freedom implies by negative
pregnant the nonexistence of practical freedom. Kant's point in the
Critique of Pure Reason, however, was precisely to show that
practical freedom is possible. He left it to his second critique, the
Critique of Practical Reason,8 7 to try and demonstrate that practical
83. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 69, at 305.
84. Id. at 302.
85. Id.
86. "Man is a phenomenon of the sensuous world, and at the same time, therefore, a
natural cause, the causality of which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must
possess an empirical character, like all other natural phenomena." Id. at 307.
87. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1.
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freedom necessarily flows from the concept of transcendental
freedom. 8
Kant's theory is that there is a necessary relationship between
phenomena and noumena. "If... phenomena are held to be, as they
are in fact, nothing more than mere representations, connected with
other[s] in accordance with empirical laws, they must have a
ground which is not phenomenal." 9 Indeed, he thinks that this
relationship is definitional. The noumenon is the thing-in-itself;
the phenomenon is a mere representation of something else. If
a phenomenon were not the representation of something else,
it would be a thing-in-itself, i.e., a noumenon rather than a phenom-
enon. But "[pihenomena-not being things in themselves- must
have a transcendental object as a foundation, which determines
them as mere representations."9° In other words, each phenomenon
refers to, and depends on, an underlying noumemon.
If one accepts this proposition, then "there seems to be no
reason why we should not ascribe to this transcendental object, in
addition to the property of self-phenomenization, a causality whose
effects are to be met with in the world of phenomena, although it is
not itself a phenomenon." 1 In other words, although all phenom-
ena, being natural, must have a cause, this cause does not have
to be phenomenal. It might be possible for a phenomenon to have
a noumenal cause. The noumenon is the uncaused cause of the
phenomenon. Kant asks, "Is it not ... possible that, although every
effect in the phenomenal world must be connected with an
empirical cause, according to the universal law of nature, this
empirical causality may be itself the effect of a non-empirical and
intelligible causality-its connection with natural causes remaining
nevertheless intact?"92 In other words, although freedom, if it exists,
would be noumenal, not phenomenal, noumenal freedom could have
88. Whether Kant, despite his disclaimers, did attempt to show that freedom is necessary
as well as possible in the Critique of Practical Reason and whether Kant was successful in
his argument for the existence of a meaningful concept of practical freedom, are matters of
dispute among Kantian scholars. See generally ALLISON, supra note 68 (reviewing the
debates among Kantian scholars regarding Kant's argument for the existence of practical
freedom).
89. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 69, at 302.
90. Id. at 303.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 306.
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practical effects in the phenomenal world despite the laws of
nature. Most importantly, freedom could have a role in human
action. Although man as an empirical creature is phenomenal, he
is not merely phenomenal. The essence of the Kantian subject is
noumenal.93 In Christian terms, man is soul as well as body. "He
is thus to himself, on the one hand, a phenomenon, but on the
other hand in respect of certain faculties, a purely intelligible
object-intelligible, because its action cannot be ascribed to sens-
uous receptivity. These faculties are understanding and reason." 4
As Robert Merrihew Adams characterizes Kant's argument:
How then can the demands of empirical knowledge be reconciled
with the demands of morality? Kant's answer, in a nutshell, is
that both can be satisfied if we are subject to causal
determinism as phenomena (as we appear to ourselves and to
each other) but free from causal determination as noumena (as
we are in ourselves). We cannot be experienced (not even by
ourselves) except as subject to a thoroughgoing causal
determinism; but since objects of experience as such are only
phenomena, it does not follow that we are causally determined
as we are in ourselves. As a phenomenon the self is causally
determined, but as a noumenon the self of the same person can
still be the free agent that morality requires.95
In other words, although Kant will prove to be the father of
speculative thought, he is still a liberal philosopher who believes
in a prelegal subject. Where Kant differs from other forms of
liberalism, however, is that he sharply distinguishes the essential
and the natural. Whereas libertarianism, utilitarianism, and
romanticism believe that man is naturally free, Kant believes that
man is free despite nature which is fundamentally unfree.
93. As a self-identified feminist, I have long opposed the general use of the term "man"
to designate humanity generally, for the usual reasons. Nevertheless, in the context of
discussing Kantian philosophy, on the one hand I find some available substitutes such as
'person" and "mankind" too abstract and lacking in emotional resonance. The word "man"
better captures Kant's conception that humans are not merely disembodied noumena, but
actual concrete, phenomenal creatures. On the other, I find that the connotations of the term
"human" seems to place too much emphasis on our biological reality and too little on the
spiritual.
94. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 69, at 307.
95. Adams, supra note 81, at x.
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2. Positive Freedom as Spontaneity
We are now in a position to consider what Kant means by
freedom and how it is necessarily related to his conception of
reason. So far we have encountered freedom as a purely negative
entity-as the absence of natural causality. Kant argues that
freedom from natural causality is possible because noumena can
affect phenomena.96 The noumenal aspect of man is his reason.
Consequently, if human noumenal rationality can cause the
phenomenon of human action, then practical freedom is more than
the mere negative freedom to slip loose the causal chains of nature.
There could be a positive aspect of freedom as the uncaused cause
of action in the world, i.e., spontaneity. Reason, as a noumenon, is
equivalent to positive freedom. Kant concludes:
That reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least
we are compelled so to represent it, is evident from the
imperatives, which in the sphere of the practical we impose on
many of our executive powers. The words I ought express a
species of necessity, and imply a connection with grounds which
nature does not and cannot present to the mind of man.
Understanding knows nothing in nature but that which is, or
has been, or will be. It would be absurd to say that anything in
nature ought to be other than it is in the relations of time in
which it stands.9"
Paradoxically, Kant's concept of the "ought" as obedience to the
moral law, is the source of, if not equivalent to, freedom understood
as spontaneity. Reason, freedom, law, and morality are inextricably
linked. Consequently, Posner's recent vociferous attack on Kantian
moral theory is perhaps an inevitable consequence of his life-long
fear of Kantian freedom.98
Since reason can contemplate what ought to be, reason can
contemplate that things could be other than they are. Kant believes
this conception of reason implies that man is capable of the volition
to act and change things.9 "[Tihe idea of an ought or of a duty
96. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
97. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 69, at 307.
98. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
99. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 69, at 308.
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indicates a possible action, the ground of which is a pure con-
ception; while the ground of a merely natural action is, on the
contrary, always a phenomenon."'O° The noumenon of reason can
cause the phenomenal effect of human action; freedom is not merely
transcendental, but practical. 10 1
Reason is not merely the cause of freedom in the negative sense
of lacking natural constraints, but rather it becomes a positive
conception of freedom as spontaneity-the ability to change and
remake the world. "Reason will not follow the order of things
presented by experience, but, with perfect spontaneity, rearranges
them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical con-
ditions to agree."0 2 In his later work, Kant refers to negative
freedom as autonomy or independence and positive freedom as self-
legislation. 0 3
From this brief analysis, we can see the two ways that the
speculative conception of reason differs from economic rationality.
First, economic rationality is merely the characteristic behavior of
natural creatures (and genes) to act in ways that further their
desires. Economic rationality does not, therefore, necessarily
require conscious thought. Kantian reason is the intelligible
cognition that separates man from nature. There are no rational
frogs or rats in Kant's universe. Second, economically rational
behavior is supposed to be rigidly predictable. Kantian reason is, in
fact, nothing but the capacity for pure spontaneity. This is not to
suggest that all human actions are free and spontaneous; empirical
men are phenomenal and are also subject to natural causes. 0 4 At
this point, Kant only argues that some degree of human freedom is
theoretically possible. The practical expression of human freedom
comprises one of the primary themes of Kant's second critique, the
Critique of Practical Reason. 105 In this work we encounter the third
difference between economic and speculative rationality, the
relationship between rationality and instrumental ends-means
reasoning.
100. Id.
101. 'Thus the volition of every man has an empirical character, which is nothing more
than the causality of his reason." Id. at 309.
102. Id. at 308.
103. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 49.
104. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 69, at 310.
105. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1.
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3. Can Freedom Be Practical?
For Kant, reason is "practical" insofar as it "can of itself deter-
mine the will independently of anything empirical."'" Practical
reason is reason that causes human action (i.e., has an effect in the
phenomenal world). In other words, the title of the second critique,
The Critique of Practical Reason, indicates that it is intended to be
a critical analysis of whether freedom can exist in the empirical
world.
The second critique is a consideration of one of the crucial issues
remaining from the first critique. The first critique argued that it
is theoretically possible for noumena to cause phenomenal effects.
The second critique considers whether they in fact do so. Because
reason and freedom are either identical or inextricably linked, it is
necessary to ask whether man, who is free in theory, can also be
free in practice. As Kant states in the preface to the second critique:
With th[e] faculty [of pure reason], transcendental freedom is
also established; freedom, namely in that absolute sense in
which speculative reason required it in its use of the concept of
causality in order to escape the antinomy into which it
inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries to
think the unconditioned. Speculative reason could only exhibit
this concept (of freedom) problematically as not impossible to
thought, without assuring it any objective reality, and merely
lest the supposed impossibility of what it must at least allow to
be thinkable should endanger its very being and plunge it into
an abyss of skepticism." 7
The goal of this inquiry is to demonstrate the actuality of pure
reason by showing that it has empirical effects and therefore is
practical.0 8 Freedom is "the keystone of the whole system of pure
reason."'" Consequently, the possibility of reason will be "proved by
the fact that freedom actually exists, for this idea is revealed by the
moral law."10 "[I1f we can now discover means of proving that
106. Id. at 59.
107. Id. at 13-14.
108. Id. at 13.
109. Id. at 14.
110. Id.
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[freedom] does in fact belong to the human will ... then it will not
only be shown that pure reason can be practical, but that it alone,
and not reason empirically limited, is indubitably practical."'
Consequently, in the second critique Kant attempts to argue that
there are good reasons to believe that practical freedom, and
therefore the capacity for morality, does in fact exist.
In the course of analyzing practical reason, Kant says many
harsh things about the empiricist's conception of ends-means
reasoning and what is known today as utilitarianism. He does not,
however, condemn ends-means reasoning in all situations.
Instrumental reasoning is obviously an important component of
cognition, which is absolutely necessary for every day pragmatic
decisions. Kant's conception of the moral law, known as the
categorical imperative, is noumenal, not phenomenal. Pragmatic
reasoning is, therefore, necessary in providing the substantive
empirical content necessary to make concrete decisions.
Kant's entire concept of "maxims" reflects a conception of ends-
means reasoning that is quite different from Posner's. According to
Kant, man does not act blindly out of instinct like a frog or rat.
Even when man follows his inclinations, he makes choices as to
what to do. These choices as to what behavior to follow are
"maxims." In Allison's words:
The crucial point here is that ... the empirical character [of
human behavior] involves not simply a disposition to behave or
to respond in certain predictable ways in given situations but a
disposition to act on the basis of certain maxims, to pursue
certain ends, and to select certain means for the realization of
these ends.112
Kant's point is that even practical reasoning, which is a form of
freedom as spontaneity, cannot be reduced to mere ends-means
reasoning, which is a form of servitude. Although one uses ends-
means reasoning when one chooses how to implement one's maxim,
the adoption of maxims is the choice of ends, not means. Moreover,
rationality consists not merely of a choice of maxims (which always
involve ends-means reasoning), but also a choice of what Kant
111. Id. at 26.
112. ALLISON, supra note 68, at 33.
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calls "laws" (objective rules), which, if moral, are totally non-
instrumental and are adopted regardless of their anticipated
consequences. Moreover, Kant purports to show that conse-
quentialism cannot serve as a moral principle, even when the
desired consequence is the substantively good goal of the greatest
happiness for the greatest number of people (utilitarianism).
Kant's argument states that as a rational being, man acts in
accordance with his will rather than by pure animal instinct. Man
thus makes choices, or in Kantian terminology, adopts maxims that
govern his behavior. Kant distinguishes between laws and maxims
as follows:
Practical principles are propositions which contain a general
determination of the will, having under it several practical
rules. They are subjective, or Maxims, when the condition is
regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will, but are
objective, or practical laws, when the condition is recognized as
objective, that is, valid for the will of every rational being.113
Maxims are therefore subjective in the sense that they are
idiosyncratic to an individual subject. Laws are objective in the
sense that they are generally applicable to all subjects (i.e.,
intersubjective). This distinction looks forward to Kant's famous
"categorical imperative," or universal moral law: "Act so that the
maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a
principle of universal legislation."114
4. The Problem with Utilitarianism
Rather than proceeding directly to a discussion of the
categorical imperative, Kant first considers, and then rejects,
utilitarianism as a governing principle. Of course, Kant, writing in
the 1780s, could not address utilitarianism per se for the obvious
reason that Jeremy Bentham would not coin the term and
articulate its principles until the next century. Instead, Kant
addresses the empiricist philosophical tradition through the work
113. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 31.
114. Id. at 46; see also KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at 17 ("[Alct upon a maxim that can
also hold as a universal law.').
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of David Hume." 5 The salient points of this philosophic approach
are substantially similar to those of modern utilitarianism and
consequently, neo-classical price theory adopted by the law and
economics movement.116 Consequently, I anachronistically refer to
the position Kant rejects as "utilitarianism."
Kant's criticism of utilitarianism is markedly different from
that found in most contemporary legal literature. Critics usually
attack utilitarianism on a number of substantive grounds. The most
familiar of these is moral monstrousness. If society's only moral
principle requires the greatest good equal the greatest happiness,
then any number of unspeakable crimes would be permitted if the
aggregate pleasure of the sadistic onlookers outweighed the pain of
the victim." 7 Kant cannot use this criticism because it objects to the
substantive content of utilitarianism. In contrast, Kant famously
makes morality a purely procedural principle, totally devoid of
substantive content. 118 Kant distinguishes the right (what one ought
to do because it is the moral law) from the good (what one wants to
do because it will have a desired beneficial effect). Consequently,
Kant cannot use a substantive argument to defeat a candidate for
a moral law, but must develop a purely formal one.
Kant starts by agreeing with a number of propositions basic
to utilitarianism. Kant agrees that rational beings seek to fulfill
their preferences," 9 and to increase, if not maximize, their utility.'
20
115. Indeed, the quote at the head of this Article was addressed specifically to Humean
empiricism. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 23-24.
116. For example, Kant attributes to epicureanism the principles that '[t]o be conscious
that one's maxims lead to happiness is virtue ... Prudence was equivalent to morality." KANT,
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 136. 'The Epicurean maintained that happiness was the
whole summum bonum, and virtue only the form of the maxim for its pursuit, viz., the
rational use of the means for attaining it." Id. at 137.
117. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth
Maximization, 1999 WIS. L. REv. 687, 697 [hereinafter Schroeder, The Midas Touch].
118. See infra notes 153-71 and accompanying text.
119. As in economics theory, preferences are pregiven in the sense that they are
idiosyncratic, empirical and emotional, and are not determined by rational deliberation.
[Ihf the desire for this object precedes the practical rule, and is the condition of
our making it a principle, then I say ... this principle is in that case wholly
empirical, for then what determines the choice is the idea of an object, and that
relation of this idea to the subject by which its faculty of desire is determined
to its realization.
KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 34. The satisfaction of preferences leads to
happiness-what economists call utility and Kant calls "pleasure." Id.
120. "To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being, and this, therefore,
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This observation reflects the fact that a governing principle of
personality is self-interest, or what Kant calls "self-love.""' He also
agrees with the concept that a law that "promote[s] the happiness
of others" might be substantively good.'22 In other words, as a
classical liberal, Kant's vision of man as phenomenon is remarkably
consistent with the utilitarian conception of the autonomous, self-
interested individual.
In order for utilitarianism to meet Kant's criterion for a
universal moral principle, however, the proposition that the law
should maximize aggregate utility must be defended on formal
grounds. Kant believes that utilitarianism fails his formal test.
"Instead, reason commands how men are to act even though no
example of this could be found, and it takes no account of the
advantages we can thereby gain, which only experience could teach
us." 12s This is because man is not merely phenomenal (substantive,
concrete, empirical), but also noumenal (formal, abstract, intel-
ligible).
The problem of utilitarianism as a moral principle springs from
Kant's distinction between maxims and laws. "A maxim is a
subjective principle of action, a principle which the subject himself
makes his rule (how he wills to act). A principle of duty, on the
other hand, is a principle that reason prescribes to him absolutely
and so objectively (how he ought to act)."12' It also relates to the
proposition adopted by utilitarianism that desires (preferences)
are purely empirical and, therefore, subjective. Idiosyncratic
preferences cannot serve as the basis of objective law because one
could never achieve the unanimity that would meet Kant's test of
universality.
Even supposing, however, that all finite rational beings were
thoroughly agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings
of pleasure and pain, and also as to the means which they must
employ to attain the one and avoid the other; still, they could by
is inevitably a determining principle of its faculty of desire." Id. at 39.
121. "All material principles, then, which place the determining ground of the will in the
pleasure or pain to be received from the existence of any object are all of the same kind,
inasmuch as they all belong to the principle of self-love or private happiness." Id. at 35.
122. Id. at 51.
123. KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at 10.
124. Id. at 17-18.
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no means set up the principle of self-love as a practical law, for
this unanimity itself would be only contingent.
26
Limiting moral law and rationality to the satisfaction of
preferences would not be consistent with Kant's goal of finding
practical reason and practical freedom in the world. Freedom is,
at a minimum, the negative capacity of freedom from nature's
causal chains that govern all phenomena. Kant's solution to this
conundrum is to assert that although all phenomena are subject to
the law of causality, phenomena can have noumenal causes.
Moreover, noumena are not subject to the natural law of causality.
He asserts that it is a matter of a priori knowledge that man is
capable of reason and that reason is noumenal. Although man as an
empirical creature is phenomenal, through his reason it is at least
theoretically possible for him to form a volition which is not
caused by nature. "A categorical (unconditional) imperative is one
that represents an action as objectively necessary and makes it
necessary not indirectly, through the representation of some
end that can be attained by the action, but through the mere
representation of this action itself (its form), and hence directly."12
This, once again, is the conception of freedom as the positive capac-
ity for spontaneity. "The ground of the possibility of categorical
imperatives is this: that they refer to no other property of choice (by
which some purpose can be ascribed to it) then simply to its
freedom." 7 As a free being, any man has the capacity to change his
opinion spontaneously, thereby destroying the universality of the
law. Kant is trying to examine whether this theoretical possibility
has practical effect. In other words, can and does man ever act
freely in the empirical world?
Kant concludes, as I do, that utilitarianism, as a moral system,
leads to a conclusion that man is not free.
The principle of private happiness, however much under-
standing and reason may be used in it, cannot contain any other
determining principle for the will than those which belong
tot [sic] the lower desires.... Then only, when reason of itself
125. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 40.




determines the will (not as the servant of this inclination), it is
really a higher desire to which that which is pathologically
determined is subordinate, and is really, and even specifically,
distinct from the latter, so that even the slightest admixture of
the motives of the latter impairs its strength and superiority."2
Let me interpret this cryptic but crucial passage with the
terminology that I have been using. Freedom is, negatively, the
liberation from nature's causal laws and, positively, the capacity for
spontaneity, i.e., the ability to do something uncaused by nature.
Desires, being empirical, are phenomenal and part of nature. They
are, therefore, subject to the laws of causality like the rest of
nature. If rationality is reduced to ends-means reasoning or the
satisfaction of desires, then reason is not free, but is subservient to
desire. If reason is subservient to desire, it is subject to the causal
laws of nature, i.e., unfree.
This is the point that I made earlier: economics views rationality
as enslavement to emotionality and, therefore, essentially unfree. 1
Only if reason can choose its own ends, totally divorced from the
ends forced upon it by desire, can reason be truly noumenal and
free. "An end is an object of the choice (of a rational being), though
the representation of which choice is determined to an action to
bring this object about."18
Kant believes, as I do, that freedom is the stumbling block on
which all empiricism, including law and economics, founders. The
128. KANT, PRACTICALREASON, supra note 1, at 38. Within the Kantian tradition, the term
"pathological" carries none of the negative connotations of diseased or sick. Rather, based on
the Greek rootpathos (suffering), pathology merely designates that which relates to emotions
and feelings-as opposed to pure reason. Id. at 95.
129. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
130. KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at 146. Kant continues:
But if I am under obligation to make my end something that lies in concepts of
practical reason, and so to have, besides the formal determining ground of
choice (such as right contains), a material one as well, an end that could be set
against the end arising from sensible impulses, this would be the concept of an
end that is in itself a duty.
That is to say, determination to an end is the only determination of choice the
very concept of which excludes the possibility of constraint through natural
means by the choice of another.
Id. at 146. In other words, freedom is precisely the ability to use reason to choose ends,
rather than having ends forced upon us by nature.
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paradoxical question that Kant faces, however, is whether em-
piricism is the stumbling block on which his concept of freedom
founders. If utilitarianism is empirically "true", then not only is
freedom impossible, but the conclusions of speculative philosophy
reached in the first critique are contradicted. In order for Kant to
defend the proposition that man is capable of practical freedom, he
must first destroy utilitarianism.
In order to do so, rationality must be redefined as the capacity
to choose one's own ends rather than ends dictated by desire.
In Kant's terms, for reason to be practical, it must be "self-
legislative.""'1 Freedom requires that one be subject only to laws
that one writes for oneself. "An end is an object of the choice (of a
rational being)."' "What end anyone wants to set for his action is
left to his free choice.""" "Hence in ethics the concept of duty will
lead to ends and will have to establish maxims with respect to ends
we ought to set ourselves, grounding them in accordance with moral
principles."" 4 "Every action, therefore, has its end; and since no one
can have an end without himself making the object of his choice into
an end, to have any end of action whatsoever is an act of freedom on
the part of the acting subject, not an effect of nature."5 In other
words, virtue is the choice of subjective maxims that are consistent
with objective laws.
Scholars disagree as to whether Kant is successful in his task
or whether Kantian freedom remains purely noumenal with no real
practical effect.13 ' This debate is beyond the scope of this Article.
Here I will only note the conclusions reached by Kant.
To recap, Kant argues that the problem with utilitarianism as
a moral principle is that it cannot serve as a moral "law" because
it cannot be made universal. If desires are empirical and idio-
syncratic, then they are by definition subjective.3 7 In other words,
even if all men on any given day agree as an empirical matter that
131. See KANT, PRACTICAL RLASON, supra note 1, at 38.
132. KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at 146.
133. Id. at 147.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 149.
136. See generally ALLISON, supra note 68.
137. "The capacity for having pleasure or displeasure in a representation is called feeling




something is good, this agreement, being empirical, is merely
contingent. Consequently, there is no way of achieving a permanent
consensus or "harmony."
For whereas in other cases a universal law of nature makes
everything harmonious; here, on the contrary, if we attribute to
the maxim the universality of law, the extreme opposite of
harmony will follow, the greatest opposition, and the complete
destruction of the maxim itself, and its purpose. For, in that
case, the will of all has not one and the same object, but
everyone has his own (his private welfare), which may
accidentally accord with the purposes of others which are
equally selfish, but it is far from sufficing for a law."
This is a formal way of restating a number of classical substantive
objections to utilitarianism. Because not all people will have the
same preferences, any organized society will have to impose the
preferences of some members (such as the sovereign or majority) on
others. As discussed above, this means that utilitarianism has no
limiting concept of inalienable and inviolable human rights."9
Bentham famously penned one of the most devastating insults in
history to ridicule the concept of universal, natural human rights:
"nonsense upon stilts."40 Individual rights are only contingently
granted as a means to a collective ends. Rights should, therefore, be
rescinded if society's calculation of the utility of these rights
changes.
Kant's criticism is a variation of the libertarian objection that
utilitarianism views rights as contingent. 141 Although utilitari-
anism is supposed to be based on a concern for each individual's
happiness, the rule of maximum utility is not universal precisely
because it is willing to sacrifice the happiness of some for the
happiness of others. Implicit in Kant's argument is the familiar
objection that because utilitarianism posits that tastes are
138. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 42.
139. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
140. There are 'no such things as natural rights-no such things as rights anterior to the
establishment of government-no such things as natural rights as opposed to ... legal
[ones).... Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical
nonsense,-nonsense upon stilts." 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
500-01 (J. Bowring ed., 1962).
141. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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subjective, there is no way of making interpersonal comparisons
of relative utility. Consequently, there is no way of rewriting
utilitarianism from "promoting the happiness of all" to "promoting
the greatest aggregate happiness in society (even if it results
in pain for some or even most)" because there is no way of
aggregating happiness. 142 This admission makes any policy
purportedly made on utilitarian grounds a lie by definition. And so
although utilitarianism is supposed to be an empirically-based
moral system, not only freedom, but empiricism itself, is a
stumbling block to utilitarianism on its own terms.
It was precisely this problem that led Posner to propose that
wealth maximization supplant utilitarianism as the guiding
principle of an economically-based legal system. One cannot
compare, and therefore cannot measure, aggregate subjective
utility. One can, according to Posner, at least measure wealth in
monetary terms.'" Posner's critics point out that because one might
be able to measure aggregate wealth does not in and of itself
suggest any reason why we should want to do so.
4
'
142. Although I have spoken ofutilitarianism's willingness to sacrifice the minority for the
sake of the majority, such a position implicitly assumes both that we can measure and
compare the utilities of different persons, but also that all persons have comparable
capacities for pleasure and pain. Once one jettisons these assumptions, it is theoretically
conceivable that there could be one or a handful of fabulous sadists who get such intense
delight in torturing others that the goal of aggregate happiness would require the sacrifice
of the majority for the minority.
143. "Partly because there is no common currency in which to compare happiness, sharing,
and protection of rights, it is unclear how to make the necessary trade-offs among these
things in the design of a social system. Wealth maximization makes the trade-offs
automatically." Posner, Value, supra note 59, at 247; see also Richard A. Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103,115 (1979) [hereinafter
Posner, Utilitarianism].
144. "Wealth maximization ... is neither more defensible than utilitarianism nor is it an
alternative efficiency criterion. Indeed it is not an efficiency criterion at all." Jules L.
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 521 (1980)
[hereinafter Coleman, Efficiency]. 'Te only area in which wealth maximization escapes the
condemnation accorded utilitarianism is in measurement. It is much easier to measure
wealth than utility, although the need to hypothesize markets reveals that even wealth
measurement is not without difficulty." Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed
Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591,603 (1980).
I would also criticize Posner's assertion that wealth is itself a relatively unambiguous
concept and is readily measurable. This ignores the fact that Posner's definition of wealth
includes not merely the exchange value of all of the good things in the world, but also all
consumer surplus defined as the amount by which the idiosyncratic use value of things
owned by economic subjects exceeds the exchange value. By definition, since consumer
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5. The Right v. the Good
Kant argues that because empiricism makes it impossible for
positive law to be "law" (i.e., universal), true law cannot be natural
or phenomenal, but must be noumenal. Law cannot be discovered
by experience but must be deduced by reason.
Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason,
and is, therefore, not an object of the senses, and consequently
does not belong to the class of phenomena, it follows that the
idea of it, which determines the will, is distinct from all the
principles that determine events in nature according to the law
of causality, because in their case the determining principles
must themselves be phenomena. 4"
If law as moral law must be independent from natural causality,
law is, therefore, "freedom in the strictest, that is in the tran-
scendental sense; consequently, a will which can have its law in
nothing but the mere legislative form of the maxim is a free will."'"
The first surprising conclusion at which Kant arrives is the
apparent paradox that freedom requires law, and vice versa.
"[F]reedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply
each other.""4 7 Because law cannot be merely empirical (the "is"),
but must be imperative (the "ought"), it cannot be bound by nature
but must be the creation of spontaneity. To violate Kant's principle
argument and give substantive content to this statement, to be free,
one must have the ability to choose to disobey one's natural
inclinations and instead create one's own standards of behavior.
"That choice which can be determined by pure reason is called free
choice. That which can be determined only by inclination (sensible
impulse, stimulus) would be animal choice .... "' Law must be self-
legislated by reason. This concept raises a more interesting
paradox: how can law be law (universal, objective) and not merely
surplus is subjective, it is idiosyncratic and non-comparative in precisely the same way
as utility. Consequently, wealth maximization suffers from the same impossibility as
utilitarianism. See Schroeder, The Midas Touch, supra note 117, at 754-60.
145. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 43.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 44.
148. KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at 13.
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a maxim (individual, subjective) if each rational person self-
legislates her own law? Kant's answer is that morality consists of
freely self-legislating a subjective doctrine which complies with the
objective imperative of the universal moral law.
Kant famously distinguishes between the concepts of the "right"
and the "good." The test of whether a proposed law is moral (and
therefore a true law), is purely formal, and therefore objective and
universal. "[Niothing is contained in [the matter of the law] except
the legislative form. It is the legislative form, then, contained in the
maxim, which can alone constitute a principle of determination of
the [free] will." 49 This formal test is the categorical imperative. I
have already given the more familiar version of this imperative, the
so-called principle of universality that one should "[aict so that the
maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a
principle of universal legislation."50 Probably lesser known is the
categorical imperative expressed as the principal of humanity set
forth in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: "Act in
accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for
everyone. " '5' In other words, rationality, and therefore freedom,
consists not in formulating the appropriate means for achieving
one's ends, but in formulating an appropriate ends. Moreover, both
means and ends must meet the test of universality. Because no
phenomenon is universal, the test for both the ends and means of
morality must be purely formal and without substantive content. In
contrast, the utilitarian's goal of utility is empirical and, therefore,
cannot serve as the basis of morality.
Of course, Kant completely recognizes that in ordinary life, as
well as in the course of adopting public policy, maxims and positive
laws must have substantive content. Many substantive rules, such
as the utilitarian's directive to increase happiness, may very well
be good, but good is empirical and merely contingent, not moral. To
be moral, a "good" rule must be justified by some reason other than
its beneficial consequences, i.e., it must meet the formal test of
universality that characterizes the noumena.
149. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 44.
150. Id. at 46.
151. Roger J. Sullivan, Introduction to KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at vii, xviii.
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Therefore, the law that we should promote the happiness of
otheris] does not arise from the assumption that this is an object
of everyone's choice, but merely from this, that the form of
universality which reason requires as the condition of giving to
a maxim of self-love the objective validity of a law, is the
principle that determines the will.152
Good relates to policy-what should be done to achieve a specific
goal. Good is, therefore, economic rationality as ends-means
reasoning. It can appropriately be a subject of debate. Morality, in
contrast, is an imperative. It is what ought to be done. If a rule
passes the formal test of morality, there can be no debate.
Consequently, "[tihe maxim of self-love (prudence) only advises; the
law of morality commands. Now there is a great difference between
that which we are advised to do and that to which we are
obliged." "
Or, to put this another way, if the philosopher were to adopt the
principles of utilitarianism and seek to increase pleasure and
reduce pain, "the foundation of his practical judgments would call
that good which is a means to the pleasant, and evil, what is a
cause of unpleasantness and pain."15 Kant completely agrees
with the utilitarian proposition that "reason is alone capable of
discerning the connection of means with their ends." 5 Rationality
thus includes, but cannot be limited to, ends-means reasoning.
[Yet the practical maxims which would follow from the
aforesaid principle of the good being merely a means, would
never contain as the object of the will anything good in itself,
but only something good for something; the good would always
be merely the useful, and that for which it is useful must always
lie outside the will, in sensation."
152. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 51.
153. Id. at 53.
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In other words, "The end itself, the pleasure that we seek, is ... a
welfare; not a concept of reason, but an empirical concept of an
object of sensation." 157 To adopt utilitarianism would mean that
the possession of reason would not raise [man's] worth above
that of the brutes, if it is to serve him only for the same purpose
that instinct serves in them; it would in that case be only a
particular method which nature had employed to equip man for
the same ends for which it has qualified brutes, without
qualifying him for any higher purpose.16
This observation, of course, looks forward to Posner's assertion that
from an economic (utilitarian) position it is not a solecism to speak
of a rational rat or frog.'59 It also predicts that utilitarianism will
become the basis of a radical animal "rights" advocacy because
utilitarianism cannot make a moral distinction between man and
beast. 60 To Kant, a beast might be good or bad, but it cannot be
moral or evil.
6. The Moral Law and Radical Evil
I believe the single most interesting aspect of Kantian moral
philosophy is the fundamental, unresolvable contradiction between
morality and evil that constitutes the human condition. This
problem, which dates back at least to St. Augustine's account of
Original Sin, becomes a central focus of Hegelian philosophy and
Lacanian psychoanalysis. This tension, surprisingly, will be shown
to be the foundation of human freedom.
Kant insists on an essential qualitative distinction between
morality, which is noumenal, and the good, which is phenomenal.
Any maxim adopted in accordance with empirical reasons is stained
with pathology. Consequently, whether or not the act is good, it is
not moral.
157. Id. at 81.
158. Id. at 80-81.
159. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
160. Which is why Peter Singer, probably the preeminent utilitarian philosopher living
today, is also the foremost theorist of the animal rights movement. See PETER SINGER,
ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d ed. 2001).
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The essential point in every determination of the will by the
moral law, is that being a free will it is determined simply by
the moral law, not only without the cooperation of sensible
impulses, but even to the rejection of all such, and to the
checking of all inclination so far as they might be opposed to
that law. So far, then, the effect of the moral law as a motive is
only negative.1 61
He continues:
The notion of duty, therefore, requires in the action, objectively,
agreement with the law, and subjectively in its maxim, that
respect for the law shall be the sole mode in which the will is
determined thereby.... [Mioral worth, can be placed only in this,
that the action is done from duty, that is, simply for the sake of
the law.16
2
As David Gray Carlson and I discuss elsewhere, the problem is
that every actual moral decision we make has to be made in a
concrete situation. 6 3 Every decision we make, every action we take
is necessarily empirical and smeared with pathology. All pathology
is natural. As such, our acts are never truly moral because they are
notpurely free, but are partly subject to the causal chains of nature.
What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral
law should directly determine the will. If the determination of
the will takes place in conformity indeed to the moral law, but
only by means of a feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to
be presupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to
determine the will, and therefore not for the sake of the law,
then the action will possess legality but not morality .'"
Thus, if you feed a starving child out of compassion, rather than
because it is the right thing to do, your action, no matter how
good, is not purely moral. It is, therefore, to some degree corrupt."6 5
161. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 93.
162. Id. at 102.
163. See Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?,
88 CAL. L. REV. 653 (2000).
164. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 92.
165. See ALLISON, supra note 68, at 186; Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 163, at 671.
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Compassion is an empirical fact and, therefore, phenomenal and
natural. Kant goes so far as to assert that the "very feeling of
compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes the deliberation on
the question of duty and becomes a determining principle, is even
annoying to right-thinking persons, brings their deliberate maxims
into confusion, and makes them wish to be delivered from it and to
be subject to law-giving reason alone." 166
As a result, as Carlson and I have said:
By definition, concrete personality is constituted by pathology.
That is, to take a concrete action is precisely to pour a content
into the empty form of the moral law. Unhappily, this means
that every concrete choice is inescapably pathological; the act
always has an instrumental reason. Consequently, Kant insists
that every attempt by man to act ethically and to obey the moral
law is stained by the "evil" of pathological motives.'67
Consequentially, in a late work on the problematics of morality,
Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,6 ' Kant rewrites
the Protestant doctrine of Original Sin and concludes that man is
"radically" evil in the sense that a trace of nonmoral pathology must
necessarily lie at the root (radix) of all human actions.'
Of course, it is not inconsistent with the moral law to perform
an act which one both desires to perform (in the sense that it will
increase one's happiness) and which complies with the moral law.
Indeed, many moral laws (such as a law prohibiting murder) can
have substantively beneficial effects that make one feel good. One
cannot assume, however, that either the mere fact an action makes
one happy or that it requires self-sacrifice is any evidence of its
morality. Morality is completely indifferent to pleasure and pain.
166. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 144.
167. Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 163, at 672.
168. "This evil is radical, since it corrupts the ground of all maxims; as natural propensity,
it is also not to be extirpated through human forces." IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON 59 (Allen Wood ed. & George Di Giovanni trans., 1998)
[hereinafter RELIGION). As Carlson and I explain elsewhere, Schroeder & Carlson, supra note
163, at 657 n.19, it is a common misperception that the Kantian term "radical" evil bears the
colloquial connotation of really, really extreme evil (i.e., diabolical evil), perhaps because of
Hannah Arendt's terminology in her famous work on the banality of evil. HANNAH ARENDT,
EiCHmANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1994).
169. See KANT, RELIGION, supra note 168, at 117.
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Moral laws "command for everyone, without taking account of
his inclinations, merely because and insofar as he is free and has
practical reason."
170
More radically, even if one could determine that one's actions
complied with the moral law, one could still never be sure of one's
motives. If a person feeds a starving child both because she feels
compassion and because she decides that she is morally duty-bound
to do so, she can never know whether she would have obeyed the
moral law even if she did not feel compassion.1 71 In the words of
Ziiek, "[We never know if the determinate content that accounts
for the specificity of our acts is the right one, that is, if we have
actually acted in accordance with the Law and have not been guided
by some hidden pathological motives."172 Kant concludes that a
person who adopts a maxim that is consistent with moral law, but
is only adopted because of a pathological (empirical) motive, is
guilty of the form of radical evil Kant calls "impurity.
" 173
As finite humans, we can never really know what our "true"
motives are. In Allison's words, "[Flar from asserting a doctrine of
unqualified noumenal freedom ... Kant explicitly asserts that since
the intelligible character is inaccessible to us, we can never be
certain whether, or to what extent, a given action is due to nature
or freedom." 74 The pure reason that is essential to man is itself a
noumenon, a thing-in-itself. Each person as an empirical individual
is a phenomenon who does not have direct contact with his
own noumenal, essential self. In Kant's words, "The depths of
the human heart are unfathomable." 75 Consequently, no one can
170. KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at 10.
171. See KANT, RELIGION, supra note 168, at 58-59.
172. SLAVOJ 22EIC, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY
365 (1999) (hereinafter 212FM TICKLISH SUBJECT).
173. As Kant stated:
[Tihe impurity ... of the human heart consists in this, that although the maxim
is good with respect to its object (the intended compliance with the law) and
perhaps even powerful enough in practice, it is not purely moral, i.e. it has not,
as it should be [the case], adopted the law alone as its sufficient incentive but,
on the contrary, often (and perhaps always) needs still other incentives besides
it ... in other words, actions conforming to duty are not done purely from duty.
KANT, RELIGION, supra note 168, at 53-54; see Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 163, at 675-
77.
174. ALLISON, supra note 68, at 43.
175. KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at 196.
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directly know his own self. "For a human being cannot see into the
depths of his own heart so as to be quite certain, in even a single
action, of the purity of his moral intention and the sincerity of his
disposition, even when he has no doubt about the legality of the
action."' Kant's idea of a radical split between our conscious selves
and another essential "true" inner self will reappear in Lacan's
attempt to rewrite Freud's psychoanalytic theory in light of
speculative thought.
177
A congruence of one's maxims and the moral law is virtue. 178 A
perfect congruence of will to morality is holiness, "a perfection of
which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any
moment of his existence." 79 Holiness, therefore, is an attribute
of God alone. Consequently, Kant rewrites traditional Christian
doctrine and finds that man is always in a state of sin. Kant's
conclusion can most strikingly be seen in the title he gave to Part
One of Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason, "Concerning the
indwelling of the evil principle alongside the good or Of the radical
evil in human nature.""s The more moral a man is, the more he
desires to comply with the moral law for the sake of morality, and
the more aware he is of the stain of his own pathology. According to
Kant, "In view of what has been said above, the statement, 'The
human being is evil,' cannot mean anything else than that he is
conscious of the moral law and yet has incorporated into his maxim
the (occasional) deviation from it."'"' For a utilitarian to say that a
Kantian has a "preference" for morality, therefore, is to completely
misinterpret Kantian theory. For a Kantian, a preference is an
inclination and is antithetical to morality, which must be served
regardless of preferences. In other words, utilitarianism and
Kantianism are radically different ways of conceptualizing human
motivation.
176. Id. at 155.
177. See infra notes 24446 and accompanying text.
178. See KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at 156; KANT, RELIGION, supra note 168, at 67.
179. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 148.
180. KANT, RELIGION, supra note 168, at 45.
181. Id. at 55.
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7. The Dialectical Relationship Between Law and Freedom
Kant recognizes, however, that it is precisely this impossibility
of knowing and achieving the morality which is the reciprocal of
freedom, that creates the actuality of human free will in the world.
If man could actually see into the mind of God and know the moral
law, he would no longer be self-legislating (i.e., free). He would be
submitting himself to an external force. In Kant's moving metaphor,
"Man would be a marionette or an automaton."'82 Ironically, it is
man's sin, his failure, his radical evilness, his inability to be truly
free, that results in his practical freedom. As the common law
tradition understands, law, as well as freedom, is a work in process.
In order for the subject to be free, she must be self-legislating and
constantly creating new law. If, however, she ever succeeded in the
task of finishing and completely filling her world with law, it would
bind her and prevent her from spontaneously creating new law. She
would no longer be free. Paradoxically, the reason the individual is
able to liberate herself from nature's causal chains so that she
might freely bind herself to the moral law, is that every time she
tries to bind herself to the moral law its chains slip her wrists. Man
is always a moral Houdini despite himself. As I have written
elsewhere, 8' Lacan will identify this fundamental paradox that
characterizes the moral universe as the sexual impasse. The part
of personality that is bound by law is the "masculine," and the part
that slips away is the "feminine."184
182. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 123. As my co-author and I have said
elsewhere:
If this self were noumenal, then God (a noumenon) would be our equal. God
would stand before our eyes as directly perceivable. We would lose our freedom,
if we could directly know God's law. We would be mere puppets in the thrall of
the moral law. Ironically, morality would become legality, and morality would
be thoroughly pathological-that is natural.
Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 163, at 667.
183. SCHROEDERTHETRIUMPHOFVENUS, supra note 63; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Apples and
Oranges: The Commensurability Debate in Legal Scholarship (2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Schroeder, Apples and Oranges].
184. "For the class of X, not allX's are submitted to the phallic function." JACQUES LACAN,
THE SEMINAR OF'JACQUES LACAN, BOOKXX ENCORE, ONFEMINIE SEXUALITY, THE LIMITS OF
LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE 1972-1973, at 78-81 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Bruce Fink trans.,
1998) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR XX].
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One sees the Kantian moral paradox reflected in the myth of the
Fall of Man as recounted in Genesis. The serpent tempted Eve by
telling her that if she ate from the tree of knowledge of good and
evil (i.e., if she could know the moral law) she could be like God. 185
Of course, there can be but a single Absolute. If the serpent's
promise were true, Eve would not become "like God," but would lose
her individuality and be subsumed into God. Consequently, when
Eve and the man ate the forbidden fruit, mankind did not attain
holiness. Rather, they committed the Original Sin that Kant
reinterprets as his notion of radical evil.le" As God warned, if
mankind obtained the knowledge of good and evil, we would also
become subjected to death.' s7 It is mortality (limitation) that is the
necessary condition of morality."' Exiled from the Garden, the first
couple's inability to know both the moral law and the motivations
of their own hearts became the basis of their free will.
I shall leave this fascinating subject at this point. I am not about
to resolve the paradox of freedom. Indeed, Kant never truly resolved
this issue, i"9 which can be seen as the central problem of all the
185. The serpent told Eve, "For God knows that in the day you eat from it your eyes will
be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil." Genesis 3:5.
186. KANT, RELIGION, supra note 168, at 61-65.
187. "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, 'From any tree of the garden you
may eat freely, but from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in
the day that you eat from it you shall surely die.' Genesis 2:16-17.
188. Indeed, God exiled the first couple precisely so that they would not become immortal
and, therefore, truly godlike.
Then the Lord God said, "Behold, the man has become like one of Us, knowing
good and evil; and now, lest he stretch out his hand, and take also from the tree
of life, and eat, and live forever" therefore the Lord God sent him out from the
garden of Eden ....
Genesis 3:22-23.
189. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant tried to resolve this paradox by positing the
immortality of the soul. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 147-50. That is, every
specific act fails the test of complete morality in that it is always partially stained by
pathology. By constant striving one can approach morality as an asymptote that can be
reached at infinity. Id. If the soul lives forever, it can eventually achieve holiness. Id. Kant
does not, however, go so far as to claim that the soul is necessarily immortal. Rather, he
claims that the requirements of the moral law give us a very good reason to believe that the
soul must be immortal in order to meet these requirements. Id.
Over time, Kant may have jettisoned this simplistic solution. After all, if the soul only
reaches holiness at infinity, the soul is, therefore, never holy but always in the state of sin.
Every new attempt at holiness is always a new failure. The "deed is every time (not generally,
but at each instant) defective." KANT, RELIGION, supra note 168, at 84. As a result, in the end,
Kant seems to have concluded that some form of the Protestant concept of grace would be
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speculative philosophy that follows. In this tradition, freedom and
law have a dialectic relationship. Each necessarily requires the
other, even as each necessarily contradicts the other. As Roger
Sullivan notes, Kant begins his discussion in the Metaphysics of
Morals with the antinomy he set up in the second critique, which
"requires that person be both passively constrained (by such duties)
and simultaneously actively constraining (by legislating the same
duties)."1 In Kant's words, "The moral law, which itself does not
require a justification, proves not merely the possibility of freedom,
but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this law as
binding on themselves. The moral law is in fact a law of the
causality of free agents
8. Kant's Legacy
The speculative tradition explores the logical implications of
Kant's theories and in some cases comes to very different
conclusions. Hegel universalizes Kant's concept of antinomies. 192 By
doing so, he ends up rejecting Kant's dichotomy between the
noumenal and phenomenal. 193 There is no pure unchanging
noumenon that escapes the contradiction and flux one observes in
the empirical world. In Hegel's words, contradiction "is not to be
taken merely as an abnormality which only occurs here and there,
but is rather the negative as determined in the sphere of essence,
the principle of all self-movement .... "19' Further, I will argue that
Lacan makes the Kantian dialectic between freedom and law the
basis of his rewriting of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. As
mentioned, Lacanian theory holds that subjectivity and sexuality
necessary for man to be saved. Id. at 182-83; Adams, supra note 81, at xxi-xxv.
190. Roger J. Sullivan, Introduction to KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at x.
191. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1, at 65.
192. Schroeder, Apples and Oranges, supra note 183.
193. JEAN HYPPOLITE FIGURES DE LAPENSEE PHILOSOPHIQUE 1(1971); ROBERTB. PIPPIN,
HEGEL'S IDEALISM: THE SATISFACTION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 206 (1989); Jeanne L.
Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Wrong and the Essence of Right, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
194. G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 440 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969) [hereinafter
HEGEL, LOGIC]. Hegel is particularly hard on those philosophers who try to deny or do away
with contradiction. Id.
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are nothing but this fundamental dialectical relationship between
freedom and the moral law. 195
9. Modesty with Respect to Policy
Before moving on, however, I would like to recap a number of
points and raise a few others. First, to reiterate the primary point
of this Article, speculative philosophy conceives of rationality not as
predictable instrumental reasoning, but as freedom understood as
the capacity for pure spontaneity. Consequently, rationality is not
merely the capacity to choose an appropriate means to achieve a
pregiven, nonrational end because that notion makes rationality the
slave to inclination. Rationality must also include the capacity to
choose an appropriate end to pursue.
Second, one can now better understand why speculative thought
is more modest about policymaking than utilitarian or economic
thought. Speculative thought is always critical of its own capacity
to make substantive recommendations that comply with its own
moral criteria. Since the speculative philosopher and critical legal
scholar believes that true freedom requires self-legislation, she is
wary of imposing rules designed to manipulate the behavior of
others. Indeed, "Kant held that positive ethical obligations to others
do not belong to the public domain, to be enacted into law and
enforced with punitive incentives by the state, as utilitarians ...
later held and as the majority of people today also hold."1 96 As
discussed below, and further developed by Hegel and Lacan,
speculative thought, as an attempt to understand the world, seeks
to develop a retroactive account of how what is came to be, and not
to predict what will be. 97 In Hegel's formulation, philosophy
can save itself the trouble of giving good advice on the subject.
Plato could well have refrained from recommending nurses
never to stand still with children but to keep rocking them in
their arms; and Fichte likewise need not have perfected his
passport regulations .... In deliberations of this kind, no trace of
philosophy remains...."'
195. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
196. Sullivan, supra note 190, at xxiv.
197. See discussion infra Part II.D.3.
198. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 21 (Allen W. Wood ed. &
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Of course this leads to a quandary. The speculative scholar, as
a human being and a member of society, also desires to do good
(promote the happiness of herself and others) and recognizes
that, as a practical matter, the state needs to have positive laws
and public policy.'99 As the clich6 states, although one can only
study history retroactively, one is forced to live it prospectively.
Consequently, far from pragmaticism being antithetical to spec-
ulative idealism, it is, in fact, a necessarily corollary. We must use
pragmaticism to write positive law precisely because pure reason is
not empirical.
Nevertheless, the speculative scholar is equally wary of making
policy recommendations based on the pragmatic grounds supported
by utilitarianism and law and economics, because she believes
that these theories fail on their own pragmatic terms. They cannot
achieve the scientific "objective" measurability that is their
supposed justification.
Consequently, I wish partially to rehabilitate Posner's attack
on the attempted use of neo-Kantian theory to make practical
legal policy recommendations and judicial decisions. I agree that
from a Kantian perspective one cannot derive specific concrete
"pathological" conclusions from the abstract and formal moral law.
Dworkin's attempt to explain specific legal doctrines through neo-
Kantian theory is doomed to failure by the logic of Kantianism. On
the other hand, Posner is incorrect to conclude from this that
Kantian moral theory is irrelevant to practical decision making.
Speculative theory can demonstrate how alternative ways of
making decisions such as utilitarianism or Posnerian "pragmatism,"
also fail by their own terms. Moreover, Kantianism can suggest
some overarching principles that can necessarily limit specific
decision making, e.g., that murder is immoral."'
H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) [hereinafter HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT].
199. Kant himselffalls offthe wagon occasionally. Forexample, the Metaphysics ofMorals
finds him moving from a discussion of how the moral duty of self-control suggests that one
not abuse alcohol or overeat to a consideration of the proper number of people to invite to a
dinner party! KANT, MORALS, supra note 68, at 180-81. I personally find that a number of
passages in the Philosophy of Right come close to the type of practical minutia that Hegel
claims philosophy must avoid. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 198.
200. For example, Posner says that if he was a British colonial official under the Raj, he
would have had no difficulty outlawing the Hindu practice of suttee, not because it is
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C. The Failure to Communicate
Ever since Posner and others proposed an economic analysis of
law in the 1970s, scholars from the critical legal studies and other
schools have offered trenchant criticism of its methodology and
assumptions, including the rationality postulate. And yet law and
economics has famously regarded these attacks as irrelevant or
external to its paradigm. This essential failure to communicate is
so great as to suggest that the different schools might be speaking
distinct languages. As I discuss in the final part of this Article,
from a Lacanian perspective this is almost literally true.20 1 Policy
scholarship and speculative scholarship are engaging in dia-
metrically different discourses, that of the university and the
hysteric, respectively. As each of these discourses is the reverse of
the other, they are not directly addressed to each other. To hear, let
alone understand, the speculative scholar's criticism of law and
economics within the hysteric's discourse, the legal economist must,
at least temporarily, leave her position in the university's discourse.
Consequently, I lay a good part of the blame for this commu-
nication failure at the door of law and economics. Although many
discussions of economic rationality dutifully start with the
disclaimer that the writer is using the word as a term of art with a
specific technical meaning designed for a specific analytical
purpose, in context they tend to use the term much more broadly.
Deviations from economically "rational" behavior are frequently
treated as though they were "irrational" in the colloquial sense of
crazy or erratic. This position is taken by Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler,
and the majority of the commentators at the Oregon symposium.0 2
Indeed, I suspect that one of the reasons why legal economists
immoral, but because he finds it disgusting. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral
and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1644 (1998). A Kantian analysis would have no
problem in concluding that since murder and suicide are immoral, suttee, as some
combination of the two, is immoral. I believe that Posner is correct that on its own terms a
Kantian analysis may not be able to give specific policy advice on more subtle questions (such
as whether killing in self-defense is immoral murder or permissible homicide). As mentioned
above in note 199, despite Kant's insistence that philosophy not give advice, in the
Metaphysics of Morals he occasionally violates his own dictum and purports to do just that.
201. See infra Part III.
202. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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persist in using the term "rationality" for certain economic behavior
is precisely to draw on all of the connotative baggage of the term's
conventional and philosophic usages.' °
I do not wish to exonerate the critics of economics entirely,
however. As I have written extensively before, and as I addressed
briefly earlier in this Article, many critics of the economic approach
to law are what I have called "romantics."2' Under my definition,
romantics adopt many of the utilitarian assumptions they claim to
criticize, but apply the opposite valorization. Romantics share
several economic assumptions: They (1) define rationality as a
calculation of ends-means reasoning, (2) characterize markets as
cold, impersonal manifestations of rationality, (3) believe that
market analysis leads to commodification in which a price can be
put on everything, and (4) assume that for law to be "law," it must
be determinate. While the utilitarian embraces this vision, the
romantic is repulsed by it. 5 Consequently, the romantic concludes
that she must reject the concepts of economic rationality, market
analysis, and commodification and that she must condemn
positive law because it is indeterminate.' Nevertheless, by so
concluding she does nothing to challenge the fundamental form of
analysis engaged in by economists; she merely disagrees with the
utilitarian's opinion.
This approach fails precisely because it neither addresses the
reasons why economics seems so attractive, nor the logical
inconsistencies that ultimately make it a limited tool for legal
analysis. Neo-classical economic theory is one of the great
intellectual accomplishments of Western thought. It is a construct
of exquisite elegance and beauty. It was my first academic love. It
swept me off my feet as a seventeen-year-old college student and I
do not regret yielding my intellectual virginity to it. With age,
however, as is so often the case with the romantic object, my girlish
infatuation began to look unappealingly jejune."0 7 Despite the fact
that we grew estranged, I will always think of economics with
203. See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 25, at 147, 181-82.
204. I make this argument at great length in Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra note
29.
205. Id. at 824-27.
206. Id. at 883-84.
207. The same year I gave a copy of Kahlil Gibran's The Prophet to my then boyfriend.
Need I say more?
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nostalgic fondness for initiating me into the ways of rigorous
thought. Nevertheless, I am glad that I am not still involved with
the old rou6.
One of the great attractions of neo-classical economics'
rationality postulate is that it matches many people's intuitions and.
anecdotal observations about how people behave. People frequently
engage in ends-means reasoning in order to achieve their self-
interests narrowly defined; they respond to economic incentives and
disincentives; they make trade-ofts and, occasionally, "tragic"
choices. Another attraction is that the rational person envisioned by
neo-classical economics is consistent with the vision of the
autonomous individual posited by the classical liberal political
theory that underlies our constitutional system. Despite my interest
in speculative theory, I am attracted to Hegel, not Marx, and am a
thoroughgoing capitalist. In other words, the economic postulate
seems to say something "true" about human nature and our
political system that is arguably relevant to legal analysis.
The flaw of the economics approach (and the romantic reaction)
is that it assumes that the rationality postulate is a "true" account
of some aspects from the intuition of human nature, inevitably
implies the conclusion that it is an adequate (full) account of human
nature and behavior. The speculative theorist, in contrast, argues
that human nature is much more complex and layered than the
rationality postulate assumes. It proposes that subjects might very
well act as though they were economically rational for some but not
all purposes. In other words, the rationality postulate might be the
truth, but not the whole truth. From this standpoint, one of the
failings of the law and economics movement is not so much that it
tries to apply economic analysis to legal questions per se, but that
it seeks to expand economic analysis beyond its proper scope and
use it as an instrument of power over others.
Consequently, the speculative theorist does not reject the
concept of rationality generally, nor even economic rationality as
ends-means reasoning specifically, within its appropriate bailiwick.
Instead, she seeks to develop a fuller account of what it means to be
rational in order to understand not merely how one formulates
means to achieve one's ends, but also how one formulates one's
ends. She therefore studies law not merely for the purpose of
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predicting economic behavior, but also to understand the experience
of human freedom and spontaneity.
D. Speculative Thought
Jacques Lacan, the French psychoanalyst who died in 1982,
is probably the theorist most closely associated with the sup-
posedly postmodern concept of the death of the liberal subject.20 8
Nevertheless, Lacan's entire teaching is nothing but an extended
exploration of the subject. Unlike many scholars associated with
"postmodernism," however, Lacan is never dismissive of liberal
forebearers. He always worked within the Western intellectual
tradition and remained as likely to rely on St. Augustine, Kant, or
Hegel as on Freud.
Consequently, Lacan should not be viewed as rejecting whole-
sale Kantianism or classical liberalism. If Lacan and Hegel spend
so much time critiquing Kant, it is because of the strength, not the
weakness, of his theory. Lacan and Hegel do not so much argue that
Kantian liberalism is wrong, but that it is partial. Indeed, Kant
took one of the early necessary steps in the journey that Hegel, and
then Lacan, continue. Indeed, the beginning of psychoanalysis can
be pinpointed in Kant's writings.
1. Kant and Hegel
I briefly digress to make some points about Hegel, as he is the
central span in the bridge leading from Kant to Lacan. 20 9 Kant
208. One might debate the definition of postmodernism and question whether Lacan
should be deemed a postmodernist, but these are issues beyond the scope of this Article.
209. Lacan was not a Hegel scholar per se, and like many French intellectuals, probably
irst encountered Hegel through Kojeve's controversial interpretation. Nevertheless, I agree
with tifek's assessment that Lacan's system can coherently be read only as a development
of the Hegelian tradition. For example, he presents his discourse theory as an elaboration
of Hegel's famous master-slave dialectic from The Phenomenology of Spirit. G.W.F. HEGEL,
PHENOMENOLOGYOF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) thereinafter HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY
OF SPUr]. In an amusing passage during the Seventeenth Seminar in which he first
presented his discourse theory, he asks his students whether any of them have gone back
and carefully reread The Phenomenology in light of his earlier discussions of the dialectic.
Although it is hard to tell exactly what happened by reading a transcript, it seems that an
awkward silence followed Lacan's question until one or two students shyly raised their
hands. Lacan rips into the class for their laziness, then admits that the reason he did so was
precisely because he felt that his own familiarity with Hegel was spotty. LE StMINAnE DE
2002] 317
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
defined his notion of the liberal subject in terms of absolute free
will: the capacity of being one's own end, not the means to the end
of another. This notion is precisely the opposite of what happens to
law and economics' liberal subject, who is the means to society's
ends.
Hegel agrees with Kant that the liberal, autonomous individual,
understood as free will, is an appropriate starting place for any
theory of subjectivity.210 He concludes, however, that it could not
serve as a full account of subjectivity because it contains its own
internal logical contradictions that need resolution.2 ' I have
rehearsed Hegel's argument as to how the liberal individual
develops into the Hegelian subject extensively elsewhere,212 and
shall only touch on certain aspects in this Article.
Though Hegel agreed with Kant that the essence of personality
is free will, he thought that the freedom of the Kantian individual
in the state of nature could only be potential. Pure freedom is
radically negative, indeed it is negativity per se. "' To be completely
free is to be totally without bounds of any kind. To be completely
free from bounds is to be totally lacking in content, to be a
pure abstraction without individuality (i.e., noumenal)."' In
order to become actual, the individual must become concrete (i.e.,
phenomenal). 15
2. Appearances All the Way Down
As discussed above, Kant recognizes that since his concept of
pure or noumenal freedom is not empirical, it is without content.21
JACQUES LACAN, LIVR XVII: LENVERS DE LA PSYCHANALYSE 1969-70, at 197 (Jacques-Alain
Miller ed., 1991) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINARXVII]. An English translation of this seminar
by Russell Grigg is scheduled to be published. Professor Grigg has graciously allowed me to
have access to a draft of his translation. English quotations from this seminar used in this
Article are based on Grigg's translation, with some of my own modifications. At Griggs
request, page citations are to the original French edition.
210. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 198, at 37, 67-68; SHLOMO AVINERI,
HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 37 (1984).
211. Alan Brudrer, The Unity of Property Law, 4 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 3, 14-15 (1991).
212. My most complete account appears as Part I of SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29;
see also Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra note 29.
213. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RGHT, supra note 198, at 67-70.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 73; SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 31-34.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 81-105.
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He argues that although freedom as liberation from the causal laws
of nature is purely negative, freedom as spontaneity is positive. He
struggles to account for how this capacity for spontaneity can have
practical effect in the phenomenal world. His problem is that it
followed from his distinction between noumena and phenomena,
and from his observation that all content is phenomenal, that all
practical action is necessarily smeared with pathology, and,
therefore, partially amoral and unfree. Consequently, many Kant
scholars believe that he ultimately failed in his attempt to prove
that freedom can become practical (actual)." 7
Hegel takes another approach. Hegel, in effect, believes that
Kant did not have the courage of his convictions to take his theory
to its logical extreme. This is precisely because Kant persists in
the misconception that there is an eternal, unchanging and ideal
noumenon radically different from the ceaselessly changing,
empirical, phenomenal world. To put the difference between Kant
and Hegel in colloquial terms, when one considers what the "thing-
in-itself" can be, one encounters a blank or void. That is, we have
the intuition that there must be more to the objective world than
that which mortals can subjectively capture in words and imagery.
Kant assumes that the reason we encounter this void or missing
reality is because the thing-in-itself is hidden from or inaccessible
to human reason. Hegel, in effect, rhetorically asks Kant, "if you
really believe we can never know the thing-in-itself, how come you
have been able to tell us so much about it?"
Consequently, although known as an idealist, Hegel is not a
neo-platonist who distinguishes the ideal from the empirical
world.21 Hegel rejects Kant's radical separation of noumena and
phenomena.21 In other words, for a concept to exist-to be possible,
the ideal must manifest itself in the world. It must be actual. The
noumenal and the phenomenal are one and the same.220 This
217. Even Kantian Henry Allison admits that "Kant's theory of freedom is the most
difficult aspect of his philosophy to interpret, let alone defend." ALLISON, supra note 68, at
1. "The consensus among Kant's critics is that the application of [the phenomenal-noumenal]
distinction to the problem of freedom leads to a dilemma from which there is no ready
escape." Id. at 2.
218. In Hyppolite's words "Hegelian philosophy rejects all transcendence ... There is no
world, nothing in itself, no transcendence ...." HYPPOLITS, supra note 193, at 1.
219. Or in Pippin's characterization "there is literally nothing 'beyond' or 'behind' or
responsible for the human experience...." PIPPIN, supra note 193, at 206.
220. As Allison explains, "the Hegelian critique of Kantian morality is essentially a protest
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concept is one of the correct meanings of Hegel's frequently
misunderstood assertion: "What is rational is actual; and what is
actual is rational."221 This assertion should not be misinterpreted
as a Panglossian defense of the Prussian status quo. Rather, it
is a rejection of the Kantian dichotomy and can be translated as
"the noumenon is the phenomenon and the phenomenon is the
noumenon."
Hegel argues that the reason why we encounter a blank when
we consider the thing-in-itself is not because it is hidden. Rather it
is because potentiality (the ideal or noumenon), when abstracted
from actuality (phenomena), is negativity per se.222 Kant's thing-in-
itself is an attempt to positivize negativity. 3 Rather than only the
four antinomies identified in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Hegel
asserts that all concepts are antinomies.2' Dialectical opposition-a
radical constituent split-characterizes the entire intelligible
universe.
Contradictions are, of course, unstable; they cannot stand and
must be resolved. As we have seen, Kant assumes this means
that there must be a static noumenal world "out there" beyond
contradiction. Hegel, in contrast, argues that it means that the
entire world, even the so-called thing-in-itself, is in a constant state
of flux. 225 Contradictions are only temporarily resolved until a new
contradiction is identified in the supposed resolution leading to a
new temporary resolution, ad infinitum.226 In a passage that is
against its location of supreme value (a good will) in an inner realm of purity' that is
divorced from the real'objective' world of actions and events." ALLISON, supra note 68, at 187.
Hegel rejected Kant's theory of moral law as empty formalism because, for Hegel, "there can
be no action without passion...." Id. at 186. As Allen Wood says, "Hegel's fundamental
concern in rejecting the Kantian conception of the good will is to prevent our conceiving of
the good will as an essentially alienated form of human existence, cut off both from its own
sensuous nature and from the real world in which it acts." Id. at 187 (quoting Allen Wood).
This is part and parcel of Hegel's "wholesale rejection of the metaphysics of transcendental
idealism .... " Id. at 188.
221. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 198, at 20.
222. HEGEL, LOGIC, supra note 194, at 543.
223. As should become clearer late in this Article, Kant's thing-in-itself serves, therefore,
as his objet petit a. See infra Part III.A.6.
224. See David Gray Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quality, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 425 (2001).
225. Contradiction "is not to be taken merely as an abnormality which only occurs here
and there, but is rather the negative as determined in the sphere of essence, the principle
of all self-movement .... " HEGEL, LOGIC, supra note 194, at 438.
226. As I have explained elsewhere:
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obviously addressed to Kant and his followers, Hegel accuses
certain philosophers of assuming that one can solve the antinomies
by concluding
that the world is in its own self not self-contradictory, not self-
sublating, but that it is only consciousness in its intuition and in
the relation of intuition to understanding and reason that is a
self-contradictory being. It shows an excessive tenderness for
the world to remove contradiction from it and then to transfer
the contradiction to spirit, to reason, where it is allowed to
remain unresolved. In point of fact it is spirit which is so strong
that it can endure contradiction, but it is spirit, too, that knows
how to resolve it. But the so-called world ... is never and
nowhere without contradiction, but it is unable to endure it and
is, therefore, subject to coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. 27
To put this another way, rather than positing that there is a sharp
break between appearance and essence, Hegel argues that
appearance is essence.2 In the words of my colleague Arthur
Jacobson, to Hegel, "it is appearance all the way down."2" As we
If contradiction could be permanently resolved, the world would become eternal,
unchanging, necessary and essential. That is, the phenomena would eventually
graduate to noumena. Speculative reason, however, preserves a moment of
contradiction which the understanding must resolve by an immediate
proposition. As such, dialectic reasoning will show that this new understanding
will imply and generate its own negation and the process will continue
indefinitely.
Schroeder, Apples and Oranges, supra note 183, at 14.
227. HEGEL, LOGIC, supra note 194 at 237-38.
228. See Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 193, at 2.
229. Conversations with Arthur Jacobson. Jacobson is, of course, referring to the classic
metaphor for infinite regress. The seeker of truth asks the guru about the universe. The guru
states that the world is supported on four columns on the back of a giant elephant who
stands on the shell of the cosmic turtle.
The student asks, "And on what does the cosmic turtle stand?"
The guru replies, "On the shell of an even greater turtle."
The student inquires further, "And on what does the even greater turtle stand?"
"On a still greater turtle."
"But, oh master, on what does that turtle stand?"
"Listen buster, it's turtles all the way down!"
I discuss the genealogy of this great anecdote, and its variations, in SCHROEDER, VESTAL,
supra note 29, at 5-6 n. 12.
In the words of Robert Pippen, in Hegel's system "there are no 'essences' beyond or behind
the appearances, at least none that can do any cognitive work. There are just the
appearances ...." PIPPIN, supra note 193, at 211.
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have seen, Kant argued that man's essential freedom was
noumenal, which means it is pre-legal, and unchanging, not
empirical, positive, and contingent. Hegel rejects the concept of the
noumenal and concludes that the free subject is itself an empirical,
artificial, contradictory, and changing entity.23
To make a long story short, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel
argues that the freedom that is only a "becoming" in the state of
nature can be actualized through an empirical, intersubjective
relationship with other persons.231 It is only through such
relationships that the abstract autonomous Kantian individual
becomes a concrete subject.232 Specifically, an abstract individual
only becomes a subject if and when another subject recognizes her
as an equal subject. 3 3 Freedom is actualized through legal
relationships in which subjects accord each other rights in a regime
of private law (i.e., property and contract).2 4 Accordingly, to Hegel,
law is the most primitive form of interrelationship in the sense that
it is the simplest and most basic.2 35 Far from being primitive in a
temporal sense, however, our modern concept of legal rights is
relatively recent, as a historical matter-relating to the so-called
Enlightment. Indeed, one of the points of the Philosophy of Right is
230. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
231. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHYOF RIGHT, supra note 198, at 57, 73; SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra
note 29, at 31.
232. "The passionately right-seeking creature respects the rights of others ... because only
by respecting the rights of others can it achieve recognition." Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's
Legal Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 877, 897 (1989).
233. SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 19-20,31-34; Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the
Dialectics of Contract, 10 CARDoZo L. REv. 1199, 1220-21 (1989).
234. "Hegel gives the name freedom' to the reciprocal recognition ofindividuals in ethical
institutions governed by ethical laws." Jacobson, supra note 232, at 896. For a technical
description of the logic of mutual recognition, see David Gray Carlson, How to Do Things
With Hegel, 78 TEX. L .REV. 1377 (2000).
235. "The creatures at the beginning of the Philosophy of Right thus hunger for legal
relations more powerfully than they hunger for food, shelter, or sex." Jacobson, supra note
232, at 897; see also SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 51.
Hegel's speculative logic purports to be a circular form of reasoning in the sense that,
theoretically, one should be able to start from any point in analysis and derive the entire
system. Nevertheless, for practical reasons, Hegel starts each of his books with a
consideration of the simplest, most primitive conception of the topic to be analyzed. As The
Philosophy of Right is a consideration of personality and society, he starts with the Kantian
construct as the bare minimum concept of what it could mean to have personality. Alan
Ryan, Hegel on Work, Ownership and Citizenship, in THE STATE & CIVIL SOCIETY: HEGEL'S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 178, 185 (Z. Pelczynski ed., 1984).
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that the reason human freedom was only first becoming an
actuality at the time he was writing (i.e., in the early nineteenth
century) is that it required the type of capitalistic economic system,
modem constitutional state and resulting rule of law that only
started developing in the eighteenth century.236
3. The Retroactive Nature of Speculative Theory
Because Hegel is supposedly a totalizing philosopher, it is
common to misread The Philosophy of Right as positing a closed
totalitarian philosophy in which obedient citizens are fully
integrated within and subordinated to a bureaucratic monarchy.
This reading misses a number of important facts. The Philosophy
of Right is an examination of the internal logic of the modern
constitutional state that was becoming the norm in Europe at the
time Hegel was writing. 7 Although Hegel seeks to explain why
236. I mention this because it is an important point frequently missed by critics of Hegel.
For example, as I have discussed, Radin misinterprets Hegel's dialectic of property as though
he was trying to describe the empirical process by which human beings become mature
adults through object relations. Schroeder, Virgih Territory, supra note 29, at 55.
The Philosophy of Right is an attempt to explain the internal logic of the modern
constitutional state which was becoming the norm in Europe at the time Hegel was writing
in the early nineteenth century. As his famous metaphor of retroactivity indicates,
philosophy can not predict the future, but only explain the present and the past. HEGEL, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 198, at 23 ("When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a
shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in
grey of philosophy; the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk." ). By
starting his analysis with an explanation of the logic of contract and property-the legal
foundations of capitalist economics-and then turning to civil society-the market
economy-he indicates that the constitutional state-the subject of the last section of the
book--could not exist until our modern conceptions of contract and property came into being.
237. One of the aspects of The Philosophy of Right that disturbs many contemporary non-
Hegelians is his discussion of hereditary monarchy. It is easy to misread Hegel as promoting
such a form of government. For example, an old college friend of my husband who owns a
small computer business in Silicon Valley and who considers himself an arch-scientific
rationalist made this accusation a couple of months ago. In context, Hegel is trying to explain
the general function of the office of "head of state" that all modern constitutional states have.
I believe that we, in the United States, tend to miss this point because we combine two
distinct functions which in most constitutional states are held by two individuals (i.e. head
of government and head of state) in one individual (the President).
Unlike the substantive position of head of government, head of state is a purely empty
ceremonial position-the head of state serves as the physical embodiment of the subjectivity
of the state at official functions. In Lacanian terms, the king is an empty master signifier.
See infra Part III.A.3. This is why in most constitutional states the substantive office of head
of government (the prime minister or premier) is powerful while the formalistic office of head
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these states developed as they did, nowhere does he argue that this
was an inevitable development or that the constitutional state is
theoretically the most superior form of government. Although Hegel
is famous (or infamous) for arguing that certain developments are
logically necessary, this necessity, however, is retroactive, not
prospective. He never argues that given the current state of affairs
something must necessarily develop in the future. Rather, he tries
to determine from the current state of affairs what necessarily must
have happened in the past."'
It is also common to assume that since Hegel speaks about the
"end of history" and posits that the modem constitutional state
developed because it resolved certain contradictions existing in
more "primitive" societies, that Hegel believes the modern state is
a final resolution." 9 Once again, this is a misconception. As Hegel
famously states in the preface to The Philosophy of Right,
speculative philosophy, as he understands it, is a retroactive, not a
prospective, study.' This is the point of probably the most well-
known passage in all of Hegel's work.
A further word on the subject of issuing instructions on how the
world ought to be: philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late
to perform this function. As the thought of the world, it appears
only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative
process and attained its completed state. This lesson of the
concept is necessarily also apparent from history, namely that
it is only when actuality has reached maturity that the ideal
appears opposite the real and reconstructs this real world,
which it has grasped in its substance, in the shape of an
intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a
shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but
of state (such as the British monarch, the Japanese emperor, or the Italian president) has
little or no effective power. In Hegel's words, the only function of a proper king is to dot the
i's of legislation adopted by parliament. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHYOF RIGHT, supra note 198,
at 323. Consequently, while the head of government should be elected, the head of state can
appropriately be appointed in any number of ways. Hegel thought that was a distinct
advantage in making head of state a hereditary office; it made it clear that the position was
arbitrary. Id. at 322-23.
238. See generally HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 198.
239. Perhaps the most notorious example of this misreading in recent years is expressed
in FRANCIS FuKuyAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
240. See HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 198, at 23.
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only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of
Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.24'
Speculative theory can only seek to explain what has happened, not
predict the future or give policy advice. The only thing the
philosopher can say about the future is that, given that all reality
is characterized by contradiction, negativity, and change, it will
probably be different than we predict. The liberal constitutional
state is the end of one era of history in that it resolves the internal
contradictions of feudalism.2 2 But, over time, its internal con-
tradictions will be revealed. Hopefully, these contradictions will be
resolved in a new form of societal organization that is even more
freedom loving, but there are no guarantees this will occur. Like
Kant, Hegel believes that man is essentially free.24 Freedom
means precisely that we are free to make wrong, immoral, even
diabolically evil decisions not only about our own lives, but also
about our societies. How else can one explain how Germany-the
land of Kant, Hegel, Schiller, and Goethe-accepted Hitler?
III. POLICY AS THE OTHER SIDE OF CRITIQUE
Lacan rereads the speculative tradition of Kant and Hegel
through a Freudian lens or, more accurately, rewrites Freud's
psychoanalysis with a speculative pen. He thereby combines the
two great European theories of subjectivity into a new synthesis.
The heart of Lacan's theory of personality is that the subject is
split, or, in Lacan's colorful and intentionally misleading termi-
nology "castrated." Lacan's reinterpretation of Freudian theory
has its origins in Kant's division of man into a noumenal and a
phenomenal self and his paradox of freedom as failure,2" but Lacan
241. Id.
242. "The Philosophy of Right is founded on an ethical theory which identifies the human
good with the self-actualization of the human spirit. Hegel's name for the essence of this
spirit is freedom." Allen W. Wood, Introduction to HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra
note 198, at vii, xi.
243. Id.
244. Indeed, according to Slavoj 2ilek, Lacan identifies the Critique of Practical Reason
as the "birth of psychoanalysis." SLAVOJ &I±EK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO:
ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR 229 (1991) [hereinafter hIEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT
WHAT THEY DO].
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follows Kant's implications a step further than Hegel towards their
logical extreme.
In the remainder of this Article, I shall concentrate on that
portion of Lacan's theory that relates specifically to discourse.
Lacanian discourse theory equally explains policy science's fear of
freedom and its defenses to criticism. I set forth this explanation in
the context of Lacan's notion of four discourses. I have explained
Lacanian discourse theory in detail elsewhere,245 and shall only
offer a very simplified account of those ideas necessary for the
points I wish to raise in this Article.
A. The Matrices of Discourse
Lacan first developed his theory of discourses in his Seventeenth
Seminar, L'envers de la psychanalyse.2" This title can be translated
as the other side, reverse, invert, lining, or facing of psychoanalysis.
He identifies four discourses: that of the master, the university, the
analyst, and the hysteric. 247 In the Seventeenth Seminar, Lacan
argues that the master's discourse is the other side or reverse of the
analyst's. 48 I posit that, by Lacan's reasoning, the university's
discourse (policy science) is, therefore, the other side of the
hysteric's discourse (speculative theory, doctrinal scholarship, and
legal practice). ' 9
1. The Mathemes
In an attempt to give a more science-like rigor to his theory,
Lacan formulated quasi-mathematical symbols which he called
"mathemes" to express many of his core concepts. Lacan graphically
expressed the four discourses as four matrices having the same
245. Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Four Discourses of Law: A Lacanian Analysis of Legal
Practice and Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2000) (hereinafter Schroeder, The Four
Discourses].
246. See supra note 209.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 99.
249. I first suggested the analysis that I develop here in Schroeder, The Four Discourses,
supra note 245, at 16-19.
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structure and each consisting of the same four mathemes placed in
different positions and representing four different roles:20
g en other
truth product/loss25'
I shall explain these roles below. 252
The four mathemes that rotate through the four positions of
matrices are "S,, S 2, S and a."2 " "S," stands for the master
signifier. 254 "S2" is the chain of all signifiers or knowledge.
5 5 
"s"
stands for the split subject.2s The "a", the lower case letter "a"
printed in italics, represents what is perhaps Lacan's most
important and difficult innovation in psychoanalysis: the objetpetit
a, the object cause of desire.257
2. The Three Orders
Before we can consider the definitions of these four mathemes,
I must briefly introduce Lacanian linguistic theory. Lacan posits
that the subject is split between three orders which he called the
symbolic, the imaginary, and the real.258
250. I have described the four discourses in detail elsewhere and shall only give a brief
account necessary to understand the following discussion. See Schroeder, The Four
Discourses, supra note 245, at 40-90.
251. BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 131
(1995).
252. See infra Part III.A.3. to Part III.A.6.





258. See THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK I: FREUD'S PAPERS ON TECHNIQUE 1953-
54, at 80 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & John Forrester trans., 1988) [hereinafter LACAN,
SEMINAR I]; Jacqueline Rose, Introduction II to JACQUES LACAN AND THE 9COLE FREUDIENNE,
FEMININE SEXUALITY 27,31 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., Jacqueline Rose trans.,
1985). SeegeneraUy ELIZABETHGROSZ, JACQUES LACAN: AFEMINST INTRODUCTION 10 (1990).
As is the case with virtually all of Lacan's concepts, not only are three orders extremely
complex, but Lacan's thinking about them developed over time. For example, in the early
seminars of the 1950s, Lacan concentrated more on the contrast between the symbolic and
the imaginary, whereas his later seminars put more emphasis on the real. Indeed, it seems
that over time, Lacan shifted some of the functions he originally assigned to the imaginary
over to the real. I have explained on the three orders and their implications for law and
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The symbolic order is that of language, law, and signification.259
Another term for the symbolic order is the big Other,260 which is the
term I will generally use in the rest of this Article. As it includes
law, the symbolic is the primary focus of the remaining portion of
this Article. To understand the symbolic, however, one needs to
have- some familiarity with the other two orders to which it is
inextricably linked. Indeed, Lacan explained the relationship of the
three to subjectivity with the metaphor of the overlapping rings of
the figure known as the Borromean knot:21
If any ring is removed, the entire knot of subjectivity instantly falls
apart.
The imaginary order is that of imagery, complementarity, and
meaning.26 2 The real order is that which cannot be reduced to, or
which seems to escape, the other two orders.26 ' The real is our sense
that there is an external reality that cannot be reduced to our words
or pictures. Consequently, our intuitive understanding that there
is an object world outside of our psyche is located within the real.
economics at great length elsewhere and shall not repeat this discussion here. I will merely
reiterate a few crucial points.
259. See LACAN, SEMINAR I, supra note 258, at 80.
260. Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 32-33.
261. STUART SCHNEIDERMAN, JACQUES LACAN: THE DEATH OFAN INTELLECTUAL HERO 33
(1983). For a brief description of the metaphor of the Borromean knot, see SLAVOJ 2IdEK,
LOOKING AWRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES LACAN THROUGH POPULAR CULTURE 5, 143
(1991) [hereinafter kI2EK, LOOKING AWRY].
262. SLAvOJ ±IZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF
IDEOLOGY 123 (1993) (hereinafter 2IEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE]; Jeanne L.
Schroeder, The Eumenides: The Foundation of Law in the Repression of the Feminine (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Eumenides).
263. In Grosz's words: "The Real is not however the same as reality; reality is lived as and
known through imaginary and symbolic representations." GROSZ, supra note 258, at 34. She
states: "The Real cannot be experienced as such: it is capable of representation or
conceptualization only through the reconstructive or inferential work of the imaginary and
symbolic orders. Lacan himself refers to the Real as 'the lack of a lack." Id.
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But so is our understanding of God (in the sense of the Absolute),
death, and everything else that we sense is beyond the limitations
of human speech and imagery.2"' The real can be thought of as
Kant's misunderstanding that there is a noumenon, a thing-in-
itself, that is beyond our phenomenological understanding.
By this I mean that "real" is not the noumenon itself but the
misperception that there is a noumenon distinct from the empirical
phenomenal world. The "real" is not, therefore, the physical reality
or the "object world" per se. Being empirical, actuality (reality) falls
within Kant's category of phenomena. Lacan's conception of the real
does not question the existence of phenomena, but questions Kant's
theory that there exists in addition to empirical reality, some
nonempirical, purely rational thing-in-itself that exists outside
human understanding (the noumena).215 This sense that the thing-
in-itself exists outside of empirical phenomena is itself only an
appearance generated by our misunderstanding.266
Although Lacan does not question the existence of an objective
empirical world, his very idea of the real can be seen as a ques-
tioning of whether we have the ability to have a direct, immediate
understanding of it. Kant believes that only the noumena are
hidden, and one can know the phenomena through experience.
Lacan, following Hegel, questions one's ability to know even one's
own experience (Hegel's "sense certainty") as opposed to what one
264. See, e.g., JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
45 (Jacques-Allan Miller ed. Alan Sheridan trans., 1981) [hereinafter LACAN, THE FOUR
FUNDAMENTAL9S; SCHNEIDERmAN, supra note 261, at 76. Any attempt to give afflirmative
content to the idea of God (as in religions) is imaginary, not in the sense that such a God does
not exist, but that our understanding of such a God is located in the imaginary order.
265. Although we experience it in this way, "the Real is not a hard external kernel which
resists symbolization, but the product of a deadlock in the process of symbolization." &I EK,
THE INDm IBLE REMAINDER, AN ESSAY ON SCHELLING AND RELATED MATTERS 110 (1996)
[hereinafter 2±EK, INDVSIBLE REMAINDER]; see also Schroeder, The End of the Market,
supra note 19, at 500-01.
266. Actual markets, like law, are located in the order of the symbolic. In contrast, the
economic ideal of the perfect market is "real" (or noumenal) in the technical sense. The
perfect market is the realm beyond distinctions of time and space, where each subject has
perfect information about himself and all other subjects, including perfect knowledge of his
own preferences and desires, where all objects immediately flow to the highest valuing user
so that all subjects eventually become perfectly indifferent between what they have and any
other combination of goods at the perfect price ratios. In the perfect market all actual market
transaction stops. I set out this argument in full in Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra
note 19, at 548-58.
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can understand through speculative reason (or psychoanalysis).267
All three Lacanian orders are human reinterpretations of
experience.
Lacan and Hegel's point is shared by such diverse philosophers
of science as Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper. Peirce called
direct, immediate physical experience "oneness."26" Peirce argues,
however, that the instant one, as a conscious being, becomes aware
of his experience, he is already reinterpreting it through what
Peirce calls "secondness" (roughly the imaginary) or "thirdness"
(the symbolic).269 Consequently, man has no direct knowledge of
267. HEGEL, LOGIC, supra note 194, at 323.
268. Firstness may be described as pure unmediated essence, quality, unanalyzed total
impression, or potentiality.
Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject's being positively
such as it is regardless of aught else. That can only be a possibility, for as long
as things do not act upon one another there is no sense of meaning in saying
that they have any being, unless it be that they are such in themselves that
they may perhaps come into relation with others. The mode of being a redness,
before anything in the universe was yet red, was nevertheless a positive
qualitative possibility.
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECD PAPERS, VOLUME I, PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY 7 (E.
Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1931).
269. Secondness is the awareness of difference which suddenly thrusts itself on one's
consciousness. It is mediation and difference. It is actuality.
Actuality is something brute. There is no reason in it. I instance putting your
shoulder against a door and trying to force it open against an unseen, silent,
and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and
resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of
actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of being of one thing
which consists in how a second object is. I call that Secondness.
Id. at 7.
Thirdness, is mediation, connection and law.
Thirdness, in the sense of the category, is the same as mediation. For that
reason, pure dyadism is an act of arbitrary will or of blind force; for if there is
any reason, or law, governing it, that mediates between the two subjects and
brings about their connection.
Id at 164.
Peirce developed a particularly clear illustration of the mediated nature of consciousness
and our inability to have immediate contact with firstness.
Imagine me to make and in a slumberous condition to have a vague,
unobjectified, still less unsubjectified, sense of redness, or of salt taste, or of an
ache, or of grief or joy, or of a prolonged musical note. That would be, as nearly
as possible, a purely monadic state of feeling.
Id. at 149. But, as soon as one becomes conscious that one is tasting something there is no
longer one thing, the pure essence of the taste. There are two, the taste and the taster. You
no longer have an unmediated experience of the quality of taste, but a mediated or
interpretive experience. You can speculate that a few seconds before, you might have had an
330
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oneness. Similarly, Popper argues that although the empirical
world (which he called the first world) no doubt exists, man only
knows it indirectly through his subjective interpretation (the second
world) or the intersubjective collective reinterpretation (the third
world).27 World Three is Popper's definition of science.271
The symbolic is characterized by the linguistic concept of
signification. In signification, a word (a signifier) is never equiv-
alent to, and does not stand for, any "real" thing outside of
language. Rather, each signifier stands only for another signifier
within a chain of interpretation.2 This concept means that
signification is contingent because a word or a law can only be
understood within a specific context. The important aspect of this
for present purposes, is that the symbolic is always in a constant
state of flux. The symbolic order is always a work in progress and,
therefore, is always incomplete.
In contrast, the real includes the dream of a wholeness, a
completion, a permanence, and an integrity that the symbolic can
never achieve." It includes Kant's vision of an eternal noumenon
lying beneath ephemeral phenomena. The real includes the dream
of a subject who is not split (castrated).2 ' The dream of the real
can, however, be a horrifying nightmare. The real is the world of
no distinctions, no consciousness, and no subjectivity.275 It is a
mythical primal unity with the universe that must have existed
before one was born, and to which one might return when one dies.
immediate, purely physical, experience, but you can never know this directly.
270. KARLA. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: ANEVOLUTIONARYAPPROACH 106-07,153-
56 (Rev. ed. 1986).
271. Id. at 108.
272. "Lacan compared this chain of signifiers as 'rings of a necklace that is a ring in
another necklace made of rings.'" William J. Richardson, Lacan and the Subject of
Paychoanalysis, in 6 INTERPRETING LACAN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE HUMANITIES 54 (Joseph
Smith & William Kerrigan eds., 1983) (quoting JACQUES LACAN, 19CRITs: A SELECTION (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977)).
The meaning of this chain does not "consist" in any one of these elements but
rather "insists" in the whole, where the "whole" may be taken to be the entire
interlude as described, whose meaning, or rather whose "effect" of meaning, is
discerned retroactively ....
Id. at 55.
273. Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra note 19, at 511.
274. Id. at 511-13, 558.
275. Id. "The concept of the real implies the annihilation of the subject." SCHNE IDERMAN,
supra note 261, at 76.
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The real is where all movement stops.27 6 Kant anticipated this
interpretation when he declared that if man could ever truly know
the moral law he would not become like God, rather he would
become a lifeless puppet. 7
Man seeks relief from the ever-changing, partial world of the
symbolic, and the primal, dead fullness of the real in the third order
of the imaginary.278 The imaginary is not merely the realm of
images, but of "meaning."" 9 Meaning, in contrast to contingent
context-bound signification, is perfect correspondence, commen-
suration, or self-identity between sign and object. 280 It is not "X
stands for Y," but "X is Y." Lacan associates the imaginary to
animalistic thinking.28 ' In other words, economic rationality is in
the imaginary in the sense that it characterizes the type of behavior
characteristic of rats and frogs. The imaginary is the order of mirror
images, and simple negations where everything always is or is
not. 2 2 The imaginary is the fantasy that one can somehow preserve
the reassuringly static aspect of the real without submitting to its
terrifyingly deadly aspect. The imaginary is the fantasy that one
can somehow achieve the freedom, and moral responsibility of
the symbolic, without risking its unpredictability and ceaseless
change. 283
Using the imaginary, the subject builds fantasy structures
which seem to bind the three orders together in order to convince
himself that the symbolic order in which he acts is like the real
which he both desires and dreads. 4 It is these fantasies, these
fictions, that enable him to get through the day, and through his
276. Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra note 19, at 511-12, 536.
277. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
278. Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra note 19, at 506.
279. "There is no doubt that meaning is imaginary." THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN,
BOOK III: THE PSYCHOSES 1955-56, at 54 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & Russell Grigg trans.,
1993) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR III].
280. Id.; see also bL±EK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE supra note 262, at 123; Schroeder,
The Eumenides, supra note 262.
281. See LACAN, SEMINAR III, supra note 279, at 93-95.
282. Alan Sheridan, Translator's Notes to LACAN, ]9CRITS: A SELECTION (Alan Sheridan,
trans., 1977), at vii, ix. Lacan first developed his notion of the imaginary in his famous early
work on the mirror stage. See The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as
Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience, LACAN, ECRITS: A SELECTION at 1, 2; see also 2I2EK,
TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 262, at 123.
283. Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra note 19, at 506-08.
284. Id.
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life.28 Note, however, that because the fantasies only contingently
bind together three very different aspects of the psyche-the
symbolic, the imaginary, and the real-there is going to be an
inevitable split between what man imagines he desires, and his
desire created by the symbolic and the real.
3. The Master Signifier
The first matheme is S1, the "master signifier." In order for a
symbolic order to function, it is necessary to freeze the shifting of
the unending chain of signifiers, if only contingently and
temporarily."s This "freeze" is done through the adoption of what
Lacan calls a "master signifier."2s This signifier holds the key that
gives meaning to the other signifiers. The master signifier is the
signifier that does not have a signified; only stands for itself.' It,
therefore, can serve as the period that at least momentarily ends
the run-on sentence of signification. It is crucial that a symbolic
order have master signifiers, but the content of the master signifier
is, from a formal analytical perspective, irrelevant.289
285. In 2itek's words:
[F] antasy is the ultimate support of reality: "reality" stabilizes itself when some
fantasy-frame of a "symbolic bliss" closes off the view into the abyss of the
Real.... fantasy constitutes what we call reality: the most common bodily
"reality" is constituted via a detour through the cobweb of fantasy.
2IEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 262, at 119-29.
286. As explained by 2idek, "J[I]n order for the series of signifiers to signify something (to
have a determinate meaning), there must be a signifier (a "something") that stands for
'nothing," a signifying element whose very presence stands for the absence of meaning (or,
rather, for absence tout court). SLAvOJ I±EK, THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM 39 (1997) [hereinafter
212EK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM].
287. ,12EK, FOR THEY KNOw NOT WHAT THEY DO, supra note 244, at 23.
288. As explained by itek:
Because of this inherent tension, every language contains a paradoxical
element which, within its field, stands in for what eludes it-in lacunaes, in
every set of signifiers, there is always "at least one" which functions as the
signifier. This signifier is the Master Signifier: the "empty signifier" that
totalizes ("quilts" the dispersed field-in it, the infinite chaim of causes
("knowledge") is interrupted with an abyssal, nonfounded, founding act of
violence.
SLAVOJ 2dEK, ENJOY YOUR SYMPTOM!: JACQUES LACAN IN HOLLYWOOD AND OUT 102-03
(1992) [hereinafter IdEK, ENJOY YOUR SYMPTOM].
289. Mark Bracher, On the Psychological and Social Functions of Language: Lacan's
Theory of the Four Discourses, in LACANIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE: SUBJECT, STRUCTURE,
AND SOCIETY 107, 111-12 (Mark Bracher et al. eds., 1994).
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The master signifier is a master signifier because it serves a
function, not because it "deserves" to be a master signifier."2'
Indeed, because it is the signifier that stands for nothing but itself,
the master signifier is completely empty and vacuous. A perfect
example of a master signifier is the role of money in a market
economy. Money is the only thing in an economy that has no
substance or use value of its own. It exists only as a placeholder for
the substance or use value of other things. By doing so, it ties down
the market by treating incommensurable things as though they
were commensurable, thereby giving them economic value. 1
Of course, in theory anything could be a master signifier; in
practice, the choice of master signifier is crucial. To say that a
master signifier is arbitrary means only that no specific master
signifier is logically mandated. Rather, a master signifier is always
chosen by individuals and societies, although sometimes this choice
is forced.292 The choice of master signifier is, therefore, always an
ethical act. This notion means both that one can choose an evil
master signifier and that each person bears moral responsibility for
her choice of signifiers. In liberal legal systems, typical master
signifiers include "justice," "freedom," the "autonomous individual
or ego" and, in the case of legal academia, "efficiency.""3 In Nazi
Germany and other anti-semitic societies, the vicious stereotype of
"the Jew" (along with freemasonry and the New World Order), who
supposedly caused all the evil in society, is the most important
master signifier. In the 1990s, the master signifier of "Greater
Serbia" served to justify genocidal war, just as today Islamic purity
serves to justify terrorism. The point from a Lacanian analysis is
that these master signifiers can serve their function in a society
even though there is not a shred of evidence supporting the
290. FINK, supra note 251, at 29.
291. See Schroeder, The Midas Touch, supra note 117, at 749-60 (developing this analysis).
292. As Bracher says, "As master signifier is any signifier that a subject has invested his
or identity in." Bracher, supra note 289, at 111. In Renata Salecrs words, "it proceeds in an
unconditional manner and requires to be obeyed on the sole authority of its enunciation;...
not because there are good reasons to obey it." Renata Salecl, Deference to the Great Other:
The Discourse of Education, in LACANIANTHEORYOF DISCOURSE: SUBJECT, STRUCTURE, AND
SOCIETY 103 (Mark Bracher et al. eds., 1994).
293. See Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 29-31.
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stereotypes on which they are supposedly based. 9 ' Indeed, as Ziiek
has vigorously argued in his analysis of anti-semitism in Europe,
the very lack of evidence for, and the vacuity and fantasmic quality
of, stereotypes actually make them more powerful.295
4. Knowledge
The second matheme, S 2, stands for knowledge understood as
the entire chain of signifiers in a symbolic order held together by
the master signifier S1.' Although this idea seems quite intuitive,
there is one quirk to keep in mind. In psychoanalysis, knowledge is
not necessarily, or even usually, conscious knowledge. It is char-
acteristically unconscious.297
5. The Split Subject
Although the third matheme in the matrices is a, the objet petit
a, I shall discuss it last because an introduction to Lacan's theory
of subjectivity is required before we can discuss this notoriously
difficult concept.
The matheme of the split or barred subject (S) is one of Lacan's
earliest.'" The capital "S," stands for the subject. The line, or "bar"
that bifurcates refers to the constituent split that creates sub-jectivity.29
The statement that the subject is split is not merely an
assertion about how empirical individuals feel in modern society
(e.g., that contemporary Americans feel alienated). Rather it is a
definition of what a subject is. Subjectivity is nothing but its
constituent split, the radical negativity of pure possibility."°
294. Slavoj 2ilek, Ideology Between Fiction and Fantasy, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1511,1518-
20(1995).
295. See, e.g., ME TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 262, at 149-50; 2ilek,
Ideology Between Fiction and Fantasy, supra note 294, at 1519-23.
296. Bracher, supra note 289, at 111-12.
297. Id. at 110.
298. Lacan introduced the "S" at least as early as 1957. See LACAN, &CRrrs: A SELECTION
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) [hereinafter LACAN CRrFTS.
299. FINK, supra note 251, at 45, 173; Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at
34.
300. As 2ifek elaborates:
This "nothing," of course is the subject itself, the subject qua $ (the Lacanian
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Consequently, the phrase "the subject is split" is not a description,
but an equation (the subject = split).0 1 Our empirical experience of
our essential constituent split is expressed in Lacan's metaphor of
"castration."0 2
This metaphor expresses the idea that the subject does not
experience himself as being split as a matter of fact, rather he feels
that he has been split by the symbolic. °30 The split is experienced as
something horrible that someone else has done to the subject.
Lacan's account of the birth of subjectivity, like Hegel's, is
retroactive, not prospective.3 0 4 Lacan does not purport to tell how
infants really develop into adults. Rather, he theorizes how adults,
looking at themselves and their current "castrated" condition,
retroactively reconstruct what they believe "must have happened"
for this to occur.305 That is, if people feel castrated by the law today,
they believe this means that the law must have castrated them.
This seems to imply that it is possible that one could escape
castration by escaping the law (the romantic myth). It is Lacan's
view, however, that although the romantic myth is personality's
founding myth in contemporary Western society, it is merely a
myth. The autobiography society writes to explain its current
condition is literally false.
Lacan's analysis originates in Freud's theory of the Oedipus
complex. The Oedipus complex is typically thought of as a literal,
prospective account of childhood development."° Lacan, in contrast,
matheme, designating the subject with all content removed), the empty set, the
void that emerges as the result of the contraction in the form of expansion:
when I contract myself outside myself, I deprive myself of my substantial
content.
2IEK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 286, at 39.
301. See FINK, supra note 251, at 44-46.
302. SCHROEDER, VESTALN, supra note 29, at 87-94; Schroeder, The End of the Market,
supra note 19, at 501-06. In 2ifek's words: "[W]hat, precisely, is symbolic castration? It is ...
the sense of the precise loss of something which the subject never possessed in the first
place." tItEK, THE PLAGUE OF FANTASIES 15 (1997) [hereinafter 2LtEK, PLAGUE OF
FANTASIES].
303. Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 34-35.
304. See, e.g., LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 264, at 176 (The legibility
of sex in the interpretation of the unconscious mechanisms is always retroactive.").
305. SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 54, 56-57.
306. Freud himself seems to have wavered between naturalistic and fictional accounts. See
GROSZ, supra note 258, at 24-31; Anthony Wilden, Lacan and the Discourse of the Other, in
JACQUES LACAN, SPEECH AND LANGUAGE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 159, 199 (Anthony Wilden
[Vol. 44:263
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points out that even Oedipus did not have an Oedipus complex.0 7
In Lacan's reading, the Oedipus complex is merely Freud's dream
and, like all dreams, must be interpreted.08
Lacan's reinterpretation of the romantic Freudian dream is that
the "Law" (the Big Other) does not exist!. 9 Of course, laws exist as
an empirical matter, but they are not preexistent, objective,
necessary, determinate, closed, or permanent.1 0 Instead, all
legal systems (as well as language and sexuality) are artificial,
intersubjective, contingent, indeterminate, open, and shifting.1 '
Positive law is not "Law" with a capital "L." At first blush this
seems remarkably consistent with the romantic view that I criticize.
At further consideration, however, one can see that the conclusions
Lacan draws from this are much different.
One of Lacan's crucial points is that, despite the fact that law
"does not exist," the subject cannot escape the law.312 In contrast to
liberalism, but consistent with Hegelianism, the Lacanian subject
is not natural but is a legal creation, a negative unity of positive
legal attributes. 313 Negativity is the ground of the subject. The term
"split subject" is, therefore, a self-conscious redundancy. The subject
is nothing but the negativity of the split that creates it. Moreover,
it is precisely the law that creates the subject by splitting it, even
as it is the law that is intersubjectively written by the community
trans., 1981).
307. THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOKVII: THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, 1959-
60, at 304 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. Dennis Porter trans., 1992) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR
VII].
308. LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 159.
309. Id. at 74; see also Jacques-Alain Miller, Extimiti, in THEORY OF DISCOURSE, supra
note 298, at 74,81. This prefigured Lacan's even more infamous pronouncement that Woman
does not exist. LACAN, SEMINARXX, supra note 184, at 72-74.
310. Lacan expresses the fact that the notion that the symbolic order functions despite,
or maybe because of its nonexistence through the riddle "What has a body and does not exist?
Answer-the big Other." LACAN, SEMINAIE XVII, supra note 209, at 74; see also Schroeder,
The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 75.
311. See also Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 34, 82-85; Jeanne L.
Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Law's Invisible Empire, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming
2002).
312. Those unlucky individuals who escape the symbolic order are not subjects but,
literally, madmen. See, e.g., SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 88-89; 2dEK, FOR THEY
KNOW NOT WHAT THEY Do, supra note 244, at 101; 7IAEK, LOOKING AWRY, supra note 261,
at 20; 2dIEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 172, at 19.
313. SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 5383, 277. The negative unity of positive
attributes is Hegel's definition of the self. See HEGEL, LOGIC, supra note 194, at 583.
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of split subjects.314 Neither law nor subjectivity preexist the other;
they are mutually constituting and come into being together.315 In
contrast to libertarianism, but consistent with utilitarianism, law
is conceived as unnatural and artificial. The law cannot be reformed
"to exist." In other words, although it is necessary to subjectivity
that there be "Law," no specific positive laws are essential.
Following Kant and Hegel, Lacan posits that it is precisely positive
law's "non-existence," i.e., its failure, that enables the law to
function, subjectivity to exist, and freedom to be actualized.1 6
Even in this brief discussion, there are a number of issues which
should interest economists. First, psychoanalysis shares economics'
belief that the subject is nothing but a locus of unfulfilled desire.1 7
As Becker and Stigler have argued, one of the great problems of
neo-classical price theory is that it has lost a theory of desires
(what they would call preferences). 31 8 Posner's changing account of
economic rationality over the years demonstrates how the law
and economics movement has had to abandon its traditional
assumptions about selfish, atomistic behavior, but has yet to319
develop a coherent substitute. One is left with either unexplained
and unpredictable idiosyncratic pregiven preferences, or Posner's
ad hoc speculations about man's prehistoric genetic heritage.320
Psychoanalysis has the potential to enrich the economic analysis
by offering an account of how these desires arise and what they
314. Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 74-75; Schroeder & Carlson,
Law's Invisible Empire, supra note 311.
315. This is, famously, Hegel's theory set forth in the first section of The Philosophy of
Right. See SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 15-52. I argue that Lacan's account of the
creation of subjectivity and the symbolic order parallels Hegel's account. Id. at 52-106.
316. SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS, supra note 63; Schroeder & Carlson, Law's
Invisible Empire, supra note 311. I present an extended argument of how the imperfection
of the symbolic enables it to function extensively (in the specific case of an analysis of
markets) in Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra note 19 and Schroeder, Pandora's
Amphora, supra note 29.
317. Schroeder, The End ofthe Market, supra note 19, at 512-13. Similarly, to Hegel self-
consciousness is nothing but desire. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, supra note 209,1
167; see also DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND, HEGEL'S THEORY OF MADNESS 46-47 (1995).
318. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
319. I chronicle Posner's changing account of rationality in Schroeder, Economic
Rationality, supra note 25, at 159-85.
320. Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 36, at 1570. 1 discuss Posner's recent foray
into socio-biology in Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 25, at 173-80.
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might be. It therefore seeks to give content to Becker and Stigler's
intuition about universal desires. 21
Psychoanalysis also provides an account of why the subject as
a locus of desire is not a unitary, self-identical self. It does so,
however, without resorting to Posner's intuition that the person
might be a collection of warring sub-selves. The Lacanian account
neither sees the split subject as an alternative to the traditional
unitary subject, nor sees the split of subjectivity as an occasional
exception to the norm of unity. Rather, it explains how the
traditional subject of liberalism is comprised of various psychic
components and seeks to help individual persons understand and
thereby take control over their own desires.
Moreover, because economics has no account of unconscious
thought, it has no account of economic decision making. At most, as
I discuss in Just So-Stories, economists such as Posner and
Friedman must resort to the proposition that economic subjects act
"as if" they were rational. 22 Indeed, Friedman and Posner go so far
as to trumpet the fact that neo-classical economics is totally devoid
of psychological content. 8 This is not an explanation, but a failure
to explain behavior. To the psychoanalyst, the unconscious is a
necessary complement to consciousness.324 To the economist, the
unconscious is an unpredictable, "irrational," unknown process. In
contrast, psychoanalysis argues that the unconscious is highly
structured and predictable-perhaps even more economically
"rational" than the conscious.32
321. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
324. In Lacan's famous formulation, the unconscious is "structured like a language.*
LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 264, at 20, 149.
325. For an introduction to the role of the unconscious in the creation of the subject see
Jacques Lacan, Position of the Unconscious (Bruce Fink trans.), in READING SEMINAR XI:
LACAN'S FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 259 (Richard Feldstein et al.,
eds., 1995); see also LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 264, at 45-46; ±J1rE, FOR
THEY KNow NOT WHAT THEY Do, supra note 264, at 146-49; Mladen Dolar, Cogito as the
Subject of the Unconscious, in 2 SIC: COGITO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 11, 30-31 (Slavoj 2ifek
ed., 1998) [hereinafter, 2 SIC).
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6. The objet petit a
The term "objetpetit a" (the little object a) and the matheme "a"
designate that the object referred to stands in the place of the "little
other" (autre in French, hence the letter "a"). The concept of the Big
Other (the symbolic order) can stand for alterity (whatever is
other than the subject) per se. Little others are specific others
encountered by the subject.
The objetpetit a serves as the object cause of desire. Because the
subject is split, he desires. Specifically, he desires not to be split,
but to be whole. Indeed, the split of subjectivity can be thought of
as nothing more than this desire. Because the subject desires to be
whole, he does not want to acknowledge that his split is constituent
of his subjectivity. He wants to be an "unsplit" subject. He believes
that there must be some specific external thing that would explain
his split. 2 ' This hypothesized explanatory object-"the little a"-is
an attempt to positivize or to give body to negativity. Kant's concept
of the noumenon or "thing-in-itself" is technically an objetpetit a: an
attempt to give positive body to the radical negativity of essence.
The subject seeks to identify an actual object to explain why he
desires.3 This object might be something conventionally considered
desirable. He can then tell himself, "The reason I am not whole is
that I lack that wonderful object. If I could just obtain that object,
I could then be happy. " "s Alternately, the object could be one of
fear or disgust. "The reason I am not whole is because that terrible
object is eating away at me. If I could just rid myself of the object,
326. That is, "the subject calls for recognition on the appropriate level of authentic
symbolic exchange-which is not so easy to attain since it's always interfered with-is
replaced by a recognition of the imaginary, of fantasy." JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF
JACQUES LACAN, BOOK II: THE EGO IN FREUD'S THEORY AND IN THE TECHNIQUE OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 1954-55, at 15 (J.-A. Miller ed. & S. Tomaselli trans., 1988) [hereinafter
LACAN, SEMINAR II]; see also SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 109. In Lacan's words,
'The fantasy is the support of desire; it is not the object that is the support of desire." LACAN,
THE FOUR FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 264, at 185.
327. I2EK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 286, at 79.
328. See SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 7-8. As explained by 2itek:
In this precise sense, a is the object-cause of desire: it does not effectively pre-
exist desire as that which arouses it, it merely gives body to its inherent
deadlock, to the fact that desire is never satisfied by any positive object; that is
to say, apropos of every positive object, the subject's experience will always be
a "this is not that."
2IEK, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 265, at 144.
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my wound could heal." The subject, therefore, treats that object as
though it caused her desire. In other words, although the desire of
man is the desire of the Other329-i.e., to be recognized in
intersubjective relations-the subject attributes her desire to the
objetpetit a.3"' In this way, intersubjective relations are replaced by
object relations.
This is a fantasy. The subject does not desire because he lacks
this object, he looks for an object because he desires. In other
words, the effect of desire antecedes its hypothetical cause. This
fantasy is reassuring because it purports to give a simple account
of and solution to the universal sense of alienation Lacan calls
"castration."31 In the words of the familiar song from The Wizard
of Oz:
I would not be just a nuffin'
My head all full of stuffin'
My heart all full of pain.
I would dance and be merry
Life would be a ding-a-derry
If I only had a brain....
I'd be brave as a blizzard ...
I'd be gentle as a lizard...
I'd be clever as a gizzard...
If the Wizard is a wizard who will serve.
Then I'm sure to get a brain; a heart; a home; the nerve!3 2
329. See infra note 453 and accompanying text.
330. The objet petit a is "the chimerical object of Fantasy, the object causing our desire and
at the same time-this is the paradox-posed retroactively as this desire .... SLAVOJ ±2EmK,
THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 65 (1989) [hereinafter NI EK, SUBLIME OBJECT]. "The
paradox of desire is that it posits retroactively its own cause, i.e., the object a .... I2EK,
LOOKING AWRY, supra note 261, at 12 ; see also 2 IdEK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 286,
at 79.
331. Lacan insisted on the "universality of the process of castration as the unique path of
access to desire and to sexual normativisation .... " JACQUES LACAN AND THE lkCOLE
FREUDIENNE, FEMININE SEXUALITY 118 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., Jacqueline
Rose trans., 1985).
332. If I Only Had a Brain, in THE WIZARD OF OZ (MGM 1939). Dorothy's three fellow
travelers take the masculine position with respect to castration. They believe that they are
not whole because a precious part has been taken away that could be restored by the Big
Other personified by the Wizard. Dorothy, in contrast, takes the feminine position that sees
castration as a deeper level of dislocation and loss of innocence. She does not want a thing.
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In these familiar lyrics, each of Dorothy's fellow travelers imagines
that he lacks a special part and that all his problems could be
solved if the Big Other, personified by the great and powerful
Wizard of Oz, would fill his lack by supplying him with one. Of
course, as the movie makes clear, none of the three fellow travelers
lacked the object that caused their desire. Their respective actions
during their rescue of Dorothy proved that the Scarecrow was
always the most intelligent, the Tin Woodsman always the most
loving, and the Cowardly Lion always the most courageous of
creatures. The "missing" brain, heart, and nerve were merely objets
petit a that stood for their feelings of inadequacy."'3
In the movie, the Scarecrow, Tin Woodsman, and Cowardly Lion
were satisfied when the Wizard gave them meaningless trinkets (a
diploma, testimonial, and medal, respectively) and Dorothy was
happy to leave the magical and colorful riches of Oz to return to the
grim, black-and-white poverty of Kansas. This is because the movie
is a fantasy in both the colloquial and Lacanian senses. Indeed, it
is precisely the fantasmical element of the happy ending that
makes the film so enjoyable to the split subjects in the audience."3 '
Obviously, as a fantasy, this strategy could never successfully
satisfy desire in the symbolic world of intersubjective relations in
which people live. If one were ever to attain one's objet petit a, one
would find that one still desires and would, therefore, immediately
have to find another object to serve this role. 3 5
When she was in Kansas, she longed to go "Somewhere Over the Rainbow;* when she was
in Oz, she just wanted to go home.
333. Michael Patrick Hearn, in his decidedly un-postmodern annotations to The Wizard
of Oz, makes a similar point based on M.L. Franz's Jungian analysis of the fairytale
tradition:
A hero ... often seeks that one talisman ... that will make one whole.... [Tlhe
desired object will restore meaning to the afflicted person.... The Scarecrow, the
Tin Woodman and the Cowardly Lion all suffer from these feelings of
inadequacy; each one must find that one special thing that will make him
complete. But the talisman is only a symbol and has no value of its own.
Michael Patrick Hearn, Note 18 in L. FRANK BAUM, THE ANNOTATED WIZARD OF OZ: THE
WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ 273 (Michael Patrick Hearn ed., 2000). A Lacanian analysis
would agree, except for the fact that an objet petit a is not technically a "symbol."
334. This is why, at the end of the movie, we learn that Dorothy's adventures were only
a dream. By contrast, in the book, the adventures are "real." But even Frank L. Baum, the
author of The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, ultimately could not believe the fantasy of the happy
ending. He and his successors brought Dorothy back to Oz in numerous sequels.
335. Unlike the movie, the original book does not end and Dorothy does not return to
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One should not assume that the class of things that can serve
as "objects little a" are physical things, or even things that are
conventionally desirable.816 Abstract principles can equally be
"objects" for this purpose, which is to set the chain of desire into
motion. 37 Nobelists for economics Becker and Stigler have proposed
a theory that could be interpreted as an intuitive approximation
of the "little a".338 They posit that all human beings have a few
universal preferences involving intersubjective relationships,
such as a desire for status. Rather than pursuing these goals
directly, however, economic actors seek to acquire specific objects
or commodities as means of achieving, or proxies for, their true
desire. 39 For example, one person may think he wants a fancy
sports car and another a fancy house, but in fact what they really
want is the same thing: the admiration of others, or more to the
point, reassurance that the self exists.
An understanding of the subtleties of this idea is not necessary
for the purposes of this Article, however. For this Article's purposes,
the objet petit a can be thought of simply as ends-whether as
individual preferences, or as societal goals or policies.
7. The Positions
As already mentioned, the four positions of the matrix are:
Went other
truth product/loss3 o
The upper left corner is the agent, the speaker of the discourse. The
agent addresses the matheme in the upper right comer as the
Kansas when the Wizard bestows the tokens. The tokens do not bring the anticipated
satisfaction to their recipients. Being self-conscious of his brain, heart, and courage,
respectively, "the Scarecrow has grown conceited and the Tin Woodman self-absorbed, the
Lion has become a bully." Hearn, supra note 333, at 309 n.2. They must go on a second
journey of self-discovery before they can find their true vocations.
336. Bracher, supra note 289, at 114.
337. Id.
338. I explicate this argument in full elsewhere. See Schroeder, Economic Rationality,
supra note 25, at 243-46.
339. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES, supra note 40, at 5, 87; Stigler & Becker, supra
note 53, at 77.
340. FINK, supra note 251, at 131.
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agent's "other." This address is indicated by an arrow moving from
the left to the right. Beneath the agent is the "truth." The line or
bar between the agent and its truth indicates that the agent is
forever separated from direct access to its own truth. This is the
same "bar" that bifurcates the "S" of subjectivity in the matheme of
the split or barred subject (S).
Underneath, and barred from, the other is the result of the
discourse. The result can be something produced or something lost.
This result is underneath and barred from the other. Note that
there is no arrow connecting the two mathemes in the lower
register. This indicates that there is no direct relationship between
them. More radically, there is a fundamentally impossible non-
relationship between them. Any relationship between them only
comes about indirectly through the discourse.
The starting, most primitive, discourse is that of the master. 41
Each of the other four discourses is created by revolving the four
mathemes through the four positions of the matrix one quarter turn
counter-clockwise. Thus, the four discourses are related as follows.
Sa
Hysteric's Dizs ose Uni s 's Dcu
8 *,5 %2
a 52 S, I
S2  S,
Lacan stated that the discourse of the master is the other side
or reverse of psychoanalysis. 4 ' It is directly across the diagram
from the discourse of the analyst, and precisely reverses and inverts
all the constituent mathemes. This diagram suggests that the
university's discourse (policy science) is similarly the other side or
341. Id. at 130.
342. Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 251, at 95.
343. LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 99.
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reverse of the hysteric's discourse (speculative thought).34 I believe
that when Lacan says that the discourse of the master and the
analyst are the other sides of each other, he meant that the analyst
is in a privileged position to critique the master.3 45 Similarly, I
argue that the hysteric is in a privileged position to critique the
university. Unfortunately, the master's discourse and analyst's
discourse do not address each other directly. They require the other
discourses to act as mediators. Similarly, the university's discourse
and the hysteric's discourse fail to communicate. This is the
phenomena of contemporary legal scholarship.
B. The Discourses of Power
Oh, we shall persuade them that they will only become free when
they renounce their freedom to us and submit to us.... [W]e shall
have an answer for all. And they will be glad to believe our
answer, for it will save them from the great care and terrible
agony they endure at present in making a free decision for
themselves.
-- The Grand Inquisitor 3
46
1. The Discourse of the Master
S a
The master's discourse is, along with the university's, one of the
two discourses of power. 47 Because this Article is concerned with
344. See Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 98.
345. For example, elsewhere I show how the hidden, repressed support of the discourse
of the master is fantasy, in the technical Lacanian sense of the term. Lacan's matheme for
fantasy is "S 0 a," which forms the lower register of the master's discourse. If analysis is
successful, the analyst learns to "traverse" the fantasy that is running his life. The matheme
for the traversing of fantasy is "a - S." This is, of course, the express, upper register of the
analyst's discourse. Consequently, the analyst's discourse, in effect, can knock the support
from out from under the master's discourse. Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245,
at 96-98.
346. FYODOR MRHALOVICH DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 134 (Constance
Garnett trans., 1952).
347. Jamie Murray, An Erotics of Law: Lacanian Psychoanalysis and Legal Theory 105
(1999) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis) (on file with author).
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only the discourses of the university and the hysteric, it only refers
to the master's discourse in passing here. The master signifier (S1),
the signifier that gives meaning to the entire chain of signifiers, is
in the position of the agent or addressor of the master's discourse.
The discourse of the master is based on Hegel's master-slave
dialectic.3 48 In Hegel's example the master signifier is literally a
master-the victorious warrior who enslaved his captive.149 Lacan
generalized this so that it could apply to the political realm.5 0
It is important to remember that the master signifier, as the
signifier without a signified, is empty and meaningless. The master
asserts his authority purely by virtue of his position and power, not
because he deserves his position or for any other reason. 51
Consequently, I have argued that the discourse of the master
characterizes the positivist legal theory associated with H.L.A.
Hart. 52
The other addressee of the master signifier is S 2, knowledge.
This position is occupied by those who are subjected to the master's
rule. S2 stands specifically for practical, implicit knowledge in the
sense of know how (savoir faire)."' In Hegel's example, the slave
learns how to do things (such as farming and serving) and to make
things (such as cooking food and building walls). The master, in
contrast, proudly lives in ignorance as proof that he is above the
mundane details of existence that he leaves to the slave .3 5 In
348. FINK, supra note 251, at 131.
349. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, supra note 209, at 111-18.
350. For example, itek describes the monarch as a master signifier. 2EK, FOR THEY
KNOW NOT WHAT THEY Do, supra note 244, at 82-83. 2idek also compares Lacan's concept
of the master's discourse with Churchill's concept of a political decision. Slavoj itek, Four
Discourses, Four Subjects, in 2 SIC, supra note 325, at 74, 76-77 [hereinafter 2itek, Four
Subjects). Lacan himself relates the master's discourse to Marx's theory of surplus value.
FINK, supra note 251, at 131; LACAN, SEMINARXVII, supra note 209, at 207. Lacan further
relates the master's discourse to one notion of law. Id. at 48.
351. "The master must be obeyed-not because well all be better off that way or for some
other such rationale-but because he or she says so. No justification is given for his or her
power: it just is." FINK, supra note 251, at 131 (citations omitted).
352. See Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 46-53.
353. LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 20-21, 34.
354. Salecl, supra note 292, at 163.
Knowledge does not belong to the Master but to those who obey. The discourse
of the Master is thus always characterized by a kind of fundamental ignorance
with regard to its conditions; it proceeds in an unconditional manner and
requires to be obeyed on the sole authority of its enunciation.
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Lacan's words, "a real master desires to know nothing at all-he
desires that it work."35
Underneath the master, but barred and hidden, is his truth: the
master is a flawed and imperfect split subject (S). The emperor is
naked and the Big Other does not exist.'
Underneath the governed is the result of this discourse. This
result turns out to be the objet petit a (a), the object cause of
desire.3 57 This result is, in fact, a loss. The "little a" is what is
excluded from the discourse. For example, in Hegel's lord-
bondsman dialectic, the "little a" was the slave's freedom. Freedom
becomes the slave's "little a" precisely because it is what the master
has excluded.S Similarly, Hart argued that law is to be dis-
tinguished from such substantive criteria as morality and justice.5 9
Consequently, these excluded ideals become the law's desire. This
was precisley Hart's intent."s By divorcing law and morals, he
wished to allow us to find the source of morality elsewhere so that
we could use morality as an external perspective for judging legal
regimes.3 6'
2. The Discourse of the University
S,
The university's discourse is obtained by giving the master's
discourse a quarter turn. Although there is a cadre of Hartian
355. LACAN, SEMINARXVII, supra note 209, at 11.
356. In the words of 2ifek: "Lacan's fundamental thesis is that the Master is by definition
an imposter .... Met the place occupied by him-the place of the lack in the
structure-cannot be abolished .... " 2K, ENJOY YOUR SYMPTOM!, supra note 288, at 103.
357. "Well we have always stressed that, from this trajectory there emerges something to
be defined as a loss. This is what the letter that is to be read as the object a." LACAN,
SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 13.
358. That is, if the subject could truly capture the object that caused his desire, he would
beth cease to desire and cease to be a subject. Consequently, the "little a" is always
definitionally an absent unobtained object.
359. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
360. Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 51-52.
361. That is, Hart argued that the reason why one should disobey an evil legal regime
(such as that of Nazi Germany) is not because its law is not law, but because it is evil. Hart,
supra note 359, at 620.
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positivists in academia who arguably adopt the master's discourse,
the university's discourse is the dominant discourse of legal
scholarship. This discourse is what I call policy science.
As his terminology indicates, Lacan recognizes that this
discourse is found in its most pure form within universities. He
does not intend to imply that this is the discourse that scholars
should speak. He comes to bury most of what goes on in academia
in the name of scholarship, not to praise it.36 2 The university's
discourse is not, in his view, a sincere search for truth. True inquiry
and understanding can only come through the discourses of the
analyst and hysteric.
Specifically, Lacan developed his discourse theory in the
aftermath of the Paris student riots of 1968."36 He wished to
chastise the self-styled radicals who claimed to be establishing a
new "free" university. Lacan argued that these "radicals" were
anything but. They, in fact, were policy scientists who spoke within
the same discourse as the university they claimed to despise. 64
In the university's discourse, the addressor stands in the
position of knowledge (S) or expertise.6 5 In contrast to the master,
the expert does not claim authority purely by virtue of his position.
He claims that he deserves his position because of his superior
knowledge. He purports to have reasoned justification for where he
is and what he does. 6 '
The expert addresses the "little a," the cause of desire.6 ' Once
again, in contrast to the master, the university expert claims
purpose. He claims to inquire into society's goals (its desire) in
order to propose policies designed to achieve these purposes. The
362. For example, although Lacan considered most scientific work done in the academy
consisted of a university discourse, he disassociated it from true science, which he considered
to be a hysteric's discourse. FINK, supra note 251, at 132.
363. See Bracher, supra note 289, at 115-16, 119-20.
364. According to Bracher, Lacan thought that the so-called student revolutionaries saw
all phenomena in terms of master signifiers like "imperialism,' 'domination,' Treedom,'
'oppression.' Id. at 119. The fact that the students he was addressing tended to be Marxists
may partially explain why Lacan himself draws his examples from Marxist theory. See
Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 56-57.
365. LACAN, SEMINARXVII, supra note 209, at 119; itek, Four Subjects, supra note 350,
at 74, 78.
366. "Systematic knowledge is the ultimate authority, reigning in the stead of blind will,
and everything has its reason." FINI, supra note 251, at 132.
367. Bracher, supra note 289, at 115; itek, Four Subjects, supra note 350, at 78-79.
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university expert, having identified an end, now "rationally" pro-
poses means to achieve this end.
The truth hidden under the veil of expertise is, however, the
master.36 ' The claim to expertise is a rationalization for the expert's
imposition of her will. The claim to superior knowledge is a means
of gaining and wielding power.869 The purported inquiry into the
ends of society and the promulgating of policies are really means to
the end of controlling and manipulating others.
The result of the university's discourse is the split subject.70
The split subject is the one subjected to the expert's manipulation
and who is thereby alienated from the enterprise. 71 Lacan argues
that in the context of the actual university, one split subject is
the student. 2 In the master's discourse, the result, the "little
a," comes about through exclusion. It is, in a way, an unintended
consequence. The master seeks to exclude the "little a" from his
discourse, but by doing so, he causes the "little a" to function as the
object of desire. 73 In contrast, the goal of the university's discourse
is to produce a subject who obeys the policy set by the experts.374
That is, the expert intends that his discourse produce a subject,
whether or not the actual form this subject takes meets the expert's
expectations.
368. "The truth' of the university discourse, hidden beneath the bar, of course, is power."
FINK, supra note 251, at 78; see also LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 119.
369. FINK, supra note 251, at 132.
370. As Bracher explains: "Subjected, in this position, to a dominating totalized system
of knowledge/belief (S2), we are made to produce ourselves as (alienated) subjects, 5, of this
system." Bracher, supra note 289, at 115. But as Nitek warns us:
What one should avoid here is the Foucauldian misreading: the produced
subject is not simply the subjectivity that arises as the result of the disciplinary
application of knowledge-power, but its remainder, that which eludes the grasp
of knowledge-power.... [It is] the excess that resists being included in the
discursive network.
i.ek, Four Subjects, supra note 350, at 78.
371. itek gives the following example from medical practice:
[Alt the surface level, we are dealing with pure objective knowledge that
desubjectivizes the subject-patient, reducing him to an object of research, of
diagnosis and treatment; however, beneath it, one can easily discern a worried
hystericized subject, obsessed with anxiety, addressing the doctor as his Master
and asking for reassurance from him.
titek, Four Subjects, supra note 350, at 78-79.
372. LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 173.
373. See supra note 307.
374. Bracher, supra note 289, at 115, tilek, Four Subjects, supra note 350, at 78.
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Lacan believes that one speaking in the university discourse is
indifferent to whether the expert speaker or the student addressed
actually achieves a true understanding. 75 The professors care about
their prestige in academia and in society, and students are merely
a means to that end. Consequently, students become alienated from
the whole enterprise, parroting back what their teachers tell them
rather than seeking to create their own knowledge.
In law, the split subjects are those who are to be manipulated
by policy. The expert wishes to produce these subjects who will
achieve the expert's goals, even if the expert does not consciously
wish to alienate or "split" them. For example, Jolls, Sunstein, and
Thaler want legal rules to make people act as though they were
economically rational." 6 Nevertheless, although the expert wants
to produce certain types of subjects, the expert does not address
these subjects directly. The expert does not ask the subjects what
their goals are. The expert does not ask about their experience of
the law to which they are subjected. Rather, the university's
concern is "objective--the goals ("little a") of society as a whole.
The question is how to make the individuals who comprise society
better achieve society's goals. In the name of a free society, policy
science fundamentally mistrusts the freedom of its members.
a. Legal Policy Scholarship
Indeed, according to Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler, and the Oregon
conference participants, the subjects of their study not only do not
know the best way to achieve their desires, they do not understand
what those desires are. 77 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler identify "three
functions of any proposed approach to law: positive, prescriptive,
and normative."37 ' By positive they mean: "How will law affect
human behavior?" "The prescriptive task is to see how law might be
used to achieve specified ends, such as deterring socially un-
desirable behavior."'79 They state:
375. In Bracher's words: "No provision is made for individual subjects and their desires
and idiosyncracies. Individuals are to act, think, and desire only in ways that function to
enact, reproduce or extend the System." Bracher, supra note 289, at 115.
376. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
377. See supra text at note 23.




[The] normative task is to assess more broadly the ends of the
legal system. In conventional economic analysis, normative
analysis is no different from prescriptive analysis, since the goal
of the legal system is to maximize "social welfare," usually
measured by people's revealed preferences .... But from the
perspective of behavioral economics, the ends of the legal system
are more complex. This is so because people's revealed
preferences are a less certain ground on which to build;
obviously issues of paternalism become central here."0
That is, to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler all legal scholarship
should be addressed towards a policy goal-an objet petit a. Note
that Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler do not include an analysis of how
the law operates at the individual level as a possible function of
legal scholarship. Nor do they consider the question of how the
individual can use the law for her own purposes. The practicing
lawyer, the doctrinalist, and the speculative scholar tackle these
neglected functions.
In other words, rather than helping individuals determine how
to confront the law from their own subjective positions, Jolls,
Sunstein, and Thaler want the experts both to tell people what they
should do and manipulate people to further the experts' goals. The
experts also determine what people should and will want. They do
not seek to educate those subjected to the law. If the experts think
that it will bring them closer to their goal ("little a"), the experts
will actually withhold information from the subjects. It is the
experts who identify society's goals and the appropriate preferences
of the populace, and then use the law to manipulate individuals
(provide incentives and disincentives) to achieve these goals.
b. Examples
One issue discussed by Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler is the
supposed propensity of jurors to favor plaintiffs in negligence
actions."' Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler suggest that part of the
reason for this propensity might be cognitive errors such as
380. Id. at 1474-75.
381. Id. at 1522-33.
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"hindsight bias,"M8 2 and the inappropriate desire of jurors to
compensate tort victims. 383
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler's suggestion for dealing with this
problem is not to better educate jurors about probabilities or the
goals of the tort system, but how to "manipulat[e] the set of
information given to jurors."38' Indeed, they believe that it might be
beneficial if information is actively withheld from the finders of
fact. For example, in a product liabilities case, jurors could be asked
to decide abstract questions devoid of the concrete content of the
actual case in controversy, so that they do not know who was
harmed and how. 8 '
Of course, insofar as our society believes that our tort system is
supposed to serve some purpose, such as shifting losses to the least-
cost avoider, or making economic actors internalize their costs, it is
important that the triers of fact in tort litigation apply the
appropriate test to determine culpability and impose damages.38 6
Consequently, I am not condemning the impetus behind empirical
investigation as to how juries in fact make decisions. Indeed, as
Simon hoped, behavioral studies might serve as a healthy
counterweight against economic rationality's assumptions that
infect so much of scholarship.38 7 What I find disturbing, however, is
that the "solutions" suggested by Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler seem
so antithetical to Simon's goal of helping decision makers. It is also
strikingly different from the modest approach taken by the author
of the jury hindsight bias study on which Jolls, Sunstein, and
Thaler rely. Jeffrey Rachlinski concludes that the "legal system
has a good understanding of the hindsight bias," and that courts
have "developed mechanisms for taking advantage of specific
circumstances that allow them to reduce the influence of the
382. Id. at 1523-24.
383. Id. at 1531.
384. Id. at 1527.
385. They give an example in which a company uses a chemical in its production process
that allegedly causes cancer in a percentage of the people living near the plant. The company
takes the position that not using the chemical would increase the likelihood of bacterial
contamination of the product. The jury would be asked to make a comparative cost-benefit
analysis of the two production methods without being told whether the plaintiffs are alleging
that they were harmed because the chemical was used and they contracted cancer, or
because the chemical was not used and they contracted a bacterial infection. Id. at 1527.
386. I am agnostic as to what the "purpose" of the negligence standard is or should be.
387. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
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hindsight bias. In those cases in which the bias cannot be avoided,
the courts have pursued sensible second-best strategies. 38 8
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler also suggest that when the govern-
ment wishes to provide citizens with information so that they can
make informed choices, the government should not merely be aware
of bounded rationality.'S Nor do Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler merely
suggest that government regulators study rhetoric and commu-
nication skills.3 9 Rather, they would have the government take its
cue from advertising and actively seek to exploit people's cognitive
failures to manipulate their behavior.3 9' Indeed, Jolls, Sunstein, and
Thaler call into question one of the primary basis of a free economy:
The idea of "consumer sovereignty" plays a large role [i.e. in
normative law and economics scholarship]; citizens, assuming
they have reasonable access to relevant information, are
thought to be the best judges of what will promote their own
welfare. Yet many of the instances of bounded rationality
discussed ... call into question the idea .... In this way bounded
rationality pushes toward a sort of anti-antipaternalism-a
skepticism about antipaternalism, but not an affirmative
defense of paternalism.3"
This is a perfect illustration of everything that Lacan thinks is
wrong about the university's discourse. Despite the pretense of
university experts to be engaged in exploration of truth and the
education of others, they are really seeking to exercise power over
others by telling them what to do, even using deceit and trickery if
necessary.
Another excellent example of the university's attitude toward
those subjected to its control is its treatment of the so-called
"endowment effect." Empirical evidence suggests that people
become attached to objects they own and are loathe to exchange
them for their market price or even for virtually identical objects. 93
388. Rachlinski,A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICs, supra note 10, at 95, 111-12.
389. See Jolla, et al., Behavioral Approach, supra note 10, at 1533-35.
390. See id.
391. Id. at 1536-37.
392. Id. at 1541.
393. See id. at 1483-84.
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According to the experts, this sentimental attachment is irrational
(or an example of bounded rationality). Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler
suggest legal rules intended to dispel the endowment effects.394 In
other words, although the experts give lip service to the proposition
that there is no accounting for tastes and that rationality is limited
to the determination of the most efficient means to achieve
subjective ends, to call the endowment effect "irrational" is to sneak
in a professional judgment as to taste.395 As the subject to be
produced by the university discourse inevitably has goals and
desires, as well as behavior imported into her, she is, inevitably,
split and alienated to some extent.
Indeed, Becker criticizes traditional neo-classical economic
theory on precisely these grounds.396 Becker insists that in order
for neo-classical economics to be both internally consistent and
an effective predictor of behavior, it needs to develop a theory of
preference formation. In contrast, in his new home-economics,
Becker has tried to formulate a theory of "capital formation" to
explain how a wide variety of behavior, including habits and drug
addiction might be economically rational (even if irrationally
harmful in the colloquial sense). 97 Becker believes that households
should not be considered mere "consumers" of utility, but active
producers of utility. 98 One way one might produce utility is by
investing one's possessions with personal significance, thereby
increasing their subjective use value to the individual over
their objective market exchange value.399 Consequently, it is not
394. Id. at 1565-67.
395. Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 25, at 214-16.
396. In Becker's words, "Economists are so conditioned to identifying rational choice with
separable preferences that we often call 'irrational' quite rational behavior that is the result
of past experience." BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES, supra note 40, at 128.
397. See id. at 128-29.
398. See id. at 5; see also BLAUG, supra note 15, at 240.
399. Prior to reading Becker and Stigler's article, I intuited a similar critique of the
concepts of use value adopted both by Posner and his arch-critic, Ronald Dworkin. In their
famous debate in the Journal of Legal Studies, they both assumed that non-remunerative
activity such as gardening constituted consumption of utility. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is
Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics,
and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). I suggested, in contrast, that it could be
better seen as an investment by an individual in her home calculated to increase her use
value of her home (and therefore, her wealth). Despite his claims to the contrary, Posner's
concept of wealth maximization is absolutely incapable of recognizing use value in excess of
exchange value. See Schroeder, The Midas Touch, supra note 117, at 722-23, 749-60.
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irrational to ask for more money to sell one's car than one would
pay for an "identical" car, because no other car is associated with
the owner's subjective memories and associations. The two cars,
therefore, are not identical.'
Becker admits that other examples of the endowment effect
seem more difficult than this one.' 1 Nevertheless, he contends that
economists are giving up, so to speak, if they either ignore this well-
known and predictable phenomenon or if they condemn such
behavior as "irrational" (as Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler arguably do)
because to do so is equivalent to abandoning the rationality
postulate. Rather, they should either try to formulate arguments as
to how such behavior might be explained within the rationality
postulate, or they should try to modify the rationality postulate to
account for this behavior.
402
As a knee-jerk liberal, I certainly do not rule out occasional
paternalistic rules. Having spent years as a securities lawyer
drafting mandatory disclosure documents, I am extremely skep-
tical of the usual economic presumption that the way to prevent
certain forms of harm is to make more information available."°3
Nevertheless, I surprise myself by finding that I agree with much
of Posner's critique of Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler. He is correct to
note that there is something fundamentally totalitarian about
their position.'0 ' I believe that they frequently cross the line
between understanding how people think so as to more effectively
400. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES, supra note 40, at 128-29.
401. Id. at 129.
402. See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 25.
403. My years drafting registration statements have left me very sympathetic to the core
problem ofcommunication that Jolla, Sunstein, and Thaler address. Drowning people with
information is all too prevalent. It is well known among securities lawyers that if one's client
has something really bad in its background, the least conspicuous way to disclose it is by
printing it in bold face and putting it in the front of the document with all the mandatory
warnings and disclosures required by various state's blue sky laws. It is assumed that no
investor ever reads this section of the prospectus, but that such formally prominent
disclosure will protect management from potential liability.
404. Although he oversimplifies, Posner is not totally unfair in accusing Jolla, Sunstein,
and Thaler as advocating that whenever the populace at large can be expected to act
irrationally, a "politically insulated corps of experts that [Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler] favor
would be charged with determining the populace's authentic preferences ... Posner,
Behavioral Economics, supra note 36, at 1575 (1998). This approach "sounds totalitarian" to
Posner. Id. Moreover, Posner wonders why the experts will not share the same sources of
irrationality as the populace. Id.
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communicate with them, and understanding people's vulnerabilities
so that one can exploit and manipulate them.
Even some of the more modest scholars who try to adapt
behavioral economics to law cannot resist the lure of the
university's discourse. For example, Russell Korobkin discusses
studies that indicate that the existence of norms affect contract
negotiations in a way that violates the standard interpretation of
the Coase Theorem.' 5 These data should hardly surprise the
average "deal" lawyer. In my experience, the vast majority of
arguments in complex contract negotiations (such as those
involved in my practice areas of mergers and acquisitions, public
offering underwritings, finance and technology licensing) consist of
discussions as to what the norms are, accompanied with assertions
either that one's client is only asking for the customary terms or
that the counterparty wishes illegitimately to stray too far from
industry norms.
Consequently, I would have expected Korobkin to offer some
insights as to effective negotiation strategies that contract
attorneys and their clients might follow. Instead, Korobkin suggests
that drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code be very careful when
drafting default provisions.'
In my experience, however, despite contract attorneys'
predilection for norms arguments, I have never heard an attorney
make an argument based on a statutory or other legal default rule.
Rather they always refer to business and legal customs and
practices. The very fact that the parties have decided to negotiate
a contract indicates that they have already rejected the idea of
being governed by default. Indeed, it is a common humorous boast
of contract lawyers that they know nothing about contract law
because contract law is purely a provenance of litigators who must
interpret the inadequate language drafted by bad contract lawyers.
405. As I have argued vociferously elsewhere, I believe that this standard interpretation
is incorrect. See Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra note 19. Nevertheless, my
disagreement with the standard view is irrelevant to the points raised in this Article.
406. Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 10, at 116, 147-42.
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c. The Bureaucracy Does Not Exist
I have made the university discourse seem sinister: a Kafkesque
nightmare. To some extent, from a Lacanian perspective, it is.
Indeed, Lacan goes so far as to suggest that the Soviet Union was
the apotheosis of the university discourse-the Stalinist govern-
ment by experts produced the oppression of totalitarianism. 7
Perhaps the best known critic of policy scholarship is Pierre
Schiag. Schlag maintains that policy-oriented scholarship (which he
refers to as "normativity") is at its heart bureaucratic."" Schlag is,
unfortunately, ultimately a romantic who does not fully understand
the implications of his intuition. He thereby unwittingly undercuts
the power of his critique. As Carlson has shown, Schlag's position
is "paranoid" in the technical Lacanian sense.' 9 A paranoid is one
who truly believes that the Big Other exists-that the social system
is as strong and monolithic as it claims to be, that there is someone
or something who really is in control. 10 The paranoid believes that
there is an other of the Other.411 Of course, no one is truly in control
of the symbolic order, as Schlag acknowledges at many points when
he chides legal academics for their self-importance despite their
irrelevance.412
407. LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 237-38.
408.
It now becomes evident that the value (if any) of normative legal thought
depends on a decentered economy of bureaucratic institutions and practices ...
that define and represent their own operations, their own character, their own
performances, in the normative currency.
PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
MIND 34 (1996). I set forth my critique of Schlag in Schroeder & Carlson, Law's Invisible
Empire, supra note 311.
409. See David Gray Carlson, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1908, 1946-48 (1999).
410. MI±EK, LOOKING AWRY, supra note 261, at 8.
411. The other of the Other is "a hidden subject who pulls the strings of the great Other
(the symbolic order) ...." Id.
412.
Yet despite [normative scholarship's) obvious desire to have worldly effects,
worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned
that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and
perhaps a few law students-persons who are virtually never in a position to
put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect. The possibility that a
significant number ofjudges might actually be reading significant quantities of
this academic literature is undemonstrated and unlikely. The further possibility
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Lacan's point, however, is that the Big Other (i.e., the symbolic)
can function even if there is no bureaucracy or anyone else in
control. Insofar as the law functions and the bureaucracy stays in
place is not because the law is some objective, external force, or
because the bureaucracy is truly in control. Indeed, it is this
nonexistence of the Big Other that makes it function and society
helps it do so. By continuing to live in society and acting as though
the law were the law, one is implicitly choosing to engage in the
intersubjective enterprise of creating and enforcing the law (even
though this force may be a forced one).
Nevertheless, if the the university's discourse is oppressive, it
is also probably necessary for any modern society. All societies need
to identify collective goals and enact, apply, and interpret coercive
laws in an attempt to achieve these goals. This action results in the
alienating and splitting of legal subjects, but all subjects are by
necessity split. One cannot have subjectivity without law, and law
splits the subject. Or, most forcefully, the subject is nothing but the
split of the law.
I chastise policy science on at least three grounds. First and
foremost, I reject its implicit claim that it should be the
predominant or only proper focus of legal academics. In the next
two sections, I argue that the hysteric's discourse (and to some
extent the analyst's discourse) is an equally appropriate form of
legal scholarship. Indeed, as these discourses approach the law not
from the position of the master who imposes the law, or the expert
who justifies it, but from the position of those who are subjected to
the law imposed by the master and the expert, it comes much closer
to law as it is practiced by attorneys who advise and act for clients.
Consequently, they can offer a better understanding of how law is
actually practiced and experienced by the individuals whom the law
affects.
Second, I believe that the two discourses of critique are ethically
essential to the two discourses of power. Both the master and the
expert intend that the law affect people. The values of liberty
demand that those who wish to use laws to affect the behavior and
that judges might actually be persuaded by this academic literature to adopt a
position not their own is even more undemonstrated and even more unlikely.
SCHLAG, supra note 408, at 28-29.
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desires of others should examine the law from the perspective of the
individual affected, in addition to that of society.
Finally, the critical discourses are needed to make the powerful
discourses more effective in their own goals.
C. The Critical Discourses
If one gives the university discourse a quarter turn counter-
clockwise, one arrives at the analyst's discourse. The hysteric's
discourse is achieved by yet another quarter turn. Consequently,
just as the master's discourse is logically prior to that of the
university, the analyst's discourse is logically prior to that of the
hysteric.
Despite this, Lacan, as a psychoanalyst, saves his discussion of
the analyst's discourse until after that of the hysteric. This is
because he thought that the former had a privileged position. In his
words, the analysts' discourse "halts the giddiness of the other
three."413 By this, Lacan means that the three other discourses are
locked in a vicious circle-the subject spun impotently from one to
the other. 14 The analyst's discourse holds up the hope of breaking
this circle, if only temporarily.
1. Law as the One Possible Profession
I break with Lacan and restore the logical order of the four
discourses, so that I discuss, and privilege, the hysteric's dis-
course last. I do this for a number of reasons. First, I believe that
speculative legal scholarship, like legal representation, is primarily
a hysteric discourse.
Modifying Freud slightly, Lacan posits that governing,
educating, and psychoanalyzing are the three impossible pro-
fessions, and that they correspond to the first three discourses of
the master, university, and the analyst." 5 The unarticulated
negative pregnant suggested in this statement is that there is a
fourth "possible" profession that corresponds to the last discourse
413. LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 61.
414. " W]e are going around in circles-the signifier, the Other, knowledge, the signifier,
the Other, knowledge, etc ..... Id. at 14.
415. Id. at 193-94.
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of the hysteric. I have posited that this "possible" profession is that
of the attorney."
l6
I believe that the first three professions are "impossible" in
precisely the way one encounters impossibility throughout
speculative thought. Following Kant, human actions and law are
judged by the perfect standard of the noumena. Man is radically
evil because, in order to act, he must insert phenomenal content
into the moral law, thereby corrupting it. The subject feels
castrated and is unsatisfied by the law because they are both
necessarily incomplete. For reasons that are beyond the scope of
this Article, from a Lacanian perspective, the first two discourses
of power are "masculine." 7
2. The Discourse of the Analyst
a --+ 8
S2  $,
As might be expected, Lacan, a psychoanalyst, concentrated on
the discourse of the analyst. It is, however, the discourse least
worked out in legal practice, and I shall only refer to it in passing.
The analyst as addresser takes the position of the little a, the
analysand's desire."' One can understand what this might mean
when one considers how the mode of address in this discourse
differs from that of the previous two. The master in the position of
power orders the other. The university in the position of expertise
instructs the other. The analyst addresses her other from the
416. Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 64.
417. It should be obvious from even this passing reference that to Lacan, sexuality is not
biological, but symbolic. Lacan should not be misinterpreted as advocating the silly positions
that anatomy is irrelevant. Sexuality, being symbolic, is artificial, but that does not make it
completely arbitrary or totally malleable. Once again, Lacan makes the traditional point
that, although the object world (anatomy) exists and affects every aspect of our lives, as
conscious, speaking, and imagining subjects we do not have direct access to the object world
but are always interpreting it in words and pictures. That is, our sense that we have a purely
biological sexuality beneath our social roles and fantasies is real.
I have written extensively about the Lacanian theory of sexuality. See SCHROEDER,
VESTAL, supra note 29; SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS, supra note 63.




position of the other's own desire. 1 9 She inquires from the position
of that which the analysand feels is missing and causes his pain.
Consequently, the analyst's discourse is an interrogation, an
attempt to extract information from the analysand. This is why in
psychoanalysis, the analyst rarely speaks, but listens while the
analysand talks. The other addressed by the object of desire is the
split subject himself.' 2
The truth lying beneath the analyst is S 2, the signifying chain
of knowledge. 421 Lacan famously said that the psychoanalyst is the
"subject supposed to know." The salient word here is "supposed."
Although the analysand comes to the analyst because the analyst
is supposed to know what is wrong with the analysand, the true
analyst does not take the position of the expert who thinks she can
tell the analysand what she wants and what she should do. The
knowledge which is the truth of the analyst, therefore, cannot be
the analyst's expertise, but the analysand's own unconscious
knowledge.' 23 The chain of signifiers (S 2) issue from the analysand's
mouth during analysis. Only the analysand "knows" what her
problem is. The purpose of psychanalysis is to help the analysand
discover this.
The result of the analyst's discourse is S,, the master signi-
fier.424 In this context the master signifier is called the analysand's
"symptom."25 Lacan's term of art is different from the colloquial
meaning of a symptom as the external sign of a patient's illness.
The symptom is the split subject's own personal and idio-
syncratic master signifier. The symptom is the key to the chain of
signification that is the analysand's unconscious knowledge.' 26 It is
the trauma in the client's life that she is unable to "symbolize."'27
419. FINK, supra note 251, at 135; LACAN, SEMIAR XVII, supra note 209, at 47, 122.
420. LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 123.
421. Bracher, supra note 289, at 125.
422. See FINK, supra note 251, at 87; 2i±K, ENJOYYOUR SYMPTOM!, supra note 288, at 39;
2I2EK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO, supra note 244, at 171. Lacan identified T, as
the matheme for the analyst as the 'subject supposed to know" in his earlier work, but only
related it to a system of discourses in Seminar XVII. See JACQUES LACAN, TELEVISION: A
CHALLENGE TO THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ESTABLISHMENT 89 (Denis Hollier et al., trans., 1990).
423. iek, Four Subjects, supra note 350, at 80.
424. Id. at 123-24.
425. Id. at 80.
426. 2 1±EK SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note 330, at 74.
427. Id. at 55-56.
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It is that which the analysand is unable to make conscious and
articulate. This is the unconscious memory about which the suf-
fering subject organizes her illness. Importantly, like all master
signifiers, the symptom is empty and meaningless in itself. Lacan
called it the betisse, a little stupidity.42
To assert that the symptom is idiotic should not be mis-
interpreted as a disparagement of the suffering analysand. The
symptom is empty and meaningless in a very specific sense.
Trauma is that which the client has been heretofore unable to make
sense out of by putting it into words (i.e., symbolize). Consequently,
until the symptom is articulated, it, by definition, has no sig-
nification in the symbolic and no meaning in the imaginary. The
master signifier is the signifier with no signifed. By helping the
analysand identify his symptom as master signifier, the analyst
helps the analysand symbolize, and thereby, dissolve her symptom
as a symptom. The analysand can then attempt to choose her own
new master signifier around which to organize her life.'
I suggest that the parallel to this discourse is counseling. A
client who perceives he has a problem comes to the attorney as the
subject who is supposed to know how to solve it. The nature of this
problem could be a perceived wrong, like a contract breach, tort, or
other violations of his rights. Or, the client could wish to accomplish
a specific goal such as buying a house, bequeathing his property,
entering into a contract, or publicly offering its securities. Like the
practicing analyst, the counseling attorney of course has, and uses,
her expertise (i.e., speaks in the university's discourse). The
attorney who truly counsels her client, however, primarily sits in
the position of her client's desire. She listens and helps the client
articulate what he wants. The knowledge that is the counselor's
truth is not her expertise, but the client's own self-knowledge. The
result of a successful counseling is the client's ability to identify,
articulate, and communicate his problem as a master signifier.
428. LACAN, SEMINAR XX, supra note 184, at 13.
429. iiek, Four Subjects, supra note 350, at 80. The very symbolization of the symptom
leads to its disintegration as a symptom. 212EK, SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note 330, at 73.
Lacan eventually discovered that not all symptoms dissolved through psychoanalysis. He
eventually developed the concept of a "synthome" to describe these beloved symptoms that
a subject is able to cling to even after symbolized. See generally JACQUES LACAN, SEMINAR




3. Law as the Feminine Profession
The two critical discourses of the analyst and the hysteric are
"feminine" and the two power discourses are "masculine." Lacan's
theory of sexuation is beyond the scope of this Article." ° Suffice it
to say that, to Lacan, the "feminine" is that aspect of subjectivity
that accepts the fact that castration (imperfection) is inevitable, and
that the Big Other does not exist. The masculine is the part of
subjectivity that claims to be bound to the moral law, and the
feminine is the part that understands that one always slips its
chains. In contrast, the "masculine" is the part of subjectivity that
can't face this awful truth and tries to deny castration through a
variety of coping mechanisms.'
Nevertheless, Lacan groups analysis, along with governing and
teaching, as the impossible professions. 32 These three discourses
trip over the stumbling block of imperfection. The governor and the
teacher, being masculine, trip over the stumbling block because
they refuse to acknowledge its existence. The feminine analyst, in
contrast, sees the block but cannot get over it.
This is because there are two possible reactions one can have to
the realization that castration (imperfection) is inevitable. The first
is passivity and depression'--negativity in the colloquial sense of
pessimism. Because the impossible goal of perfection cannot be met,
one can conclude that all one can do is try to cope and hold off
suicide. This is the psychoanalytic notion of cure. The analysand
finally gives up on her futile desire and becomes de-subjectified. 4 '
430. For my analysis of Lacan's sexual theory and how it relates to law and economics, see
generally SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS, supra note 63.
431. The masculine subject falsely claims to have the "phallus--a technical term for that
which is missing in castration. The discourses of the master and the university are
"masculine" in the sense that in the former the addressor claims to have authority based on
power (when his truth is that he is a split subject) and in the latter the addressor claims to
have authority based on knowledge (when his truth is that he maintains his position only
through raw power). See Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 77-82.
432. See supra note 415 and accompanying text.
433. The tendency of the feminine position towards depression is one of the subjects of
lifek's essay David Lynch, or, the Feminine Depression, in SLAVOJ IM THE METASTASES
OF ENJOYMENT: SIX ESSAYS ON WOMAN AND CAUSALITY 113, 119-21 (1994).
434. Lacan calls cure "subjective destitution." In titek's words:
"(Sjubjective destitution" changes the register from desire to drive. Desire is
historical and subjectivized, always and by definition unsatisfied, metonymical,
shifting from one object to another since I do not actually desire what I want.
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No wonder Lacan maintained that cure should not be thought of as
a goal of psychoanalysis, but merely as a side effect. 5 The true goal
of psychoanalysis is understanding.
The other reaction, however, is freedom.' 6 By confronting the
fact of castration directly, the feminine subject can free herself from
the paralyzing illusion of the goal of perfection in order to identify
realizable, if imperfect, goals. This reflects the well known concept
of mourning. The subject can never get over the pain of loss until
she confronts it. After a period of mourning, the grieving subject can
bury the dead, so to speak, and move on.437 The feminine is,
literally, the sadder but wiser sex.
Consequently, although the feminine subject engaging in the
analyst's discourse can perhaps accurately analyze the pain of the
split subject, she cannot take action that would change the system
that caused the split subject. She can only help the split subject
learn to cope with his pain by abandoning her dreams. Although, as
I discuss in detail elsewhere, the effective attorney necessarily
engages in the analyst's discourse when she counsels her client, she
usually does this merely as a prelude to her representation of the
client, at which point she shifts to the hysteric's discourse. '3 In
Lacan's terms, the result of the analyst's discourse can be precisely
to hystericize the subject. 43 9 The attorney speaking for the
counseled client, therefore, must speak the client's hysterical
discourse. In other words, partly because the goals of psycho-
analysis and legal representation are fundamentally different, the
attorney speaks the analyst's discourse only temporarily before
moving towards the hysteric's discourse. She, therefore, only learns
to speak a relatively crude and primitive version.440
What I actually desire is to sustain desire itself, to postpone the dreaded
moment of its satisfaction. Drive, on the other hand, involves a kind of inert
satisfaction that always finds its way; drive is nonsubjectivized ("acephalous").
2IdEK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 286, at 80.
435. SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 261, at 50.
436. Schroeder, The Eumenides, supra note 262.
437. SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 328.
438. Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 68-72.
439. Lacan states that the effect of analysis is the 'hystericization of discourse." LACAN,
SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 35.
440. See Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 73.
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It is only in the hysteric's discourse that the subject created and
split by the manipulations of the university's discourse finally
speaks."1 It allows one to understand how the policies of the
university are experienced by these subjects. Moreover, it is only
the hysteric's discourse that directly addresses the law itself
and, therefore, is the only one that can effectively critique, and if
need be, change the law. The master's discourse (positive law as
understood by H.L.A. Hart) excludes morality, justice, and
substance from the law and, therefore, inadvertently makes them
serve as the law's objets petit a-the object of the law's desire."2 In
contrast, the hysteric's discourse of legal advocacy seeks to bring
back substance to the law. It judges the law from the position of
morality.
4. The Discourse of the Hysteric
a S2
The split subject finally speaks in the hysteric's discourse. Up
until now, she has been ordered about by the master, instructed
and manipulated by the university expert, and interrogated by
the analyst."" The hysteric's discourse is that of critique and
accusation.'"
Once again, before proceedingit is necessary to examine Lacan's
unique terminology. Colloquially, hysteria connotes an inarticulate,
out of control individual. Traditionally, clinical hysteria is a form of
neuroses in which the patient's symptoms often take physical forms
(such as hysterical paralysis). In Lacan's reworking of Freud,
however, hysteria is not only the term for a clinical disease, it is the
characteristic neurosis of subjectivity.
441. See infra Part III.C.4.a. to Part III.C.4.b.
442. See supra text at notes 357-60.
443. See generally Bracher, supra note 289, at 109; Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra
note 245.
444. 'The hysterical subject is the subject whose very existence involves radical doubt and
questioning, his entire being is sustained by the uncertainty as to what he is for the Other."
.itek, Four Subjects, supra note 350, at 81.
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a. Hysteria
All "normal" subjects are split. They are neurotic in one way or
another. The characteristic neurosis of the masculine subject is
obsession. As I explain elsewhere, this is the neurosis of the
university's discourse. ' Obsession is the attempt of the masculine
subject to deny castration by frenetically trying to cover up and
repair the holes in the Big Other." 6 One sees this in legal scholar-
ship in the preoccupation with precedents and footnotes.
Hysteria is the characteristic feminine neurosis." ' Although it
is common to misinterpret Lacan's phallocentrism as a form of male
supremacy, he, in fact, radically breaks from traditional sexual
stereotypes. The true subject understands that she, like the Other,
does not exist (is negativity itself)."" Male subjectivity, is therefore,
a form of failed feminine subjectivity, rather than the other way
around.""9 In 2iiek's words, "a man is perhaps simply a woman who
thinks that she does exist"'6 (i.e., is not castrated).
Rather than being inarticulate (as the colloquial meaning of the
word assumes), the hysteric is consumed with language. The
hysteric is the subject who understands Hegel's lesson that her
subjectivity can only be created through recognition by the Big
Other in the symbolic order of intersubjective relationships (i.e.,
language, law, sexuality). This is why Lacan called Hegel the "most
sublime hysteric."" 1 Consequently, the hysteric desires to be
recognized by, and to fit into, the symbolic order." 2 This is one
meaning of Lacan's famous statement that "man's desire is the
desire of the Other." The hysteric desires the Big Other; she
445. Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 58-59.
446. Murray, supra note 347.
447. LACAN, SEMNAR XVII, supra note 209, at 36.
448. 2I2EK,ABYSSOFFREEDOM, supra note 286, at 8; 2ilek, Four Subjects, supra note 350,
at 81; see also SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 326-29.
449. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, The Sexual Masquerade: A Lacanian Theory of Sexual
Difference, in LACANAND THE SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE 49,62 (Ellie Ragland-Sullivan & Mark
Bracher eds., 1991).
450. 2dEK, SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note 330, at 75.
451. LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 38. I have argued extensively elsewhere
that if one reads Lacan with Hegel then one can see that private law is hysterically erotic.
Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra note 19, at 492-93; Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora,
supra note 29, at 823-24, 827-28, 864-65.
452. Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 245, at 75-76, 82-84.
453. In a nutshell, nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its
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desires to be desired by the Big Other; and her desire is imposed on
her from the outside by the Big Other.
The masculine is the part of subjectivity that claims to be
completely integrated into the Big Other (i.e., to not be castrated,
to have the phallus).45' He is the spectator who loudly praises the
emperor's nonexistent clothes and half convinces himself that he
sees them. He is the Kantian noumenal subject who seeks to
conform his maxims to the moral law. As a result, the masculine is
totally bound by law and language. Whenever he confronts a hole
in the incomplete and "nonexistent" Other, he obsessively tries to
cover over this hole.'
The feminine is the part of subjectivity who understands that
she does not completely fit within and is not totally constrained by
language, law and sexuality. 6 She is the Kantian phenomenal
subject who never achieves pure conformance with the moral law.
She is partially exiled from the social order dominated by men. She
desperately seeks to find a way to fit into the symbolic order, which
is why she is constantly expressing herself in language, engaging in
legal relationships, and looking for love.
b. What Do You Want?
In the hysteric's discourse, the addressor positions herself in the
position of the suffering split subject who has been subjugated by
the master, preached to by the university, and interrogated by the
analyst. As the matrix of the hysteric's discourse indicates, when
the hysteric speaks as an hysteric, it is in furtherance of the desire
meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the object
desired, as because the first object of desire is to be recognized by the other. Anthony Wilden,
Translator's Notes, in JACQUES LACAN, SPEECH AND LANGUAGE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 91, 114
(Anthony Wilden trans., 1981); see also 20YE, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 265, at
164.
454. SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 29, at 88-90; Schroeder, The Midas Touch, supra
note 117, at 740; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three's a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and
Melamed's One View of the Cathedral, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 401-04 (1999); see also
LACAN, FEMINNE SEXUALITY, supra note 258, at 99-111.
455. Murray, supra note 347, at 144-45.
456. Consequently, Lacan called the feminine pas-tout which can be translated both as
"not all" (as in, not all subjects are submitted to the symbolic order) and "not whole" (as in,
some subjects are not wholly submitted to the symbolic order. LACAN, SEMINAR XX, supra
note 184, at 72-73.
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of the Other. Consequently, everything she says can be read as the
inquiry of the Big Other, "What do you want (i.e., from me)?" 7
What must I do, what must I become, what must I say in order to
fit in? The hysteric's question, however, sometimes undergoes a
transformation.
By asking the Other what it wants, the hysteric comes to realize
that the Other could not want unless it was wanting. The Other is
not the closed, powerful system that it claims to be. The Other does
not exist. It is partial, shifting, and incomplete. It is as split and
castrated as she is. In this mode, the hysteric's question becomes
the accusation "You are wanting!"' The hysteric sees the truth of
the master's discourse. Beneath the show of mastery (Si) lies the
pathetic specter of castration (S). If law is artificial, intersubjective,
and open-ended, then the law can be changed. Hysteria is,
therefore, the position that permits radical critique. It is the
position of freedom as spontaneity.
c. Legal Discourse
In the hysteric discourse of law the feminine split subject, who
knows she is incomplete, is the addressor." 9 She addresses S,
itself-the master who claims to give meaning to the symbolic order
of society.' She addresses the Other as her symptom with the
hysteric question/accusation"What do you want?/You are wanting!"
Note that the Big Other in this discourse is designated this time
with the empty matheme of the S, (master signifier) rather than the
matheme of the S 2 as knowledge. This is because the hysteric
recognizes that the symbolic order is not complete and is wanting
457.
One should always bear in mind that the status of the subject as such is
hysterical: the subject "is" only through its confrontation with the enigma Che
vuoi? ("What do you want?*) insofar as the Other's desire remains impenetrable,
insofar as the subject doesn't know what object it is for the Other.
tI.EK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 286, at 79. Lacan posited that the subject addresses
the Big Other with the question "Che vuoi?" at least as early as his 1960 paper Subversion
of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious. See LACAN, ]kCRrrS,
supra note 272, at 312.
458. I make this argument in greater detail in Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note
245, at 82-84.
459. See tilek, Four Subjects, supra note 350, at 79.
460. Bracher, supra note 289, at 123.
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in some sense. The symbolic order fails in its goal of bringing the
entire world within its jurisdiction by completely symbolizing it.
Indeed, this is evident because the master signifier itself is a
signifier that lacks a signified.
The truth lying beneath the split subject is the "little a'"-her
own desire."1 It is out of desire that she confronts the Big Other.
This desire is, of course, the excluded little a, her feeling that she
is incomplete and that this has been caused by the Big Other. The
Big Other is barring her from the desire that is her truth.
The result produced by the discourse is S2 -knowledge. 6 2 This
is the point at which split subject finally gains control over her own
unconscious knowledge. By confronting the artificiality and im-
perfection of the Big Other, the hysteric finally learns that only she
herself can answer the question as to what she needs to do to
satisfy her own desire and how to make the Big Other better to
accomplish this. The knowledge obtained is precisely that the Big
Other cannot accommodate, and does not have the truth of the
subject's desire. It is the hysteric's discourse that allows this
indirect relationship to come about.
What happens next might initially seem surprising. Having
discovered her own unconscious knowledge, the hysteric needs to
give it meaning. She needs to find a new S1, master signifier, to
quilt signification together. Consequently, the hysteric's discourse
inevitably leads to a new master's discourse.
In legal practice and scholarship the addressor places herself in
the position of the subject subjected to law. In practice this subject
is the client. In scholarship, this subject can be the author herself,
identified individuals, a hypothetical client, or class of persons
affected by the law. This is the position of the doctrinalist, as well
as the speculative scholar. The subject is split, in the sense that she
feels lacking (or identifies with the client who is lacking) and feels
that the lack results somehow from the law. As a result she seeks
a response from the law. She therefore addresses the law by either
asking what it wants from her or accuses it of its failure to live up
to its own ideals. Underlying the split subject as her truth is her
desire. The reason she confronts the law is that she feels that she
461. FINK, supra note 251, at 134.
462. "What leads to knowledge is-I will be allowed to justify this in the more or less long
term-the hysteric's discourse." LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 209, at 23.
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wants something that the law can provide. She is in this position
because she has been hystericized through the analyst's discourse
of legal counseling.
This dynamic is, perhaps, most easily seen in litigation. The
plaintiff believes that she has been wronged. In a tort or contract
breach lawsuit, she asks the hysteric's question of how the law can
make her whole. If she is challenging the validity of the law itself
she makes the hysteric's accusation. Similarly, the defendant in
these cases feels wronged by the fact that she/it has been sued and
questions or challenges the law to set things right.
This discourse, however, is equally the discourse of negotiation,
doctrinal research, and speculative scholarship. In each case, the
speaker is in the position (either in her own right or vicariously) of
the desiring subject who questions or challenges the law. For
example, in negotiation, the client wishes to accomplish some
goal-to purchase a house, to enter into a joint venture with
another party, to raise money in a public offering, whatever. Her
truth is this personal goal. Having been hystericized by legal
counseling, she has concluded that she needs to address the law to
accomplish this goal. She asks of the law, in effect, what do you
want from me so that I can achieve my desire? What are my rights
and what would be my potential liabilities if I proceed? How must
I structure my transaction? Do I need to acquire any licenses or file
with any agency or take any other actions in order to proceed?
The doctrinal scholar similarly addresses the law from the
position of a hypothetical legal subject with a desire-a potential
problem that she thinks either might be solved or caused by the
law. In the former she addresses the law with the hysteric's
question and seeks a way to fit her problem into the law by
discovering the law's internal logic. In the latter, she addresses the
law with the hysteric's accusation and explores how the law thwarts
the subject's desire.
Similarly, speculative scholarship seeks to address the internal
logic of the law to see how either real or hypothetical subject fits
into the law. Do these subjects have desires that the law could
fulfill if we better understood the law? Or does the law, instead,
thwart the subject's desire?
In all three examples-legal representation, doctrinal scholar-
ship, and speculative scholarship-the result that is produced
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is knowledge in the sense of a greater understanding of the
relationship between the law and the subject. This knowledge
will frequently be subjective and personal. The subject, by winning
or losing her case, by successfully or unsuccessfully engaging in
a transaction, knows or changes his relationship to the law.
Sometimes the understanding is intersubjective in that the
doctrinal or speculative scholar might throw new light on a legal
problem that enlightens not only the scholar herself but other
practitioners or scholars. Sometimes this new understanding will
result in an actual change in the law-as when litigation
invalidates a law or leads to a new interpretation of the law.
Sometimes, this understanding results in a call to change the law.
If the doctrinal or speculative scholarship leads to a conclusion that
the law's effect on the subjects subjected to the law is unjust or even
unintended, this suggests the law should be changed. Knowledge,
however, can be a dangerous thing. Sometimes one learns painful
truths that one does not want to face. The client can lose the case,
and sometimes this is the "right" result from a legal perspective.
5. Policy
Like the hero in a corny melodrama, I untie normativity from
the railway tracks in the very last reel. After all my ranting against
policy chit-chat, I come to the conclusion that the hysterical
discourse of the doctrinal and speculative scholar will often result
in policy recommendations. The legal scholar can never abandon
normative considerations of the law.
Nevertheless, I support the romantic intuition that there is
something fundamentally flawed with the unreflexive form of
normative discussion in legal scholarship in that it assumes (as
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler expressly state) that the university
discourse is the only, or the most appropriate, type of scholarship.
The hysteric's discourse is another mode of normative discourse. It
is the other side of the university's discourse, its reverse or inverted
form. This is why they have so much trouble communicating.
The hysteric's discourse is only indirectly addressed to the
speaker of the university's discourse. It is not addressed to S 2, the
expert himself, but to S1, the grounds on which the expert relies.
The expert cannot accept this criticism and continue doing what he
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is doing because his expertise is undermined. Ideally the expert
would listen to the criticism and respond one way or another. But
to do so would require that he temporarily abandon the university's
discourse and speak the analyst's discourse, which addresses and
responds to the subject speaking in the hysteric's discourse. Not all
criticism is correct. If the expert is successful in responding to the
criticism, then he is arguably justified in resuming his university
discourse. If he is unable to respond to the criticism of the grounds
of his discourse, then it is intellectually dishonest to continue
to make his claims to expertise. Unfortunately, too often policy
scholars simply close their ears to the speculative discourse
indirectly addressed to them and continue business as usual in the
university discourse.
To resort to argument by anecdote, I have personally en-
countered this willful refusal to consider critiques of economic
policymaking expressly on the grounds that it would interfere with
business as usual. For example, I have on at least two occasions,
including at the Oregon Law School symposium that I referred to
earlier,"" asked a self-styled practitioner of law and economics how
he answered the classic criticism of policymaking based on classical
price theory known as the "second best" problem. This is the
proposition that there is no logical reason to believe that one can
use idealized models as a basis for making policy predictions for
real world problems that do not fit the models (i.e., one can not
derive what the second best solution would be from a model of the
first best solution). This terminology was coined in the seminal
essay The General Theory of The Second Best, '64 but this general
idea underlies such diverse work as the Coase Theorem and
Simon's studies of bounded rationality. I had been troubled by this
problem since I was an economics major in college. No doubt, there
are attempts to answer this critique in the economic literature and
I was curious to know what they might be. In both cases, however,
I was met with a response to the effect that the expert had to ignore
the theory of second best or he wouldn't be able to make policy
recommendations. I do not understand why anyone could think that
463. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.




this was a defense, rather than a condemnation, of their scholar-
ship. In other words, the theory of the second best was a direct
attack on the hidden master signifier underlying the expert's
pretense of superior knowledge. The criticism threatens to blow the
expert's cover because it shows how the expert maintains his
position not despite, but just because of, its vacuousness.
Not only does the university discourse typically refuse to hear
the address of the hysteric discourse, it also does not reply. The
expert does not address the split subject herself. That is, the nature
of policy talk is to identify a general societal goal, such as efficiency.
This address is indirectly aimed at the split subject, just as the
hysteric's address could be seen as being indirectly aimed at the
expert, but in a different way. When the hysteric questions the
grounds of the expert's expertise it can have one of several results:
it can end up reinforcing the expert's claim to expertise; it can
undermine the expert's claim to expertise; or it can lead to a new
understanding of the law which will result in a new expertise. In
contrast, the expert identifies the goals of law and then, by
changing the law, seeks to change or manipulate the behavior of the
split subjects so as to better achieve the goals.
In other words, when the hysteric speaks, she says "I (or the
client) want something. I come to you because I think you are either
the solution to, or the cause of, my problem." When the expert
speaks, he says "I identify this as the goal of the law. You should
change your behavior and desires in conformity to this goal." This
is just not an answer to the hysteric's question.
Policy science engages in the discourse of the university. Its
truth, however, is power. Schlag see this, but draws the lesson that
policy should be abolished. A middle ground is needed. A hysterical
analysis suggests that the oppressive power that results from policy
grounded in the so-called expertise of the governor and its academic
courtiers must be criticized and mitigated by policy grounded in the
understanding of the governed.
In other words, the policy scholar speaking in the university's
discourse wants to use law to manipulate other subjects to achieve
society's objective goals. The attorney, the doctrinalist, and the
speculative theorist seek to help the subject learn how to change or
use the law to achieve her own subjective goals.
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The former subjects the individual to the law, thereby making
her the law's object. The latter objects to the individual's objectifi-
cation thereby, freeing the subject from the law, and making the
law the subject's object.
